Is There a Seat for Miranda at Terry\u27s Table?: an Analysis of the Federal Circuit Court Split over the Need for Miranda Warnings during Coercive Terry Detentions by Dinger, Daniel R.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 36 | Issue 4 Article 10
2010
Is There a Seat for Miranda at Terry's Table?: an
Analysis of the Federal Circuit Court Split over the
Need for Miranda Warnings during Coercive Terry
Detentions
Daniel R. Dinger
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Dinger, Daniel R. (2010) "Is There a Seat for Miranda at Terry's Table?: an Analysis of the Federal Circuit Court Split over the Need
for Miranda Warnings during Coercive Terry Detentions," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 36: Iss. 4, Article 10.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
IS THERE A SEAT FOR MIRANDA AT TERRY'S TABLE?: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
OVER THE NEED FOR MIRANDA WARNINGS DURING
COERCIVE TERRYDETENTIONS
Daniel R. Dingert
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1469
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
THE NEED FOR MRANDA WARNINGS IN COERCIVE TERRY
D ETENTIO NS ........................................................................ 1471
A. The Fourth Amendment, Terry v. Ohio, and the
Investigative Detention .................................................... 1472
1. The Fourth Amendment and Terry v. Ohio ............... 1473
2. General Principles of Terry and its Progeny ................ 1479
a. Questioning During Terry Detentions .................. 1482
b. Time Limits for Terry Detentions ......................... 1483
c. The Use of Force and Coercion During
Investigative Detentions and the Concept of a De
Facto A rrest ......................................................... 1485
B. The Fifth Amendment, Miranda v. Arizona, and the
Concept of Miranda Warnings ........................................ 1490
1. The Fifth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona ......... 1490
2. General Principles of Miranda and its Progeny ........... 1493
a. Defining "Custodial Interrogation". .................... 1496
b. Exceptions to the Miranda Rule ........................... 1508
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT AND THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT'S POSITION ............................................................ 1510
A. The Eighth Circuit's Position in the Split over Miranda
Warnings During Terry Stops ......................................... 1510
1. United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas ............................... 1511
2. United States v. M artinez ....................................... 1513
a. Martinez: The Majority Opinion ......................... 1514
b. Martinez: The Dissenting Opinion ...................... 1516
t Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office,
Boise, Idaho;J.D., 2001,J. Reuben Clark Law School, BrighamYoung University; B.A.,
1998, Brigham Young University.
1
Dinger: Is There a Seat for Miranda at Terry's Table?: an Analysis of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
3. Making Sense of the Eighth Circuit's Position .............. 1518
B. The First and Fourth Circuits: No Warnings Required
During Coercive Terry Stops ........................................... 1521
1. The First Circuit ........................................................ 1522
2. The Fourth Circuit ..................................................... 1527
C. The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits:
Warnings are Required During Coercive Investigative
D etentions ....................................................................... 1531
1. The Second Circuit .................................................... 1532
2. The Seventh Circuit ................................................... 1540
3. The N inth Circuit ...................................................... 1543
4. The Tenth Circuit ...................................................... 1549
D. The Eleventh Circuit's Purported Abstention ..................... 1552
E. The Remaining Federal Circuits: The Third, Fifth, Sixth,
and D .C. Circuits ........................................................... 1557
1. The Third Circuit ...................................................... 1557
2. The Fifth Circuit ........................................................ 1559
3. The Sixth Circuit ....................................................... 1562
4. The D .C. Circuit ........................................................ 1567
IV. A SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED TESTS FOR DETERMINING
WHEN A TERRYDETENTION BECOMES MIRANDA CUSTODY.. 1570
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................... 1579
A. Analysis: Issues to Consider when Addressing the Circuit
Sp lit ............................................................................... 1580
1. The Mere Fact That an Investigative Detention
Involves Force or Coercion Should not Per Se
Transform That Detention into One in Which
Miranda Warnings Are Required ............................... 1581
a. The Original Terry Decision Contemplates That
Some Questions Will Be Asked During Terry
Detentions-Including Coercive Terry
Detentions-Without Implicating Miranda .......... 1581
b. Later Supreme Court Precedent Supports the View
that Some Coercion is Permissible in Terry
Detentions Without Implicating Miranda ............ 1586
c. The Original Miranda Decision Does Not Require
Warnings in All Coercive Interrogations ............... 1592
d. The Concept and Definition of "Arrest" Supports
the Argument That Miranda Warnings Have no
Place in Terry Detentions .................................... 1606
e. Questioning During Custodial Interrogation Has
[Vol. 36:41468
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
MIRANDA & TERRY
a Different Purpose From That Done During a
Terry D etention .................................................. 1609
f The Supreme Court's Narrowing of the Definition
of "Custody" Supports the View that Miranda Has
Little to No Place in Terry Investigative
D etentions ........................................................... 1609
g. Practical Considerations ...................................... 1610
2. Many of the Proposed Tests for Determining Miranda
Custody are Flawed .................................................... 1613
a. The "Reasonable Person Would Not Feel Free to
Leave" Test from the Supreme Court's Decision in
Thompson and the Eighth Circuit's Decision in
Martinez is Not Workable ................................... 1613
b. The Lack of Specificity in the Berkemer Test Has
Led to Some Confusion Among Lower Courts that
Limits its Effectiveness as a Possible Test for
Determining Miranda Custody ............................ 1616
B. Recommendations: The Best Method for Determining When
a Terry Detention Becomes Miranda Custody is one that
Recognizes that Some Limited Use of Force or Coercion that
is Necessary because of the Circumstances of a Stop is
Permissible without Implicating Miranda ........................ 1617
V I. C O NCLUSIO N ....................................................................... 1623
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Artiles-Martin,' decided June 30, 2008, the fed-
eral district court for the Middle District of Florida identified the
existence of a federal circuit court split "over whether coercive Terry
stops constitute Miranda custody. Put another way, the court noted
a disagreement among the circuits over the need for Miranda
warnings in coercive Terry detentions that involve questioning about
the reasons for the stop. In detailing the nature of the circuit split,
the court noted that the Eighth Circuit, as well as the First and Fourth
circuits, "hold that so-called Terry reasonableness means Miranda
warnings are not required, even if the stop was coercive. In other
words, Miranda warnings are not necessary when a person is detained
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and questioned pursuant to the authority granted to law enforcement
in Terry v. Ohio4 to conduct investigative detentions without violating
the Fourth Amendment, even if the detention is coercive in nature.
On the other side of the circuit split are the Second, Seventh, Ninth,
and Tenth circuits, which "hold that a coercive Terry stop requires
warnings but still is deemed a valid Terry stop."5 Put differently, these
four circuits have held that Miranda warnings, though not necessary in
all Terry stops, are required when a stop involves a certain level of
force or coercion. And finally, the Artiles-Martin court observed that
the Eleventh Circuit, to which it belongs, "has not expressly adopted
either view."6
This article will explore the aforementioned circuit split and the
legal principles and issues at the heart of the controversy. Specifically,
it will address the positions of the various circuits on the subject of
whether a person detained in an obviously coercive but non-arrest
Terry situation should be provided with Miranda warnings prior to
being asked any questions about the circumstances leading to the
detention. Further, an integral part of the discussion will be whether
the fact that a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate a
particular detention and leave is, as some courts have held, enough to
necessitate Miranda warnings. Part II of the article will provide a brief
but detailed overview of the basic legal principles involved in the issue
that have led to the circuit split noted above. This will necessarily
include a discussion of Terry, the concept of the investigative deten-
tion, and what law enforcement officers are permitted to do (and
prohibited from doing) during such a stop, including those things
that may make the stop coercive. There will also be discussion of
Miranda v. Arizona' and its requirement that certain warnings be given
prior to custodial interrogation if any statements by a criminal
defendant are to be admissible at trial. Part II will also include
4. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. Artiles-Martin, 2008 WL 2600787, at *11 n.38.
6. Id. at *11. Artiles-Martin is not the first court to recognize the existence of
this circuit split. The split was noted earlier by the Second Circuit in United States v.
Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2004). See also Griffin v. United States, 878 A.2d
1195, 1199 (D.C. 2005) ("Recently, however, courts in variousjurisdictions, including
the 3rd, 7th[,] and 10th Circuits and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, have examined the interplay between Teny and Miranda and have held
that indeed, in some cases, where there is a valid Terry stop, 'the use of handcuffs, the
placing of suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons and other measures of
force more traditionally associated with the concept of "custody" [Miranda] than with
"brief investigatory detention" [Teny], may also create a custodial situation under
Miranda.'") (citations omitted).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[Vol. 36:41470
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
MIRANDA & TERRY
discussion of what constitutes "custody" and "custodial interrogation"
in the context of the Miranda decision. Part III will address the circuit
split itself, including the different views and standards that the circuit
courts of appeals have taken in the context of the fact scenarios
presented in the cases before them. Part IV will present a summary of
the many different tests that are currently used by various courts
throughout the United States to determine when a Teny detention
becomes Miranda custody, either intentionally or unintentionally.
Part V will then provide legal support and justification for the position
that most coercive Terry investigative detentions do not and should
not be found to require Miranda warnings, and will further present a
proposed test for determining when a Terry stop becomes Miranda
custody that is consistent with that position. And finally, Part VI will
conclude the article with a brief summary of the legal justifications
and arguments presented herein.
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES INVOLVED IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE
NEED FOR MIRANDA WARNINGS IN COERCIVE TERRYDETENTIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated., 8 It further guarantees that "no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describinf the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized." The Fifth Amendment provides additional
protections, stating that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself."' The circuit split
identified in the Artiles-Martin decision directly implicates these two
important constitutional amendments and raises issues regarding the
interplay between the two. To understand the nature of the circuit
split and the questions that it presents, it is important to first have a
general understanding of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and
their guaranteed protections, as well as two lines of important
Supreme Court cases that center around the protections that they
provide.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20101 1471
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A. The Fourth Amendment, Terry v. Ohio, and the Investigative
Detention
As noted above, the Fourth Amendment protects "[t] he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures" and requires that all
warrants be supported by probable cause." This right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures-once described as an "inestima-
ble right of personal security" -is one that has long been held
sacred. As the Supreme Court recognized over a century ago in Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Botsford,13 "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestion-
able authority of law."' 4 But the Supreme Court has also recognized
that the the Fourth Amendment protections are "not, of course, a
guarantee against all searches and seizures, but only against unreason-
able searches and seizures., 15 In other words, there is no absolute
immunity from governmental searches and seizures.
One situation in which a search and seizure based on less than
probable cause is deemed to be reasonable-and therefore not a
violation of the Fourth Amendment-is the investigative detention
first recognized as constitutional in the Supreme Court's Terry
decision. Prior to Terry, "the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against
unreasonable seizures of persons was analyzed [solely] in terms of
arrest, probable cause for arrest, and warrants based on such probable
cause." After Terry, however, the Fourth Amendment landscape
changed. In Terry the Supreme Court "for the first time recognized
an exception to the requirement that Fourth Amendment seizures of
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968).
13. 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
14. Id. at 251.
15. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); see also Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989) ("For the Fourth Amendment does
not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable.");
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) ("We begin with the assumption
that... the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all
intrusions... but against intrusions which are notjustified in the circumstances, or
which are made in an improper manner."); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222
(1960) ("[W]hat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but
unreasonable searches and seizures.").
16. Dunawayv. NewYork, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979).
1472 [Vol. 36:4
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persons must be based on probable cause."1 7 In so doing, "Terry
departed from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis in two
respects. First, it defined a special category of Fourth Amendment
'seizures' so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general
rule requiring probable cause to make Fourth Amendment 'seizures'
reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test. ' ' 8 This balancing
test weighs the "limited violation of individual privacy" that results
from an investigative detention against the opposing interests of
"crime prevention and detection" and law enforcement safety.' 9
"Second, the application of this balancing test led the Court to
approve this narrowly defined less intrusive seizure on grounds less
rigorous than probable cause ....,,20
Much has changed in the more than forty years since Terry was
decided, as the general principles of Terry and investigative detentions
have been further refined and defined by the Supreme Court and
lower courts. Yet, as the existence and nature of the circuit split at
issue demonstrates, there is still much to be resolved about what
constitutes a lawful investigative detention under Terry and whether
and how the basic principles of that landmark decision interact with
another of the Supreme Court's most important and game-changing
decisions of the modern era-Miranda.
1. The Fourth Amendment and Terry v. Ohio
The Fourth Amendment protects "the people" against govern-
mental intrusion into their private lives in the form of unreasonable
searches and seizures.2 As noted by the Supreme Court in Chimel v.
California," the Fourth Amendment "was in large part a reaction to
the general warrants and warrantless searches that had so alienated
the colonists and had helped speed the movement for indepen-
17. Id. at 208-09.
18. Id. at 209.
19. Id. at 209.
20. Id. at 209-10.
21. In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990), the Supreme
Court defined "the people" to include "a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with [the United
States] to be considered part of that community." Accordingly, "[t] he community of
protected people includes U.S. citizens who go abroad, and aliens who have
voluntarily entered U.S. territory and developed substantial connections with this
country." CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1287 (Johnny H. Killian et
al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION].
22. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
2010] 1473
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d ,,23
dence. In defining the application and scope of the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,"2 4 and therefore "wherever
an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.
2 5
23. Id. at 761.
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In holding that the Fourth
Amendment protects people rather than places, the Supreme Court moved away
from the notion that the Fourth Amendment is grounded in the protection of
property and property interests. The Court addressed this concept directly in Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), when it wrote:
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to
search and seize has been discredited .... We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy
rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and proce-
dural barriers rested on property concepts.
Id. at 304.
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citation omitted). This concept was
addressed in some detail in Katz, decided one year before Tery, which held that for
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the inquiry to be made is whether the place
searched is one in which the involved party had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
In this regard, the Court wrote that the capacity to claim the protection of the
Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place, but upon
whether the area was one in which there was reasonable expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51. As such, "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, maybe constitutionally protected." Id. at 351 (citations
omitted).
To determine whether an expectation of privacy is "reasonable" for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a court must look to whether "society" would
find the expectation to be reasonable. In this regard the Supreme Court has found
that there are some expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to accept and
therefore are not reasonable. See CONSTrUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, supra
note 21, at 1290. For example, "protection of the home is at the apex of Fourth
Amendment coverage because of the right associated with ownership to exclude
others." Id. (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Payton v. NewYork, 445
U.S. 573 (1980); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); and Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)); see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed."); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion.").
There is a lesser though still existing degree of protection for automobiles.
See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) ("[Less rigorous warrant
requirements govern [the search of automobiles] because the expectation of privacy
with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home
or office."); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) ("One has a lesser
expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects.").
1474 [Vol. 36:4
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Furthermore, in addition to governing the search of a place in which
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, "[i] t is quite plain, ., -- ,,26
that the Fourth Amendment governs 'seizures' of the person as
well. Although this obviously includes formal arrests, the Fourth
Amendment also governs those detentions or seizures of persons that
"do not eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for
crime-'arrests' in traditional terminology."27 As such, "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has 'seized' that person. ,28
As a general rule, law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to
conducting a search or seizure.29 There are, however, "a few specially
established and well-delineated exceptions" to this rule that allow for
30warrantless searches and seizures. In the criminal law arena these
exceptions to the warrant requirement, though 'jealously and
carefully drawn, are of extraordinary importance because "the
greater number of searches, as well as the vast number of arrests, take
place without warrants. '3 2 These exceptions to the warrant require-
And as noted above, there are some expectations of privacy that the Supreme
Court has deemed to be unreasonable, including the alleged expectations of privacy
in bank records, phone numbers dialed from a telephone, prison, or jail cells, and
garbage placed outside for collection. See CONsTrruTION: ANALYSIS AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 1290 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988) (trash left for collection); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prison
cells); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (phone numbers dialed); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records)).
26. Teny, 392 U.S. at 16.
27. Id.; see also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,878 (1975) ("The
Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that
involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. ") (citing Davis v. Mississippi,
394 U. S. 721 (1969)).
28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.
29. See id. at 20 ("[Tihe police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure . . .")
(citing Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961)); see also Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1716 (2009) ("Consistent
with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it should in every case addressing the
reasonableness of a warrantless search, with the basic rule that 'searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval byjudge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.'") (quoting Katz, 389 U. S. at 357);
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) ("When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by ajudicial officer,
not by a policeman or Government enforcement agent.").
30. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,454-
55 (1971) (quoting this identical language from Katz).
31. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
32. CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 1313.
2010] 1475
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ment include searches incident to arrest, searches of a vehicle
pursuant to the automobile exception, vessel searches, consent
searches, border searches, searches of open fields, the seizure of items
found in plain view, school searches, prison and probation searches,
inventory searches, protective sweeps, and arrests for all felony
offenses and for those misdemeanor offenses committed in the
presence of law enforcement, as well as a handful of other excep-
tions. Also included in the list of recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement is the investigative detention-the exception
that is at the heart of the circuit split referenced above.
The first case to recognize the investigative detention as an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement was Terry v. Ohio, which made its
way to the U.S. Supreme Court by way of Ohio's state courts.34 Terry
involved a review of a police procedure known as the "stop and frisk"
during which law enforcement briefly stops a person on less than
probable cause and conducts a quick pat-down search of that person's
5outer clothing for weapons. The Court began its analysis in Terry by
noting that to determine whether the conduct at issue was reasonable,
and therefore constitutional, it had to be "tested by the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches
and seizures. 36 The test for reasonableness employed by the Court
involved first a "focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly
justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests
of the private citizen," followed by a "balancing [of] the need to
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure)
entails. ,31 In focusing on the "governmental intrusion" at issue, the
33. For additional information on the nature and scope of these exceptions to
the warrant requirement, see generally CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
supra note 21, at 1313-36.
34. In framing the issue as one of first impression, the Court wrote:
The question is whether in all the circumstances of this on-the-street en-
counter, his right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable
search and seizure. We would be less than candid if we did not acknowl-
edge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues
regarding a sensitive area of police activity-issues which have never before
been squarely presented to this Court.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9-10.
35. Specifically, in Terny, a police detective had stopped three men who, based on
his training and experience as a law enforcement officer, appeared to be "casing" a
store in preparation for a robbery. Id. at 5-6. The stop was followed by a pat-down
search of their outer clothing during which the detective found Terry and one of his
companions to be in possession of two handguns. See id. at 7.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,534-35 (1967)).
1476 [Vol. 36:4
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Terry Court required that "in justifying the particular intrusion the
police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.""' The specific facts were then to
be "subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of ajudge who
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in
light of the particular circumstances. 39 This evaluation was to be
made by employing an objective standard that took into account
whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search [would] 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the• ,,40
belief' that the action taken was appropriate.
After setting forth these general principles, the Court applied
those same principles to the facts of Terry to determine the constitu-
41
tionality of the "stop and frisk" at issue in that case. In addressing
the "governmental interest" put forth asjustification for the "intrusion
upon [Terry's] constitutionally protected interests," the Court noted:
One general interest is... that of effective crime prevention
and detection; it is this interest which underlies the recogni-
tion that a police officer may in appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner approach a person for pur-
poses of investigating possibly criminal behavior even
38. Id. at 21. In a footnote, the Terry Court noted that this requirement of
specificity was nothing new in terms of Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence. The Court
stated, "[t] his demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence."
Id. at 21 n. 18 (referencing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 34-37 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,479-84 (1963);
Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98,100-02 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1959); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-78 (1949);Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
15-17 (1948); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-95 (1948); Husty v. United
States, 282 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1931); Dunbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441
(1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,159-62 (1925); Staceyv. Emery, 97 U.S.
642, 645 (1878)).
39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
40. Id. at 21-22. In stressing the importance of employing an objective rather
than a subjective standard in determining reasonableness, the Terry Court wrote:
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result
this Court has consistently refused to sanction. And simple "good faith on
the part of the arresting officer is not enough. Ifsubjective good faith alone
were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate,
and the people would be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
only in the discretion of the police."
Id. at 22 (quoting Beck, 379 U.S. at 97).
41. Id. at 22-23.
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though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.42
The Court further recognized that in situations such as that pre-
sented in Terry, "there is the more immediate interest of the police
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against him."" Referencing the fact that "American
criminals have a long tradition of armed violence,"44 the. Court thus
recognized "the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations
where they may lack probable cause for an arrest."45 Given these
circumstances, the Court concluded:
When an officer isjustified in believing that the individual
whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range
is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others,
it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the offic-
er the power to take necessary measures to determine
whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neu-• • 46
tralize the threat of physical harm.
Having recognized that the government has a legitimate interest
in crime prevention and in the safety of law enforcement officers, the
Court next considered "the nature and quality of the intrusion on
individual rights which must be accepted if police officers are to be
conceded the right to search for weapons in situations where
probable cause to arrest for crime is lacking."47 Noting that a "stop
and frisk" is undoubtedly both a seizure and a search within the
context of the Fourth Amendment, the Court nevertheless held that
in certain situations a "stop and frisk" is reasonable and therefore not
a violation of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 4 In this regard, the Court concluded:
Our evaluation of the proper balance that has to be struck
in this type of case leads us to conclude that there must be a
narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and
dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. at 23.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 24.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 27.
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cause to arrest the individual for a crime.49
The Court outlined the proper standard for determining whether
an officer has sufficient information or knowledge to make a lawful
stop when it added:
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individu-
al is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man
in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that
his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determin-
ing whether the officer acted reasonably in such circums-
tances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to the specific
reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the
50facts in light of his experience.
The Court next applied the newly-announced rule of law to the
facts of Terry, and in the end upheld the limited seizure and search
that had taken place. In so doing, the Court held that "where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, '' the officer is entitled to detain the person,
and "for the protection of himself and others in the area [is further
permitted] to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him., 5' And perhaps most important, the Court
concluded that "[s]uch a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment."
53
2. General Principles of Terry and its Progeny
The basic holding of Terry, which is based on the premise that
"police officers must often act before probable cause can be deter-
mined,"54 is that "[a] n investigatory stop is permissible under the, .,55
Fourth Amendment if supported by reasonable suspicion. An
investigatory stop has been defined as a "brief stop of a suspicious
individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status
49. Id.
50. Id. (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 30.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 31.
54. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1993).
55. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 693 (1996).
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quo momentarily while obtaining more information, 6 about the facts
and circumstances that created the reasonable suspicion and led to
the stop. Reasonable suspicion has been defined as "specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant [a Fourth Amendment] intrusion.
57
In other words, if a law enforcement officer has specific and articula-
ble facts, which combined with rational inferences reasonably
produce a belief that criminal activity is afoot and a particular
individual is involved in that activity, the officer is permitted to briefly
stop and question the person about the person's identity and the
56. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
57. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The Supreme Court addressed the concept of
reasonable suspicion in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). Quoting its own
decision in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-44 n.13 (1983), in which it addressed
the concept of probable cause, the Sokolow Court held that "[i] n making a determina-
tion of probable cause, the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is
'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of
noncriminal acts. That principle applies equally well to the reasonable suspicion
inquiry." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10. The Court further noted that "there could, of
course, be circumstances in which wholly lawful conduct might justify the suspicion
that criminal activity [is] afoot." Id. at 9 (quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441
(1980)). And that "innocent behavior will frequently provide the basis for a showing
of [reasonable suspicion]." Id. at 10 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 243-44 n.13).
In its discussion of reasonable suspicion, the Court also noted that the
concept is not one that lends itself to an easy definition. To this end the Sokolow
Court noted that "[t] he concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not
'readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.'" Id. at 7 (quoting Gates,
462 U.S. at 232). That said, the Court did provide some guidance on what level of
proof is needed to meet the standard or burden of reasonable suspicion. It wrote:
In Teny v. Ohio, we held that the police can stop and briefly detain a person
for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported
by articulable facts that criminal activity "may be afoot," even if the officer
lacks probable cause. The officer, of course, must be able to articulate
something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or
hunch." The Fourth Amendment requires "some minimal level of objective
justification" for making the stop. That level of suspicion is considerably
less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence. We
have held that probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found," and the level of suspicion required for a
Terry stop is obviously less demanding than that for probable cause.... In
evaluating the validity of a stop such as this, we must consider "the totality of
the circumstances-the whole picture." As we said in Cortev "The process
does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities. Long before the
law of probabilities was articulated as such, practical people formulated
certain common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors as fact-
finders are permitted to do the same-and so are law enforcement offic-
ers."
Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted) (referencing and quoting United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
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activities that have caused the officer concern.5 8 Additionally, if the
officer has reason to believe that the detainee is armed and danger-
ous, a brief pat-down search of the person for weapons is permitted.
However, both the stop and the search must be limited in scopej5 and
any frisk or search for weapons must be such that the "intrusion [is]
reasonably designed to discover [weapons] for the assault of the
police officer"" and not evidence of a crime."'
Following an arrest and the charging of a person detained during
a Terry stop, courts are often asked to review the circumstances of the
stop to determine whether there was reasonable suspicion and
whether the stop was otherwise lawful. The Supreme Court has
imposed a two-part test for determining the lawfulness of a Terry
62
investigative detention. The first part of the inquiry involves an
examination of "'whether the officer's action was justified at its
inception,' which turns on whether the officers had reasonable
suspicion that the defendant had engaged, or was about to engage, in
a crime. 6 ' The second part of the inquiry involves a determination of
"whether the stop went too far and matured into an arrest before
there was probable cause."' 64 In making that determination, courts
have been directed to consider "whether [the stop] was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place., 65 If a court determines that either there was no
reasonable suspicion or the stop "matured into an arrest" for which
there was no probable cause, any evidence discovered during or as a
result of the search is subject to suppression and is inadmissible at
58. See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 ("Based upon thatwhole picture the detaining
officer must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.").
59. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462.
60. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
61. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146 ("The purpose of this limited search is not to
discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without
fear of violence ...."); see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64-66 (1980)
(holding that a search that goes beyond what is necessary to discover whether a
suspect possesses any weapons is not valid under Terry and any evidence discovered in
such a search is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule).
62. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985) (noting that there is a
"dual inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigative stop").
63. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1144-45 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
64. Id. at 1145.
65. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20; see also Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 683 (determining whether it
was reasonable for two drug enforcement officers to detain the defendant and his
suspicious vehicle for twenty minutes).
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trial.66
As law enforcement officers have put the Terry decision into ac-
tion in their various jurisdictions, a number of related issues and
questions have arisen, and the Supreme Court has therefore had to
continue to define and refine the principles governing investigative
detentions. For the purposes of this article, issues of what law
enforcement can and cannot do during a Terry stop and how far
officers can go in terms of coercion and force are key to understand-
ing the circuit split and determining which position should be the
prevailing view.
a. Questioning during Terry detentions
In addition to detaining an individual and conducting a brief
search for weapons, a law enforcement officer conducting a Terry stop
is also permitted to briefly question the detainee-a concept of
obvious significance in the context of this article. In this regard, in• . 67
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce the Supreme Court noted that when an
officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is
afoot, the officer is permitted to briefly detain a person suspected of
being involved in that activity in order to "investigate the circums-
tances that provoke [d] suspicion. As noted in Berkemerv. McCarty,
a decision that addressed both Terry and Miranda, "this means that the
officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or
dispelling the officer's suspicions 7 0 regarding possible criminal
activity.71 The Court reiterated law enforcement's ability to ask
questions during a Tery stop in Hayes v. Florida, where it held that "if
there are articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that a
person has committed a criminal offense, that person may be stopped
in order to identify him, to question him briefly, or to detain him• ,,73
briefly while attempting to obtain additional information. During
66. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983).
67. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
68. Id. at 881.
69. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
70. Id. at 439.
71. The Court further held, however, that "the detainee is not obliged to
respond" to an officer's questions regarding the circumstances of the stop, and
"unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him,
he must then be released." Id. at 439-40.
72. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
73. Id. at 816; seealsoUnited States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,229 (1985) ("[T]he
ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions, or check identification in the absence
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Teny detentions law enforcement officers are limited in what topics
they can address in questioning and conversing with a detainee.
Specifically, as noted above, officers are permitted to ask questions
regarding a person's identity and may ask additional questions so long
as those additional questions are "reasonably related in scope to the
justification for their initiation.7 4 And as a general rule, "[t] he very
nature of a Teny stop means that a detainee is not free to leave during
the investigation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights. 7 5 The issue, of
course, is whether there comes a point during a Teny stop that
warnings are required despite the fact that the stop has not been
converted to either a formal or de facto arrest supported .by probable
cause.
b. Time Limits for Teny Detentions
One issue that has arisen on more than one occasion in the con-
text of a court's review of a Teny stop has to do with the length of a
Terry stop, or how long officers can detain a person based solely on
reasonable suspicion. While the Supreme Court has not adopted a
specific time limit in terms of the number of minutes that a Teny stop
can last, it has provided some guidance on the issue. For example, in
Florida v. Royer,16 a plurality decision, the Court recognized that "an
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. ' ' 7 On this point, in
78United States v. Place -another Terry-related decision decided the
same year as Royer-the Court further held that "in assessing the effect
of the length of the detention, we take into account whether the
police diligently pursue their investigation. 79 The Court provided
of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and
bringing offenders to justice.").
74. Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,29 (1968); seealsoUnited States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975) ("In this case . . . we hold that when an officer's
observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular vehicle may contain
aliens who are illegally in the country, he may stop the car briefly and investigate the
circumstances that provoke suspicion. As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be
'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation.' The officer may
question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status,
and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention
or search must be based on consent or probable cause.") (citations omitted).
75. United States v. Swanson, 341 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 2003).
76. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
77. Id. at 500.
78. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
79. Id. at 709.
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similar guidance on the issue in United States v. Sharpe, where it held
that "[i] n assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be
justified as an investigative stop," courts should "examine whether the
police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was
necessary to detain the defendant." In short, as the Court noted in
United States v. Hensley,82 it is entirely possible that "a detention might
well be so lengthy or intrusive as to exceed the permissible limits of a
Tery stop."s5
That said, Terry and its progeny do provide law enforcement with
some flexibility with respect to length of detention in conducting Terry
stops. For example, in Sharpe, the Court noted that:
Obviously, if an investigative stop continues indefinitely, at
some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative
stop. But our cases impose no rigid time limitation on Terry
stops. While it is clear that "the brevity of the invasion of the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an important
factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally
intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion," we
have emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement
purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reason-
ably needed to effectuate those purposes. Much as a "bright
line" rule would be desirable, in evaluating whether an in-
vestigative detention is unreasonable, common sense and
ordinary human experience must govern over rigid crite-
ria."
80. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
81. Id. at 686. The Sharpe Court provided additional guidance on this issue of
using methods that will quickly confirm or dispel law enforcement's suspicions when
it wrote:
A court making this assessment should take care to consider whether the
police are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the
court should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing. A creative judge
engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always imagine
some alternative means by which the objectives of the police might have
been accomplished. But " [t] he fact that the protection of the public might,
in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does not,
itself, render the search unreasonable." The question is not simply whether
some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unrea-
sonably in failing to recognize or to pursue it.
Id. at 686-87 (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973) and referenc-
ing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 n.12 (1976)).
82. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
83. Id. at 235.
84. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709
(1983)) (citations omitted). In Place, the Court further explained its hesitance to
1484 [Vol. 36:4
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In choosing not to create a bright-line rule or set a time limit on
Terry detentions, the Sharpe Court confirmed important precedent
decided two years prior in Michigan v. Summers, in which it stated
that " [i] f the purpose underlying a Terry stop-investigating possible
criminal activity-is to be served, the police must under certain
circumstances be able to detain the individual for longer than the
brief time period involved in Tey .. 8 6
In the end, as the Sharpe Court noted, there is no bright-line rule
87
with respect to time limits on a Terry stop. Instead, as noted above,
"a court considering the reasonableness of a particular detention's
duration must 'examine whether the police diligently pursued a
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the
defendant. "' Such a determination will necessarily be fact-specific
and will be made on a case-by-case basis after consideration of the
general principles set forth by the Supreme Court in its post-Terry
decisions addressing the concept of investigatory detentions.
c. The Use of Force and Coercion During Investigative
Detentions and the Concept of a De Facto Arrest
One of the more often-litigated issues to arise from Terry and its
daily real-world application involves the question of how far law
enforcement can go during a Terry stop in terms of the use of force
and coercion. The Supreme Court has recognized that in certain
circumstances a Terry stop can be converted into the equivalent of an
create a bright line rule when it wrote:
We understand the desirability of providing law enforcement authorities
with a clear rule to guide their conduct. Nevertheless, we question the
wisdom of a rigid time limitation. Such a limit would undermine the equally
important need to allow authorities to graduate their responses to the
demands of any particular situation.
Id. at 709 n.10.
85. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
86. Id.at700n.12.
87. SeealsoUnitedStatesv. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141,1147 (llthCir. 2004) ("There
is no rigid time limitation or bright line rule regarding the permissible duration of a
Terry stop.").
88. United States v. Robinson, 30 F.3d 774, 784 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Sharpe,
470 U.S. at 686). In determining the reasonableness of a detention's duration, the
Supreme Court "has cautioned that a reviewing court should not 'indulge in
unrealistic second guessing' as to the methods law enforcement officials use to
conduct their investigations." Id. (quoting Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686). And as the Sharpe
Court noted, "[t]he question is not simply whether some... alternative [method]
was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or
pursue it." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687.
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arrest-referred to as a de facto arrest-even though the detaining
officer has not formally arrested the suspect.8 9 This determination is
significant because at the point that a Terry stop becomes an arrest or
a de facto arrest, officers must have probable cause to justify that
more serious form of detention rather than just reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot. Determining when such a conversion
has occurred, however, can oftentimes be difficult. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals recently noted that "[t]he line between temporary
detentions and de facto arrests is often blurred."90 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has said the same thing, holding that there is "no
bright line rule for determinin1g when an investigatory stop crosses the
line and becomes an arrest." And the U.S. Supreme Court recog-
nized the existence of this problem nearly twenty-five years ago in
Sharpe when it noted that some of its prior precedent "may in some
instances create difficult line-drawing problems in distinguishing an
investigative stop from a de facto arrest."92 Not only can it be
challenging to distinguish between the two in certain instances, but in
some cases the line between temporary detentions and de facto arrests
"can shift in the course of a single encounter so that what starts out as
an investigatory stop may morph into a de facto arrest."93 And while
courts generally agree that in distinguishing between an investigative
detention and a de facto arrest a court must look to the totality of the
circumstances, there is much disagreement among both federal and
89. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 ("Obviously, if an investigative stop continues
indefinitely, at some point it can no longer be justified as an investigative stop.")
90. Morelli v. Webster, 552 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2009).
91. Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting
United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228,1231 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted)).
92. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at685. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 506-07 (1983)
("We do not suggest that there is a litmus-paper test for distinguishing a consensual
encounter from a seizure or for determining when a seizure exceeds the bounds of an
investigative stop. Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be
endless variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely
that the courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide
unarguable answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search
or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.").
93. Morelli, 552 F.3d at 19. On this issue, the Terry Court noted that "a search
[and seizure] which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment
by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope," and that "[t] he scope of [a] search
[or seizure] must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which
rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1968) (citing
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964); Kremen v. United States, 353
U.S. 346 (1957); United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); Go-Bart Imp. Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30-31
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state courts about what test to apply in making the ultimate determi-
nation.
In terms of the circuit split referenced above, the question of how
much force and coercion can be used without converting a Terry
detention into a de facto arrest for which an officer needs probable
cause, or if questioning is involved, without converting the stop into
custodial interrogation for which Miranda warnings are required, is at
the heart of the issue. The answer to the question of how far law
enforcement can go depends on the court addressing the issue and
the circumstances of the stop. For examplejust over twenty years ago
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that,
"[t] he amount of force used to carry out the stop and search must be
reasonable, but may include using handcuffs or forcing the detainee
to lie down to prevent flight or drawing guns where law officers
reasonably believe they are necessary for their protection."94 Other
94. United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing United
States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1272-74 (10th Cir. 1982)); see also United States v.
Thompson, No. 05-50801, 2007 WL 2044725, at *1 (9th Cir.July 16, 2007) ("Howev-
er, the use of guns and handcuffs does not automatically convert a Terry stop into an
arrest.") (citing Alexander v. County of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir.
1995)); Radvansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 395 F.3d 291, 309 (6th Cir. 2005)
("During a Terry stop, officers may draw their weapons or use handcuffs 'so long as
circumstances warrant the precaution.'") (citation omitted); United States v.
Maguire, 359 F.3d 71, 78 (1st Cir. 2004) ("It is well established that the use or display
of a weapon does not alone turn an investigatory stop into a de facto arrest."); United
States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993) ("[B]ecause safety may
require the police to freeze temporarily a potentially dangerous situation, both the
display of firearms and the use of handcuffs may be part of a reasonable Terry stop.");
United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29, 36 (2nd Cir. 1991) ("[W]e are... unpersuaded
that the use of handcuffs and leg irons converted an otherwise permissible detention
into a detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment."); United States v.
Alexander, 907 F.2d 269, 273 (2nd Cir. 1990) ("Under these circumstances, we do
not find it unreasonable that the officers decided it was appropriate to protect
themselves by unholstering their guns and frisking Alexander. Indeed, this Court has
repeatedly acknowledged the dangerous nature of the drug trade and the genuine
need of law enforcement agents to protect themselves from the deadly threat it may
pose."); United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 838 (9th Cir. 1990) ("In this circuit it
has been held that '[t] he use of force does not convert the [investigatory] stop into
an arrest if it occurs under circumstances justifying fears of personal safety.'")
(citations omitted); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 329 (4th Cir. 1989)
("Brief, even if complete, deprivations of a suspect's liberty do not convert a stop and
frisk into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used are reasonable to the
circumstances."); United States v. Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d 965, 968 (7th Cir. 1988)
("Although we are troubled by the thought of allowing policemen to stop people at
the point of a gun when probable cause to arrest is lacking, we are unwilling to hold
that an investigative stop is never lawful when it can be effectuated safely only in that
manner. It is not nice to have a gun pointed at you by a policeman but it is worse to
have a gun pointed at you by a criminal, so there is a complex tradeoff involved in any
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courts have allowed such things as removing detained persons from a
95
car for the purpose of conducting a pat-down search of each person,
blocking a suspect's exit from a vehicle or exit from an area in a
vehicle, allowing a quick search of an occupied vehicle for wea-
97 98pons, placing a suspect in a police car, and moving a suspect from
the location of the initial stop to a different location,9 holding that
the stop in each case remained a lawful Terry stop and did not convert
into an arrest or de facto arrest despite the officer's coercive actions
or use of force. Courts have also held that the mere fact that there
was physical contact between law enforcement and a detainee is not
proposal to reduce (or increase) the permissible scope of investigatory stops.");
United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 790 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985) ("[N]either
handcuffing nor other restraints will automatically convert a Teny stop into a defacto
arrest requiring probable cause."); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701,709 (9th Cir.
1983) ("[T]he use of handcuffs, if reasonably necessary, while substantially
aggravating the intrusiveness of an investigatory stop, do not necessarily convert a
Teny stop into an arrest necessitating probable cause.").
95. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
96. See. e.g., United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The
police may conduct an investigatory stop by blocking the egress of a vehicle in which a
criminal suspect is riding and may approach the vehicle with weapons at the ready on
a reasonable suspicion that its occupants are armed.") (citing United States v.
Greene, 783 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 961
n. 15 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v.Jones, 759 F.2d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v.Jackson, 652 F.2d 244, 249-50 (2nd Cir. 1981); United States v. Vargas, 633
F.2d 891, 896 (1st Cir. 1980)).
97. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) ("Our past cases
indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when
police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside
encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger
may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect.
These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or
hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on
'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant' the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous
and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.") (citations omitted).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Bradshaw, 102 F.3d 204, 212 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the officer "could lawfully detain [defendant in the back of the squad
car] until he had finished performing radio checks and issuing the citation," because
it was "well within the bounds of the initial stop."); United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d
1228, 1230 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Certainly, there is no per se rule that detention in a
patrol car constitutes an arrest."); United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 377 (4th
Cir. 1984) ("This court refuses to recognize a rule that all detentions in a patrol car
are per se arrests.").
99. See United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding
that officers "may move a suspect from the location of the initial stop without
converting the stop to an arrest when it is necessary for safety or security reasons"); see
also Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1990).
1488 [Vol. 36:4
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
MIRANDA & TERRY
enough to convert a Teny stop into an arrest.100 In addressing these
issues a number of courts have held that "[a] law enforcement agent,
faced with the possibility of danger, has a right to take reasonable
steps to protect himself and an obligation to ensure the safety of
innocent bystanders, regardless of whether probable cause to arrest
exists."01 Others have noted that "[a]s a society, we routinely expect
police officers to risk their lives in apprehending dangerous people
... [and therefore we] should not bicker if in bringing potentially
dangerous situations under control they issue commands and take
precautions which reasonable men are warranted in taking.' ' 02 Thus
law enforcement has been granted some leeway by the courts to use
reasonably necessary force in Terry-type investigative detentions. This
has been particularly true as the nature of law enforcement and the
level of violence that they may have to deal with has increased over
the years, as noted b' the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in
United States v. Clark:
There has been a perceptible evolution in this area of the
law. Courts today will find a permissible use of force by the
police under circumstances that might have raised judicial
eyebrows at the time the Terry decision was issued. While it
was once considered necessary, in order to justify a Terry
frisk, for a law enforcement officer to be 'justified in believ-
ing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is inves-
tigating.., is armed and presently dangerous to the officer,"
100. SeeUnited States v. Maguire, 359 F.3d 71, 78 (lst Cir. 2004) ("Working from
the premise that arrests and investigatory touching necessarily carry with it some
degree of coercion, we held that slight physical touching cannot, on its own, produce
a de facto arrest. In the instant case, there was more than de minimis physical
contact. However, merely because physical contact exceeds de minimis contact, it
does not necessarily follow that the scope of the Terry stop was exceeded. Physical
touching attendant to a Terry stop, particularly when officers are attempting to ensure
their own personal safety in a reasonable manner, must be examined in the factual
context of the case.") (citation ommited).
101. United States v. Carter, 360 F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993)); see also United States
v. Hamlin, 319 F.3d 666, 671 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Moreover, the use of handcuffs did
not convert the encounter into a custodial arrest because the use was reasonably
necessary to protect the officer's safety. During Terry stops, officers may take 'steps
reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo and to protect their safety.'")
(citations omitted); United States v. Edwards, 53 F.3d 616, 619 (3rd Cir. 1995);
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985) (noting that law enforcement
officers are "authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect
their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of [a Terry]
stop").
102. United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
103. 24 F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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it now suffices, in appropriate circumstances, for the officer
to bejustified in believing that the individual might be armed
and dangerous. This development is a product of the times.
Twenty-five years ago, when the Supreme Court issued its
opinion in Terry, it might have been unreasonable to assume
that a suspected drug dealer in a car would be armed; today,
it could well be foolhardy for an officer to assume other-
wise. 104
Finally, some courts have also held that the mere fact that a de-
tained person does not feel as if he or she is free to leave is not
enough to convert a Terry stop to an arrest.105
On the other hand, other courts take a more limited view of what
law enforcement can and cannot do in the context of a Terry stop if
the stop is to remain purely an investigative detention and not convert• .106
into either a de facto or formal arrest. In other words, there is no
unified answer to the question of when a Terry detention becomes an
arrest.
B. The Fifth Amendment, Miranda v. Arizona, and the Concept of
Miranda Warnings
The other constitutional amendment and landmark Supreme
Court decision at the heart of the circuit split that is the subject of this
article are the Fifth Amendment and the Supreme Court's 1966
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.1°7 In order to understand the issues at
the center of the debate one must first have a basic understanding of
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compelled self-
incrimination and the general principles set forth in Miranda and its
progeny.
1. The Ffth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona
The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that "[n]o person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."'08 Put another way, the Amendment protects against
compelled self-incrimination, and as the Supreme Court has noted,
104. Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
105. See United States v. Sinclair, 983 F.2d 598, 603 (4th Cir. 1993) ("[Tlhe
perception that one is not free to leave is insufficient to convert a Terry stop into an
arrest.").
106. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman-Padilla, 573 F.3d 865, 883-84 (9th Cir.
2009) (reiterating that Terry stops must be "brief" and "minimally intrusive").
107. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
108. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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the Fifth Amendment not only permits a person to refuse to testify
against himself in a criminal trial, "but also 'privileges him not to
answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or
criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate
him in future criminal proceedings."' 10 9 One of the more prominent,
and at times controversial, decisions on the Fifth Amendment
prohibition against compelled self-incrimination is the Supreme
Court's decision in Miranda-a decision "designed to give meaningful
protection to Fifth Amendment rights"' 10 that is now considered a
cornerstone of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.
The Miranda decision stemmed from a group of four cases that
went before the Supreme Court seeking a ruling on "the admissibility
of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to
custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which
assure that the individual is accorded his privilege [against compelled
self-incrimination] under the Fifth Amendment.""' One of the four
cases involved the prosecution of Emesto Miranda for kidnapping
and rape.' 12 In that case, Miranda was identified by the victim of his
crime and was thereafter interrogated; during the interrogation
Miranda admitted to the commission of the crimes and that confes-
sion was used against him at trial. I However, Miranda was never
informed that he had a right to remain silent and to have an attorney
present during questioning. 14 The Supreme Court reversed Miran-
da's conviction as a result of that omission, holding that his confession
should not have been admitted at trial because law enforcement's
failure to provide him with the aforementioned warning caused his
confession to be obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment." 5 In
109. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 425 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v.
Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973)).
110. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
111. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
112. Seeid. at492.
113. See id. at 491-92.
114. Seeid. at492.
115. See id. Prior to the Miranda decision, the general test for determining
whether a confession was admissible was whether the admission or confession was
voluntary. As noted in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985) (quoting Haynes v.
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514-15 (1963) and citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1940)):
Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of an accused's in-custody statements was
judged solely by whether they were "voluntary" within the meaning of the
Due Process Clause. If a suspect's statements had been obtained by "tech-
niques and methods offensive to due process," or under circumstances in
which the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise "a free and uncon-
2010]
25
Dinger: Is There a Seat for Miranda at Terry's Table?: an Analysis of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
holding as it did-that the now famous Miranda warnings must be
given and the right against self-incrimination waived before custodial
interrogation can take place-the Supreme Court declared that "our
holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an applica-
tion of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. In
other words, the Court asserted that in holding as it did it was simply
recognizing and upholding the Fifth Amendment prohibition against
compelled self-incrimination and the right to the assistance of counsel
in a criminal case that "were fixed in our Constitution only after
centuries of persecution and struggle.""' 7 In the Miranda opinion, the
Court wrote that providing a suspect with a set of admonishments or
warnings is necessary "to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial
surroundings."' In so holding, the Court relied on and referenced
the fact that, "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains
inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the
individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely."'1 9 In other words, subject to a few
exceptions, confessions obtained during custodial interrogations that
are not preceded by the proper warnings are inadmissible at trial.
The Supreme Court, addressing its decision in Miranda, has held
that "[o] ne of the principal advantages of the [Miranda] doctrine that
suspects must be given warnings before being interrogated while in
strained will," the statements would not be admitted. The Court in Miranda
required suppression of many statements that would have been admissible
under traditional due process analysis by presuming that statements made
while in custody and without adequate warnings were protected by the Fifth
Amendment.
The Miranda decision did not completely do away with the voluntariness test,
however, because an involuntary confession obtained by "techniques and methods
offensive to due process," though preceded by Mirandawarnings, are still subject to
suppression under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process. SeeMiller
v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) ("[E]ven after holding that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial
interrogations . . . the Court has continued to measure confessions against the
requirements of due process.") (citations omitted); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35,
38 (1967) ("A realistic appraisal of the circumstances of this case compels the
conclusion that this petitioner's confessions were the product of gross coercion.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, no conviction tainted
by a confession so obtained can stand."); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 386
(1978) ("[A] ny criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a
denial of due process of law.").
116. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
117. Id.
118. Id.at458.
119. Id. at 467.
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• ,,120custody is the clarity of that rule. In this regard, the Court has
noted:
Miranda's holding has the virtue of informing police and
prosecutors with specificity as to what they may do in con-
ducting custodial interrogation, and of informing courts
under what circumstances statements obtained during such
interrogation are not admissible. This gain in specificity,
which benefits the accused and the State alike, has been
thought to outweigh the burdens that the decision in Miran-
da imposes on law enforcement agencies and the courts by
requiring the suppression of trustworthy and highly proba-
tive evidence even though the confession might be voluntary
under traditional Fifth Amendment analysis."'
While it is reasonably clear as to what warnings must be given
during custodial interrogation, the fact that the Supreme Court has
revisited some aspect of the Miranda decision over fifty times since the
case was originally decided (as well as the fact that Miranda has been
the subject of thousands of lower court arguments and decisions) calls
into question whether the rule provides as much "clarity" as the Court
suggests.
2. General Principles of Miranda and its Progeny
The basic holding of Miranda is that in a criminal case "the pros-
ecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. With respect to these "proce-
dural safeguards," the Court noted that "[p] rior to any questioning,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or, ,123
appointed. The Miranda decision also established guidelines for
law enforcement to follow in adhering to the Court's decision. It
wrote:
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, pro-
vided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intel-
ligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any
120. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430 (1984).
121. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979).
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stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attor-
ney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise,
if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that
he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not
question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering
any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorneyS 124
and thereafter consents to be questioned.
As a general rule, if statements are obtained by law enforcement
in violation of the dictates of Miranda and the Miranda rule as it exists
today, those statements are subject to suppression and cannot be
presented by the prosecution as substantive evidence in a criminal
trial. 15 This exclusion of unwarned statements, however, does not
124. Id. at 444-45. These principles regarding police conduct and the providing
of Miranda warnings to persons subjected to custodial interrogation have been
further refined over the more than forty years since the Court's decision in Miranda.
For example, a number of subsequent cases clarified the rules regarding invocation of
one's rights pursuant to Miranda. One such case was Davis v. United States, 512 U.S.
452, 459 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that any invocation of one's Miranda
rights must be affirmative and unambiguous such that "if a suspect makes a reference
to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of
the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the
right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning."
Another invocation case was McNeilv. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 182 n.3 (1991), where
the Court rejected the concept of an anticipatory invocation of the right to counsel,
holding that no invocation is valid until the person is actually provided with Miranda
warnings or subjected to actual custodial interrogation.
Another aspect of Miranda that has been clarified over the years is that of the
re-initiation of questioning. On that issue, the Court has held that once a person
subjected to custodial interrogation invokes the right to counsel, law enforcement
cannot thereafter reinitiate questioning on the issue for which the right was invoked
and further cannot question the subject on any other matters until an attorney is
provided or the person is released from custody. SeeMinnickv. Mississippi, 498 U.S.
146, 153 (1990) (-Whatever the ambiguities of our earlier cases on this point, we now
hold that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not
reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has
consulted with his attorney."); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297-98 (1980)
(same). However, if the subject invoked only his right to remain silent, and in doing
so did not unambiguously invoke his right to have an attorney present, law enforce-
ment can reinitiate questioning on other matters so long as warnings are provided
again. See Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1975). And, of course, the
person subjected to custodial interrogation can always reinitiate questioning, after
which law enforcement is free to continue the prior interrogation without providing
the suspect with an attorney. SeeOregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983).
125. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) ("Unless a suspect
'voluntarily, knowingly[,] and intelligently' waives these rights, any incriminating
responses to [custodial] questioning may not be introduced into evidence in the
prosecution's case in chief in a subsequent criminal proceeding.") (citations
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generally extend to physical evidence discovered as a result of the
unwarned statements unless those unwarned statements are deemed
to be involuntary as a result of coercion and compulsion that rises to
the level of a due process violation.1
6
omitted); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985) ("Failure to administer Miranda
warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. Consequently, unwarned statements
that are otherwise voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment must
nevertheless be excluded from evidence under Miranda. Thus, in the individual case,
Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has
suffered no identifiable constitutional harm.").
126. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (holding that physical
evidence discovered as a result of an unwarned but voluntary statement is admissible
at trial and should not be suppressed despite the existence of a Miranda violation). In
a plurality opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia (Justices Kennedy and O'Connor joined in the result and filed a
nearly identical concurring opinion), the issue before the Court, as well as the
Court's answer to that issue, were presented as follows:
In this case we must decide whether a failure to give a suspect the warn-
ings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona requires suppression of the physical
fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements.... Because the
Miranda rule protects against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
which, in turn, is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical
evidence resulting from voluntary statements, we answer the question pre-
sented in the negative.
Id. at 633-34. In addressing the reasoning behind its holding the Court wrote:
[P] olice do not violate a suspect's constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule)
by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full
panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda. Potential violations occur, if at
all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial.
And, at that point, " [t] he exclusion of unwarned statements... is a com-
plete and sufficient remedy" for any perceived Miranda violation. Thus,
unlike unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment or actual
violations of the Due Process Clause or the Self-Incrimination Clause, there
is, with respect to mere failures to warn, nothing to deter. There is there-
fore no reason to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong
Sun.
Id. at 641-42 (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (1994)).
In the entirety of the opinion, the PataneCourt only notes one situation in which the
physical fruits of an unwarned statement might be subject to suppression. Specifical-
ly, physical fruits of an unwarned confession will only be excluded when there is
coercion that rises to the level of a due process violation. Id. at 644. It is critical to
note, however, that merely being in custody is not enough to rise to that level of
unlawful coercion. On this point the Court wrote:
And although it is true that the Court requires the exclusion of the physical
fruit of actually coerced statements, it must be remembered that statements
taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are presumed to have been
coerced only for certain purposes and then only when necessary to protect
the privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. In other words, the fact that Patane had been arrested was not enough to make
his statement involuntary for the purposes of the issue at hand.
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a. Defining "Custodial Interrogation"
As noted above, the Court has held that Miranda warnings must
be given prior to "custodial interrogation." In the Miranda decision
itself the Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. ",1 7 In other words, custody for Miranda purposes
includes more than a formal arrest. And while it is clear that a person
who has been formally arrested is in custody for Miranda purposes,
the concept and meaning of being "otherwise deprived of [one's]
freedom of action in any significant way" is more difficult to deci-
pher.2' On this issue the Supreme Court has noted that
,,129[u] nfortunately, the task of defining 'custody' is a slippery one.
Defining "custodial interrogation" has been problematic, in part,
because the Miranda Court "did not articulate the indicia of custody,
or otherwise help courts and police to determine the steps leading up
to custody."130  For the purposes of this article the concept and
meaning of custodial interrogation are significant because a Terry
detention, while not an arrest, necessarily involves to at least a small
degree a deprivation of a detainee's freedom of action and therefore
raises questions about the applicability of Miranda, particularly when
force or coercion is used during the stop.
The Supreme Court has addressed the phrase "deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way" in a handful of important
cases since Miranda was decided in 1966.131 That said, not much
guidance is provided as to the meaning of that phrase in the Teny
context, and there is no authority from the Court indicating that a
Terry detention is one in which a person is "deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way" such that Miranda warnings are required
in all Terry stops. One of the first cases to address the meaning of
"custodial interrogation" following the Miranda decision is United132
States v. Beckwith. In Beckwith the Court held that the mere fact that
127. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
128. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 371.
129. Id. at 309.
130. Katherine M. Swift, Comment, Drawing a Line between Terry andMiranda: The
Degree and Duration of Restraint, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 1075, 1078 (2006).
131. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984)("It must be
acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the 'freedom of
action' of the driver. It is a crime.., to ignore a policeman's signal to stop one's car.
132. 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
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a person is the focus of a criminal investigation, without more
evidence, does not mean that a person is subject to custodial interro-
gation when questioned by, police and therefore does not in and of
itself implicate Miranda. Beckwith also held that the fact that an
interview focuses on a subject's criminal culpability and the fact that
there are some adversarial elements to a particular interview similarly
does not automatically mean that a person was subjected to custodial
interrogation. 34 These holdings were reaffirmed in subsequent cases.
Following Beckwith the Court decided a series of additional cases
through which the test for custodial interrogation changed and
developed into the law as it exists today. One important post-Beckwith
decision that played a role in this development of standards is Oregon
v. Mathiason.135 In Mathiason the Court rejected a lower court holding
that applied Miranda to a non-custodial interview because the
interview took place in a "coercive environment.', 13 6 Specifically, the
Oregon Supreme Court based its finding that the interview took place
in a coercive environment on the facts that the interview in question
occurred in the Oregon State Police offices, the defendant was alone
with law enforcement behind closed doors, the interrogating officer
informed the defendant that he was a suspect in a crime and that the
officers had evidence that incriminated him, and that the defendant
was a parolee. 137 In response, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the
defendant, while with officers for over two hours, was never arrested
and was allowed to leave at the conclusion of the interview. s In
rejecting the application of Miranda to a coercive but non-custodial
interview, the Court held:
[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes
that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a
"coercive environment." Any interview of one suspected of a
133. See id. at 347-48 ("An interview with Government agents in a situation such
as the one shown by this record simply does not present the elements which the
Miranda Court found so inherently coercive as to require its holding. Although the
'focus' of an investigation may indeed have been on Beckwith at the time of the
interview in the sense that it was his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly
found himself in the [inherently coercive] custodial situation described by the
Miranda Court as the basis for its holding.").
134. See id. at 347. ("[T]he Court thus squarely grounded its holding on the
custodial aspects of the situation, not the subject matter of the interview.").
135. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 494.
138. See id. at 494-95.
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crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it,
simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a
law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the sus-
pect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not
required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom
they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the
station house, or because the questioned person is one
whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required
only where there has been such a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him "in custody." It was that sort of
coercive environment to which Miranda, by its terms, was
made applicable, and to which it is limited.
Thus, the Court made clear that the mere fact that there is some
coercion during an interview does not convert the situation into one
in which a person is considered to be in custody for Miranda purpos-
es.
Another important case is California v. Beheler, 14 which was de-
cided six years after Mathiason. In Beheler, the Court addressed a
factual situation somewhat similar to Mathiason in that the interview at
issue occurred at the police station, was designed to produce incrimi-
nating responses, and took place very shortly after the commission of
the crime that was being investigated and at a time when the defen-
141dant was considered a suspect in that crime. In suppressing the
statements at issue, the lower court had relied upon a "totality of the
circumstances" test.142 In Beheler, the Supreme Court rejected that test
as applied by the lower court, noting that
[a] lthough the circumstances of each case must certainly
influence a determination of whether a suspect is 'in custo-
dy' for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ulti-
mate inquiry is simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated
with a formal arrest. 
43
In so holding, the Court for the first time introduced the concept
of Miranda applying not to a general deprivation of freedom of action
"in any significant way," but to a deprivation of action that rises to
such a level of restraint that it is determined to be of "the degree
139. Id. at 495.
140. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
141. See id. at 1123.
142. Id. at 1125.
143. Id. (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)).
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associated with formal arrest."' 4
In other words, in holding as it did, the Court provided some
guidance on the issue of when Miranda applies in non-traditional
custodial situations, requiring that suppression of a confession occur
only when the restriction on movement is to a degree similar to that
of a formal arrest. That said, the Court then noted that it is not
controlling and not particularly relevant for Miranda purposes that an
interview took place in a police station, the person being interviewed
is a suspect, the police have information about the person being
interviewed, and very little time elapsed between the commission of
the crime and the police interview.4 5 Unfortunately, however, the
Court did not define the phrase "of the degree associated with a
formal arrest," thus leaving the issue open to interpretation by the
lower courts.
The Court further defined "custodial interrogation" in its 1984
decision in Minnesota v. Murphy,146 where it once again rejected a
lower court decision requiring Miranda warnings in a non-custodial
setting. Specifically, in Murphy the Court rejected the application of
Miranda to a probationer's non-custodial interview with a probation
officer and did so despite the facts that the meeting was compelled,
the probationer was under a court-ordered obligation to respond to
the probation officer's questions, the probation officer suspected that
the meeting would result in the probationer making incriminating
statements and "consciously sought incriminating evidence,"14 7 and
the probation officer had decided pre-interview to report any such
incriminating answers to law enforcement. 14 In rejecting the need for
Miranda in such circumstances, the Court provided additional
guidance as to when an interrogation is considered to be noncustodi-
al and therefore does not require Miranda warnings. On this issue,
the Court noted that a "[c]ustodial arrest is said to convey to the
suspect a message that he has no choice but to submit to the officers'
will and to confess," and that "custodial arrest thrusts an individual
into 'an unfamiliar atmosphere' or 'an interrogation environment...
created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the
will of his examiner.", 49 "It is unlikely," the Court said, "that a
probation interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually conve-
144. Id.
145. See id,
146. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
147. Id. at 430.
148. See id. at 425.
149. Id. at 433 (citations omitted).
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nient time, would give rise to a similar impression. " '5° In holding as it
did, the Court also compared the situation in Murphy to that at issue
in Miranda, noting that:
Many of the psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capi-
talize on the suspect's unfamiliarity with the officers and the
environment. Murphy's regular meetings with his probation
officer should have served to familiarize him with her and
her office and to insulate him from psychological intimida-
tion that might overbear his desire to claim the privilege.
Finally, the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation
derives in large measure from an interrogator's insinuations
that the interrogation will continue until a confession is ob-
tained. Since Murphy was not physically restrained, and
could have left the office, any compulsion he might have felt
from the possibility that terminating the meeting would have
led to revocation of probation was not comparable to the
pressure on a suspect who is painfully aware that he literally
cannot escape a persistent custodial interrogator.
From these portions of the opinion it is apparent that the Court
contemplated that custodial interrogation necessarily involved such
things as psychological ploys designed to take away a person's will and
the conveyance of an impression by law enforcement action that a
person has no choice but to confess.
Another case of significance in the continued develojRment of the
concept of custodial interrogation is Berkemerv. McCarty." In Berkemer
the Court addressed for the first and only time the question of when
Miranda warnings are necessary in a Terry-type situation. Specifically,
Berkemer dealt with a situation in which an individual was stopped for
weaving in and out of his lane and thereafter investigated for driving
under the influence. 15 During the course of the investigation at the
scene of the traffic stop, McCarty, in response to a question about the
ingestion of any intoxicants, admitted that prior to driving he had
consumed alcohol and smoked marijuana. This admission was
made after he had taken a field sobriety test but prior to his being
arrested. 155 Furthermore, no Miranda warnings were given prior to
the questioning.1 56 After addressing some other matters, the Court
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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turned to the admissibility of the admissions, concluding in the end
that McCarty was not subjected to custodial interrogation when the
statements were made and therefore that they were admissible as
evidence. 151 In reaching its ultimate conclusion that the situation was
non-custodial for Miranda purposes despite the driver's being stopped
and thereafter detained by law enforcement, removed from his
vehicle, and subjected to a field sobriety test and some related
questioning, the Court first addressed "the scope of [its] decision in
Mirandd' in the sense of "whether the roadside questioning of a
motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be• • ,,,158 "
considered 'custodial interrogation. Noting that "a traffic stop
significantly curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver.., of the
detained vehicle 5 9 and that "few motorists would feel free either to
disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop
without being told they might do so,"'6 the Court nevertheless held
that McCarty was not in custody for Miranda purposes because at no
time between the initial stop and the formal arrest "was [he] sub-
jected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal
arrest. ' '  In so holding the Court in a sense rejected, or at least
qualified, the original test for custody in Miranda, making it clear that
the issue is not one of deciding whether the person's freedom of
action was curtailed in "any significant way," but whether the person
was restrained to a degree comparable to a formal arrest-an arguably
narrower standard.
The Berkemer decision provides a number of reasons for the
Court's conclusions. First, the Court noted that "[fWidelity to the
doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be enforced.. . only
in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision," are implicated-namely "whether a traffic stop exerts upon
a detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise
of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned
of his constitutional rights., 162 In the case of McCarty's traffic stop
and the administration of a field sobriety test, the Court determined
that Miranda was not applicable. This decision was based on the
Court's belief that traffic stops are generally temporary and brief, that
the type of questioning used during a traffic stop is different from a
157. See id. at 442.
158. Id. at 435.
159. Id. at 436.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 441.
162. Id. at 437.
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stationhouse interrogation "in which the detainee often is aware that
questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the
answers they seek," that the "circumstances associated with the typical
traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the
mercy of the police," and that traffic stops are generally public at least
to some degree. 63 Given these things, the Court concluded that in an
"ordinary traffic stop" there is much less of a "danger that a person
questioned will be induced 'to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely '' l simply because "the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary
traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surround-
ing the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself and in the
subsequent cases in which we have applied Miranda."'
The Berkemer Court next addressed the interaction between Terry
and Miranda, and while the Court did not state that Miranda warnings
are never required in Terry situations, it did provide some guidance on
the issue. First, the Court noted that "the usual traffic stop is more, 166
analogous to a so-called 'Terry stop' than to a formal arrest., The
Court then recognized that it had not previously applied Miranda in
the Terry context, noting that:
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions
of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miran-
da. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pur-
suant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda.167
163. See id. The Court acknowledged that there would be some element of
coercion or compulsion in most traffic stops. However, the Court also noted that:
To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer
and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding whether
to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to
respond to questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset
these forces.
Id.
164. Id. at 438 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
165. Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted).
166. Id. at 439.
167. Id. at 440. The Court further described its view of the non-threatening
nature of "usual traffic stops" and the resulting lack of a need for Miranda warnings
in a footnote when it wrote:
The brevity and spontaneity of an ordinary traffic stop also reduces the
danger that the driver, through subterfuge, will be made to incriminate
himself. One of the investigative techniques that Miranda was designed to
guard against was the use by police of various kinds of trickery-such as
"Mutt and Jeff" routines-to elicit confessions from suspects. A police
1502 [Vol. 36:4
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But while the Court indicated that it had not previously applied
Miranda in the Terry context, it nevertheless explained that this did
not mean that Miranda could never be implicated during a traffic
stop. In this regard the Court opined that "the safeguards prescribed
by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of
action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.""' Thus,
the Court held, " [i] f a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a
traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him 'in
custody' for practical purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply
of protections prescribed by Miranda."69
The Court additionally noted that it was disinclined to accept
either a rule "that Miranda applies to all traffic stops" 170 or one that
requires "that a suspect need not be advised of his rights until he is
formally placed under arrest."'7 Thus the Court seemingly concluded
that first, a simple seizure of a person during a traffic stop generally
will not be considered custodial interrogation; second, removing
someone from his or her vehicle and subjecting the person to field
sobriety tests and some questioning regarding driving under the
influence in the manner done in Berkemer similarly will not render
someone in custody for Miranda purposes; 17 and third, it is possible
that under certain circumstances a traffic stop can be converted into a
situation in which a person is in Miranda custody, though the Court
does not specify what those circumstances are other than those in
which a person is subject to restraint to a degree associated with
officer who stops a suspect on the highway has little chance to develop or
implement a plan of this sort.
Id. at 438 n.27.
168. Id. at 440 (citations omitted).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 441.
171. Id.
172. In holding that the facts of Berkemer did not rise to the level of custodial
interrogation, the Court further described these facts as follows:
Only a short period of time elapsed between the stop and the arrest. At no
point during that interval was respondent informed that his detention
would not be temporary .... Nor do other aspects of the interaction of
Williams and respondent support the contention that respondent was
exposed to "custodial interrogation" at the scene of the stop. From aught
that appears in the stipulation of facts, a single police officer asked respon-
dent a modest number of questions and requested him to perform a simple
balancing test at a location visible to passing motorists. Treatment of this
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formal arrest."'
Finally, the Berkemer court noted a few additional concepts of im-
portance for determining whether a person is in Miranda custody.
First, the Court noted in a footnote that "[t]he threat to a citizen's
Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda was designed to neutralize has
little to do with the strength of an interrogating officer's suspi-,,.174
cions. In other words, consistent with prior opinions, the Court
noted that the mere fact that a person is considered a suspect in a
crime and that law enforcement has evidence of that person's
involvement does not in and of itself create a custodial situation for
Miranda purposes. 7 5  Second, the Court further held that "[a]
173. The Court did reference in footnotes two cases in which lower courts had
found Miranda custody in a traffic stop situation. Id. at 439 n.28 (citing Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1968)). In
doing so, the Court did not specifically state that it accepted the holdings and
reasoning of those courts, though it also did not state that it rejected those holdings.
See id. The Court simply references them as a comparison to the facts of Berkemer,
which it found did not rise to the level of custodial interrogation for Miranda
purposes. Id. at 441.
The first case referenced as a comparison to the facts of Berkemer is
Commonwealth v. Meyer, 412 A.2d 517 (Pa. 1980). Meyerinvolved a situation in which a
police officer came upon the scene of a single-car accident. Id. at 518. The accident
happened outside of the officer'sjurisdiction, so he asked the driver to wait until the
proper agency arrived. Id. The driver ended up waiting in a patrol car for approx-
imately half of an hour, and at a suppression hearing one of the initial officers on
scene indicated that the driver was being kept on scene until the proper agency
arrived. Id. The second case referenced as a comparison to the facts of Berkemer is
United States v. Schultz, 442 F. Supp. 176 (D. Md. 1977). Schultz involved a situation
where a driver was stopped by law enforcement for traffic violations and unusual
driving. Id. at 178. He was told that he could be arrested for driving under the
influence based on the odors of alcohol and marijuana, and was denied an
opportunity to call his mother. Id. Additionally, the investigating officer requested
permission to search the vehicle and when that request was denied, challenged the
driver to prove that he had no drugs or alcohol in the vehicle. Id. Eventually, the
driver confessed to having a sawed-off shotgun in the car and was arrested. Id. In
setting forth its reasoning for holding that Miranda warnings were required in the
situation, the court wrote: "In the case at bar, when [the officer] smelled marijuana
smoke and defendant confessed to having "smoked ajoint," the case became more
than a mere traffic stop.... Once [the officer] went beyond the 'mold' of the traffic
offense, Miranda was applicable." Id. at 181-82. Again, the Berkemercourt expressed
no view as to the correctness or precedential value of either decision.
174. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 435 n.22.
175. Similarly, the fact that a person is not a suspect at the time of interrogation is
also not dispositive of the issue of whether the person is subjected to custodial
interrogation. SeeStansburyv. California, 511 U.S. 318,324 (1994) ("It is well settled,
then, that a police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a
suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in
custody for purposes of Miranda. The same principle obtains if an officer's undis-
closed assessment is that the person being questioned is not a suspect.").
1504 (Vol. 36:4
38
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
MIRANDA & TERRY
policeman's unarticulated plan [to arrest a person] has no bearing on
the question whether a suspect was 'in custody' at a particular time;
the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his situation."'76 Thus, the concept of
whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes is not dependent
on the subjective intent of the investigating law enforcement officer
unless and until that intent is communicated to the person being
interrogated,"' but is instead based on the objective circumstances of
the interrogation and how a reasonable person in the suspect's
position "would have understood [the] situation. This objective
test was later affirmed in the Court's decision in ,Yarborough v.
Alvarado"9 and in other subsequent decisions, 18 and has become
perhaps the most often-cited test for determining whether a person
who has not been formally arrested is nevertheless in custody for
Miranda purposes.
Eleven years after deciding Berkemer, the Supreme Court once
176. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442.
177. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 ("In sum, an officer's views concerning the
nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the
individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the
assessment whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officer's views or
beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would
have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her
freedom to leave.").
178. Id. at 324. "Our decisions make clear that the initial determination of
custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the
subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned." Id. at 323.
179. 541 U.S. 652 (2004). In Yarborough, the Court addressed the issue of whether
an interviewee's age should be taken into account when determining whether there
was custodial interrogation. In that case, a seventeen-year-old met with law
enforcement in a small room at a police station while his parents waited outside in a
waiting room. Id. at 656. He was interviewed for approximately two hours and was
then permitted to leave. Id. at 656-58. In federal habeas proceedings, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals "held that the state court erred in failing to account for
Alvarado's youth and inexperience when evaluating whether a reasonable person in
his position would have felt free to leave." Id. at 659-60. The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, noting that "[o]ur opinions applying the
Miranda custody test have not mentioned the suspect's age, much less mandated its
consideration. The only indications in the Court's opinions relevant to a suspect's
experience with law enforcement have rejected reliance on such [subjective] factors."
Id. at 666-67. The Court also addressed once again the reason for the objective test
rather than a subjective test, noting that "[t]he objective test furthers 'the clarity of
[Miranda's] rule,' ensuring that the police do not need 'to make guesses as to lthe
circumstances] at issue before deciding how they may interrogate the suspect.'"
Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 430-31).
180. See Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323.
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again addressed the issue of Miranda custody in the case of Thompson
v. Keohane,18' a habeas review of a consensual encounter at a police
station, and in that decision once again modified the test for Miranda
custody. Specifically, the Court applied the following test to deter-
mine whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes:
Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination [of
whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes]: first,
what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation;
and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.
1 8 2
According to the Thompson opinion, this two-part test is used to
determine whether there was a "restraint on freedom of movement of.183
the degree associated with formal arrest" -the test set forth in
Beheler. Additionally, the Berkemer test-which asks "how a reasonable
man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation"-
is a component of determining the answer to the second part of the
question that asks whether "a reasonable person [would] have felt he
or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
In holding as it did, the Court recognized a slightly altered element of
the Miranda custody analysis. The year prior, in Stansbury v. Califor-• 185
nia, the Court had noted that the Berkemer question of how a
reasonable person would understand his or her situation entailed a
determination of "how a reasonable person in the position of the
individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her
freedom of action."186 In Thompson, the Court seemingly amended the
language of the test once again, making the question (or at least part
of the question) not how a person "would gauge the breadth of his or
her freedom of action," but whether that person would have felt that
he or she had the ability to stop the questioning and leave the area of
interrogation-an inquiry that had not been addressed in any
Miranda decision prior to Thompson.
The precedential effect of Thompson has been the subject of some
dispute. A number ofjurisdictions and court decisions have unques-
181. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
182. Id. at 112. The Thompson Court further asked the question: "[I]f encoun-
tered bya 'reasonable person' would the identified circumstances add up to custody
as defined in Miranda?" Id. at 113.
183. Id. at 112 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
184. Id.
185. Stansbuiy, 511 U.S. at 318.
186. Id. at 325.
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tioningly accepted the Thompson test as the proper test for determin-
ing whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes. Other
decisions, however, have questioned the applicability of Thompson in, 188
Terry situations. For example, in United States v. Salvo, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals made the following reference to Thompson:
A further indication that there may be a "free to leave" as-
pect to Fifth Amendment custody determinations can be
found in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Thompson
v. Keohane, ajurisdictional habeas corpus case, in which the
Court stated that the custody determination hinges upon
whether, "given those circumstances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave." This language, although not a cen-
tral holding of the case, indicates that the "free to leave"
inquiry is at least a component of a Fifth Amendment custo-
dy determination (presumably with the exception of a Teny
189stop situation).
The bottom line is that a review of Supreme Court precedent
leads one down a long and winding road that demonstrates that the
formation of a bright-line rule that easily fits the facts of every case in
which there is a question of custodial interrogation has become
impossible. As noted below, different courts apply the above-
referenced precedent in different ways, and as such there is a nearly
endless list of fact-specific cases going in different directions on the
issue. 190
187. See infra Part IV.
188. 133 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 1998).
189. Id. at 949-50.
190. The lack of a bright-line rule or an easily applied test is evident from the fact
that one recent compilation from the American Law Reports, addressing strictly law
enforcement and suspect interaction at either a suspect's home or the home of a
third party, lists literally hundreds of cases that have applied a number of different
tests for determining custody and reached a number of different conclusions in the
scenarios presented. See George L. Blum, What Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" by
Police Officer Within Rule oMiranda v Arizona Requiring That Suspect be Informed of His or
Her Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation-At Suspect's or Third Party's
Residence, 28 A.L.R. 6th 505 (2007). Another similar compilation of cases on the issue
of what constitutes custodial interrogation, also compiled as a part of the American
Law Reports series, is over five hundred pages in length and similarly shows that lower
courts are all over the board with respect to what tests are applied to determine
Miranda custody, what facts or factors are considered and what degree of weight each
factor carries, and what level of tolerance courts in Terry situations show for the use of
force or coercion in the many scenarios presented by the cases. SeeJ.F. Ghent, What
Constitutes "Custodial Interrogation" Within Rule of Miranda v Arizona Requiring That
Suspect be Informed of His Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation, 31
A.L.R. 3d 565 (2009).
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b. Exceptions to the Miranda Rule
There are some important exceptions to Miranda's general rule
of exclusion. First, a defendant's statements elicited in violation of
Miranda, while not available for use as substantive evidence, can be
used for impeachment purposes in the event that the defendant
chooses to testify at trial. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in
Harris v. New York,' 9' where it held that while "[e]very criminal
defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do
so," the right to testify on one's own behalf "cannot be construed to
include the right to commit perjury.'' 192 Thus, the Court held,
Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an
obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prose-
cution here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-
testing devices of the adversary process.... The shield pro-
vided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confronta-
tion with prior inconsistent utterances. We hold, therefore,
that petitioner's credibility was appropriately impeached by
use of his earlier conflicting statements.
There is also a public safety exception to the Miranda exclusio-
nary rule. This exception was set out in New York v. Quarles,194 which
involved a situation in which an officer asked a suspect about the
location of a firearm after taking him into custody but before giving
Miranda warnings. Specifically, the man taken into custody had
allegedly raped a woman who reported that he was armed with a195
gun. After the rape, the suspect entered a supermarket where he
was chased and stopped by law enforcement. Upon searching him,
the officer found an empty holster and, without giving him Miranda
warnings, asked the location of the gun. 9 In recognizing a public
safety exception, the Court held that " [w] hatever the motivation of
individual officers ... we do not believe that the doctrinal underpin-
nings of Miranda require that it be applied in all its rigor to a
situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted
by a concern for the public safety."'98 In setting forth the justification
191. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
192. Id. at 225 (citing United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969)).
193. Id. at 225-26; see also Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
194. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
195. Id. at 651-52.
196. Id. at 652.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 656.
1508 [Vol. 36:4
42
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
MIRANDA & TERRY
for the public safety exception, the Court noted the dangers of strictly
applying Miranda in situations such as that presented in Quarles. The
Court wrote:
In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the
familiar Miranda warnings before asking the whereabouts of
the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be de-
terred from responding.... Here, had Miranda warnings
deterred Quarles from responding to [the] question about
the whereabouts of the gun, the cost would have been some-
thing more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful
in convicting Quarles. [The officer] needed an answer to his
question not simply to make his case against Quarles, but to
insure that further danger to the public did not result from' 99
the concealment of the gun in a public area.
In concluding the majority opinion, the Court noted that "the
need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the
public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting
the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination,"2 00 and
further stated that:
We decline to place officers.., in the untenable position of
having to consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it
best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions
without the Miranda warnings and render whatever proba-
tive evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them to give
the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evi-
dence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy
their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the vola-
201tile situation confronting them.
Since Quarles was decided in 1984, a number of lower courts have
202invoked the public safety exception in various situations.
199. Id. at 657.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 657-58.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Watters, 572 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding a
lower court invocation of the Quarles public safety exception); United States v.Jones,
567 F.3d 712 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir.
2003) (same); United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44 (lst Cir. 1998) (same); United States
v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (same); Fleming v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1109
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT'S
POSITION
As noted above, in United States v. Artiles-Martin the U.S. District
Court for the Middle District of Florida identified the existence of a
circuit split "over whether coercive Teny stops constitute Miranda
custody., 20 3 In explaining the make-up of the split, the court noted
that the First, Fourth, and Eighth circuits "hold that so-called Terry
reasonableness means Miranda warnings are not required, even if the, ,204
stop was coercive. On the other side of the split are the Second,
Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth circuits, which, according to the Artiles-
Martin court, "hold that a coercive Terry stop requires warnings but
still is deemed a valid Terry stop. 20 5 Finally, as referenced above, the
court also acknowledged that its own Eleventh Circuit "has not
expressly adopted either view. 206 Thus there exists a legitimate split
in the circuits-a split that the Supreme Court has yet to addressd. •I 207
directly. Additionally, since none of the circuits involved have taken
the position that all Terry stops require Miranda warnings, the issue of
when a Terry detention becomes or changes into Miranda custody-
and whether it ever does-is of significant concern. These same
circuits also have differing views on this issue, and a handful of
different tests for making that determination have been proposed and
adopted in the cases that have addressed the need for Miranda
warnings during Terry stops. To understand the issues and the split
that has come about, and in particular the Eighth Circuit's stance on
the questions of whether Miranda warnings have a place in Terry
detentions and, if so, when a Terry detention becomes Miranda
custody, it is important to understand the cases and opinions in which
the circuits and their lower courts have expressed their conflicting
positions.
A. The Eighth Circuit's Position in the Split over Miranda Warnings
During Terry Stops
In defining the Eighth Circuit's position as it did, the Artiles-
203. 2008 WL 2600787, at *11 (M.D. Fla.June 30, 2008).
204. Id. at *11 n.38.
205. Id.
206. Id. at*11.
207. See CONsTrrUTION: ANALYsIs AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 1426-27
("Other instances of questioning in less formal contexts in which the issues of custody
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Martin court made reference to the case of United States v. Pelayo-R .208
Ruelas, an Eighth Circuit decision in which the court held that no
Miranda warnings were required in the Terry detention at issue in the
case. While the decision in Pelayo-Ruelas may not be as firm on the
issue of Miranda warnings and coercive Terry stops as the Artiles-Martin
opinion maintained that it is, Pelayo-Ruelas did note that the Eighth
Circuit had previously held that Miranda warnings are not required
during Terry stops and generally maintained that position. What the
Artiles-Martin court missed, however, was another Eighth Circuit
decision issued three years after Pelayo-Ruelas in which the Eighth
Circuit seemingly, but without explanation, changed its position and
held that Miranda warnings are in fact required in certain coercive
Terry stop situations. In that decision, United States v. Martinez,2°9 the
Eighth Circuit at best ignored and potentially even overruled Pelayo-
Ruelas, while at the same time citing Pelayo-Ruelas as authority in
support of its contradictory position. Given these two inconsistent
cases and the way in which Martinez referenced Pelayo-Ruelas, as well as
the rulings of lower courts within the Eighth Circuit since Pelayo-Ruelas
and Martinez were decided, the Eighth Circuit's position on the role of
Miranda warnings in Terry stops is, to say the least, unclear.
1. United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas
In United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a dis-
trict court decision denying a motion to suppress incriminating
statements made by defendant-appellant Pelayo-Ruelas to a Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent during a relatively non-
210coercive Terry detention . Specifically, the detention at issue
involved the stop of Pelayo-Ruelas's vehicle on a dead-end road by a
plain-clothes DEA agent driving an unmarked police vehicle. 211 A
second unmarked police vehicle was involved in the stop as well,
though neither vehicle blocked Pelayo-Ruelas's car such that he could
not leave the scene . 2  The agent inquired about Pelayo-Ruelas's
citizenship status and the circumstances of his being where he was in
213the vehicle that he was driving. Pelayo-Ruelas was also asked to step
208. 345 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2003).
209. 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
210. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589.
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out of his car where he was frisked and asked additional questions. 24
Pelayo-Ruelas was arrested when a drug dog alerted on his vehicle.
21 5
Miranda warnings were not proved until after the dog's alert.21 6 A
motion to suppress Pelayo-Ruelas's statements, as the product of an
unwarned custodial interrogation, was filed and denied.217
In affirming the lower court's denial of the motion to suppress,
the Eighth Circuit first noted that it had previously held in at least two
separate decisions that "[n] o Miranda warning is necessary for persons
detained for a Teny stop. 2 18 Despite this rather forceful declaration,
the Pelayo-Ruelas court nevertheless took a less rigid approach and
seemingly qualified the Eighth Circuit's prior position, holding
instead that "most Terry stops do not trigger the detainee's Miranda
rights", 19 -a potentially important change in the Eighth Circuit's
position depending on where one's Terry detention falls on the
spectrum of cases. And while it seemingly suggested that there are
some limits to the number of Terry detentions in which Miranda
warnings are necessary, the court unfortunately did not delineate
what types of Terry stops might trigger the need for law enforcement
to provide a Terry detainee with Miranda warnings prior to question-
ing. That said, the court was clear, however, that on the facts
presented (and in "most" Terry stops) no Miranda warnings were
required when Pelayo-Ruelas was questioned about his citizenship and
circumstances."' And for the purposes of the Artiles-Martin court, at
least, the holding was enough to put the Eighth Circuit in the
category of those courts not requiring Miranda warnings in coercive
Terry detentions.




217. See id. Curiously, the trial court initially granted Pelayo-Ruelas' motion to
suppress. However, after hearing the DEA agent's testimony at trial, the court
reversed itself and allowed the statements to be admitted into evidence. See id.
218. Id. at 592 (quoting United States v. McGauley, 786 F.2d 888, 890 (8th Cir.
1986)).
219. Id. (emphasis added). This position is generally consistent with another
Eighth Circuit case that is cited in the Pelayo-Ruelas opinion- United States v.Johnson,
64 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 1995). In Johnson, the Eighth Circuit held that "Miranda
warnings are not necessary during ordinary Terry stops because they generally do not
amount to custodial interrogation." Id. at 1126. Unfortunately, theJohnson decision
does not specify what constitutes an "ordinary" Terry stop that does not require
Miranda warnings, and further provides little guidance as to what might constitute a
non-ordinary Terry stop that would require warnings.
220. See Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d at 592.
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ment of significance on the role of Miranda warnings in the context of
Terry detentions. On appeal, Pelayo-Ruelas had argued that "a person
is in custody for Miranda purposes whenever a reasonable person
would not feel free to leave ,-the test for determining Miranda
custody set forth in Thompson and followed by a number of courts
throughout the United States. The Pelayo-Ruelas court unequivocally
rejected application of that test, and in doing so made it clear that this
"broad contention" is "contrary to ... controlling authority. ' ' 22 The
court further stated that the mere fact that a reasonable person would
not feel free to leave during particular circumstances does not
automatically create a situation in which a person is in Miranda
custody. Specifically, the court rejected Pelayo-Ruelas's argument on
the ground that a person "is not free to leave a Terry stop until the
completion of a reasonably brief investigation, which may include
limited questioning., 223 In other words, the Eighth Circuit held that
the fact that a detained person does not feel as if he or she is free to
leave does not automatically trigger a need for a recitation of the
Miranda warnings because the person is, in fact, lawfully detained and
therefore is truly not free to leave regardless of whether a reasonable
person would feel free to leave. Further, the court noted that since
such a detainee is not in Miranda custody, Supreme Court precedent
dictates that he or she can still be questioned on issues relating to the
reason for the Teny detention without being first provided Miranda
warnings.124 By rejecting the test suggested by Pelayo-Ruelas, the
Eighth Circuit set itself apart from a number of other jurisdictions
who have accepted that very test or versions very close to it.25
2. United States v. Martinez
Three years after the Eighth Circuit decided Pelayo-Ruelas, the
court again addressed the issue of Miranda warnings in the context of
a Terry detention in the case of United States v. Martinez.22' The
Martinez opinion has two parts-a majority opinion that appears to
run contrary to Pelayo-Ruelas, and a dissenting opinion that pushes for
a continuation of the Pelayo-Ruelas view of the need (or absence of




224. Id. at 593.
225. See infra Part IV.
226. 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
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a. Martinez: The Majority Opinion
While the Artiles-Martin court referenced Pelayo-Ruelas as the
Eighth Circuit's position on the need for Miranda warnings in
coercive Terry situations, it failed to note that three years after Pelayo-
Ruelas the Eighth Circuit issued a seemingly contradictory opinion in
United States v. Martinez. The Martinez opinion presents an interesting
contrast to Pelayo-Ruelas because it relied on Pelayo-Ruelas as support
for its position, yet at the same time went directly against both many
of the statements of law contained in the Pelayo-Ruelas opinion as well
as the general tenor of that prior decision-a fact pointed out by a
forceful dissent.
In Martinez, the Eighth Circuit addressed the detention and ques-
tioning of defendant Martinez, who was indicted for and convicted of
committing a bank robbery in St. Cloud, Minnesota."' Following the
robbery, law enforcement stopped Martinez in an area approximately
one-half mile from where the crime occurred. Martinez was stopped
because he matched the description of the robbery suspect and was
thereafter detained and searched for weapons. During that detention
officers discovered that Martinez had a large sum of cash on his
person, and when he gave inconsistent explanations for having the
cash, he was handcuffed, placed in the back of a patrol car, and taken
228
to the bank for a show-up identification. Once he was identified as
the person who committed the crime, Martinez was arrested and was
thereafter tried for and convicted of the robbery. 219 The involved
officers did not provide Martinez with Miranda warnings until he was
placed in the patrol car, which was after he made statements to the
officers about having a large sum of cash and gave the inconsistent
stories as to how he had obtained it.230 On appeal, Martinez argued
that any statements that he made to the arresting officers should have
been suppressed because he was subjected to custodial interrogation
when he was asked about the money found in his possession, and was
not provided with Miranda warnings before that questioning took
place.23 The Eighth Circuit agreed with Martinez, holding that he
was subjected to custodial interrogation prior to being placed in the
227. Id. at 906-07. Martinez was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d),
and was sentenced to 150 months imprisonment. See id.
228. Id. at 906.
229. See id. at 906-07.
230. See id. at 906.
231. See id. at 908.
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patrol car and therefore should have been given Miranda warnings. 232
The first area in which the Martinez opinion went contrary to Pe-
layo-Ruelas without any recognition of that prior opinion was in its
discussion of what test to apply to determine whether a person is in
custody for Miranda purposes. In addressing what it chose as the
appropriate test, the court cited to the Supreme Court's decision in
Thompson and its test that involves a review of "the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation" and a decision as to whether "a
reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to
terminate the interrogation and leave.,133 In applying that test to the
facts of the case, the Eighth Circuit held that "[a] reasonable person
would not, considering the totality of the circumstances, feel he was at
liberty to stop the questioning [to which Martinez was subjected] and• ,,234
leave, and therefore determined that Martinez was entitled to
Miranda warnings despite the fact that the initial detention during
which incriminating statements were made was a Teny stop rather
235than a formal arrest. As noted, this decision went directly contrary
to the same circuit's opinion from three years earlier in which the
Pelayo-Ruelas court held that "[t]hus, we reject as contrary to...
controlling authority [the] broad contention that a person is in
custody for Miranda purposes whenever a reasonable person wouldr- . ,,236
not feel free to leave.
The Martinez court's next departure from the reasoning and
holding of Pelayo-Ruelas came when the court used Pelayo-Ruelas as
support for a position arguably contrary to the ultimate holding of
that case. As noted above, in Pelayo-Ruelas the Eighth Circuit held that
the appellant was not questioned in violation of Miranda even though
some persons might have found the circumstances of the questioning
to be somewhat coercive. 237 In doing so, the Pelayo-Ruelas court cited
prior Eighth Circuit case law that unequivocally held that "[n]o
Miranda warning is necessary for persons detained for a Teny stop,"
and then it noted that "most Teny stops do not trigger the detainee's!V .. . ,,238 a
Miranda rights. Instead of looking at Pelayo-Ruelas as placing limits
232. See id. at 909. In the end, however, the court also determined that the non-
suppression of the statements was harmless error that "did not sufficiently influence
the jury to merit our reversal." Id. at 910.
233. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995).
234. Martinez, 462 F.3d at 909.
235. See id.
236. United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003).
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on the cases in which Miranda might be required in a Terry stop, the
Martinez court cited it as authority and interpreted Pelayo-Ruelas as
standing for the proposition that "this court has previously implied.... ,239
the possible need for Miranda warnings during a Terry stop.' Thus,
the court ultimately determined that Martinez "was entitled to
Miranda warnings at the time he was handcuffed., 2 4 And though the
language of Pelayo-Ruelas did leave open the possibility of some Terry
stop situations in which Miranda warnings are required, the tenor of
the Pelayo-Ruelas decision, its reference to and reliance on prior cases
rejecting Miranda's application to appropriately-limited questions
asked during Terry stops, and the court's holding and outcome seem
more akin to one in which requiring Miranda is seen as a rare
exception and not one in which carte blanche is granted to require
Miranda in subsequent cases. Martinez read Pelayo-Ruelas as providing
for the latter rather than the former, and in so doing went against
that prior Eighth Circuit precedent as to both the need for Miranda
warnings in Tery detentions and the method for determining when a
person is in Miranda custody.
b. Martinez: The Dissenting Opinion
The Martinez opinion's inconsistencies with the holding of Pelayo-
Ruelas and the cases cited in that opinion are highlighted in a brief
but pointed dissent in which the dissentingjudge "dissent [s] from the
conclusion.., that [the law enforcement officers] violated Edwin
Martinez's Fifth Amendment rights by failing to give Miranda
warnings before asking [him] to explain the 'wad of cash' found in his
pocket shortly after an armed bank robbery., 24' The dissent began by
making reference to the general holding or requirements of the
Miranda decision and the implications that a Terry stop has on a
detainee's constitutional rights. It then addressed the lack of any
interplay between Miranda and Terry, noting that
[t] he apparent overlap of the broad definition of custody in
Miranda and the detention inherent in a Terry stop inevitably
raised the question whether a Terry stop is a significant de-
privation of the suspect's freedom of action so that Miranda
warnings are required before any questioning. An affirma-
tive answer to this question would have undermined both
the practical and the constitutional underpinnings of the
239. Martinez, 462 F.3d at 909.
240. Id. at910.
241. Id. at 911 (Loken,J., dissenting).
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Court's 8-1 decision in Terry: "if the investigative stop is sus-
tainable at all, constitutional rights are not necessarily vi-
olated if pertinent questions are asked and the person is
restrained briefly in the process.
2 4
1
In other words, the Martinez dissent took the position that apply-
ing Miranda to Terry detentions would undermine the widely accepted
practice of investigative detentions to the degree that they would
become essentially useless.
The dissent further pointed out that historically, Miranda (which
was decided just two years before Terry) has not had any place in Terry
detentions and that "[n]ot surprisingly, the court declined to make
Miranda warnings mandatory during Terry stops." 243 Referencing
Pelayo-Ruelas, the dissent then argued that the Eighth Circuit's
position on Miranda and the Supreme Court cases applying and
expanding the Miranda decision has generally been that "most Terry• . . . ,,244
stops do not trigger the detainee's Miranda rights. In so doing, the
dissent seemed to indicate that its reading of Pelayo-Ruelas, unlike that
of the Martinez majority, is that the need for Miranda warnings in a
Terry stop situation should be seen as the exception rather than the
rule.
Finally, the dissent questioned the majority's reliance on certain
authority cited in the majority opinion and its subsequent acceptance
of the Thompson reasonable-person test for determining whether
Miranda warnings should be required during a Terry detention.
Specifically, the dissent cited Pelayo-Ruelas for the proposition that in a
Terry stop a detained person "is not free to leave ... until the comple-
tion of a reasonably brief investigation, which may include limited
questioning," and therefore "it is contrary to Berkemer... to frame the
Miranda custody question as being whether a reasonable person
would 'feel he was at liberty to stop the questioning and leave'
because that framing compels the conclusion that all questioning
during lawful Terry stops must be preceded by Miranda warnings.
Put another way, the dissent suggested, as the Pelayo-Ruelas court did,
that the use of a test that looks at whether a reasonable person feels
free to leave is inappropriate given the fact that a person detained
pursuant to Terry truly is not free to leave and will likely understand
242. Id. at 911-12 (Loken,J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35
(1968) (White, J., concurring)).
243. Id. at 912.
244. Id. at 911 (quoting United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir.
2003)).
245. Id. at 912.
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that fact given the circumstances of the detention. Based on this
reading of the law and its application to the facts of Martinez, the
dissent concluded that "Martinez was not in custody for Miranda
purposes when he gave inconsistent and therefore incriminating
answers to questions that were consistent with a lawful Terry stop.
2 f
3. Making Sense of the Eighth Circuit's Position
Given the contradictory positions of Pelayo-Ruelas and Martinez, it
can be difficult to discern where exactly the Eighth Circuit stands on
the interaction of Miranda and Terry in the context of coercive Terry
detentions. This difficulty is evidenced by the fact that a review of
lower court decisions within the Eighth Circuit shows that the circuit's
district courts are not always in agreement as to which case represents
the correct standard within the circuit. Specifically, since Martinez was
decided in 2006, three years after Pelayo-Ruelas, a number of district
court decisions have been issued that have followed the reasoning in
Martinez with respect to the need for Miranda during coercive Terry
stops, and the use of the Thompson reasonable person test to deter-
mine whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes. At the
same time, however, an equal number of district courts have done the
same with Pelayo-Ruelas, following its reasoning and both rejecting the
need for Miranda warnings in Terry stops and rejecting the Thompson
reasonable person test in the Terry context, indicating that not only is
there a split of authority among the federal circuits, but apparently
247within the Eighth Circuit as well .
As noted above, a number of lower courts within the Eighth Cir-
cuit have followed Martinez and applied the principles and reasoning
of the majority opinion. For example, in the case of United States v.
246. Id. at 913. Additionally, the Martinez dissent noted that the majority's
conclusion that Martinez "was entitled to Miranda warnings at the time he was
handcuffed" because at that point a reasonable person would not feel that he or she
was free to terminate questioning and leave, is contrary to "cases holding that a Terry
stop that includes handcuffing followed by brief questioning related to the purpose of
the stop does not violate the suspect's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights." Id. (citing
United States v. Cervantes-Fores, 421 F.3d 825,829-30 (9th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Fornia-Castillo, 408 F.3d 52, 63-65 (lst Cir. 2005); United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d
953, 956-57 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir.
1982)).
247. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Monje, 433 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1035 (D.N.D.
2006) ("The eighth Circuit has rejected the 'broad contention that a person is in
custody for Miranda purposes whenever a reasonable person would not feel free to
leave.'" (quoting U.S. v. Pelavo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003)).
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Pentaleri,24 the District Court for the District of Minnesota noted that
in Martinez "the Eighth Circuit set out a... nuanced approach, 249 to
determine whether Miranda warnings need to be given to a person
detained pursuant to Terry. Specifically, the Pentaleri court adopted
the reasoning and holding of Martinez and read the current state of
the law within the Eighth Circuit to be that "[i]f a suspect is sufficient-
ly restrained during an investigatory stop, the suspect may be in
custody for the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination,
even though the suspect is not formally arrested."250  The court
further cited Martinez in formulating the test to be applied in
determining whether a detainee has been "sufficiently restrained"
such that the detainee is determined to be in custody for Miranda
purposes. Specifically, the court noted that the proper test for
determining "whether restraint is comparable to formal arrest" is
"whether a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would





Curiously, although the Pentaleri court indicated that this test
came from Martinez, the test set forth in Martinez is actually slightly
different, as the Martinez court asked whether "a reasonable person
would not, considering the totality of the circumstances, feel he was at
liberty to stop the questioning and leave"2 52 and not whether the
person "would understand the situation to be an arrest. Another
decision from a district court within the Eighth Circuit that followed
Martinez and rejected the holdings and reasoning of Pelayo-Ruelas is
United States v. Gelb,254 which cited Martinez for the proposition that
"the ultimate question is whether 'a reasonable person [would] have
felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave. ' ' 255  The Gelb court also acknowledged and accepted the
Martinez court's holding that "[w]hile most traffic stops do not
constitute 'custody' for Miranda purposes, '[s] ome traffic Terry stops
might involve such restraint, necessitating Miranda warnings.'256
Additionally, a number of courts within the boundaries of the
248. United States v. Pentaleri, No. 07-298, 2007 WL 4350798 (D. Minn. Dec. 11,
2007).
249. Id. at *6.
250. Id. (citing United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 909-10 (8th Cir. 2006)).
251. Id. (citing Martinez, 462 F.3d at 908-09).
252. Martinez, 462 F.3d at 909.
253. Pentaleri, 2007 WL 4350798, at *6.
254. United States v. Gelb, No. 8:08CRI10, 2008 WL 4866338 (D. Neb. Nov. 7,
2008).
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Eighth Circuit have continued to follow the reasoning of Pelayo-Ruelas,
despite the court's more recent decision in Martinez. For example in
United States v. Diaz-Quintana,257 decided three years after Martinez, the
District Court for the District of North Dakota published an interest-
ing opinion that followed the reasoning of Pelayo-Ruelas instead of
Martinez.2 5'8  In Diaz-Quintana, the court addressed a defendant's
motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officials
2591during an investigation of his immigration status. In denying the
defendant's motion, the court referenced and followed the reasoning
of Pelayo-Ruelas, rejecting the reasonable-person test from Martinez
and noting that Miranda warnings are not required in most Terry
situations. Specifically, the Diaz-Quintana court cited and followed
Pelayo-Ruelas (and disregarded Martinez) when it held:
It is well-established that Miranda warnings are not needed
for persons detained for a Teny stop. The Eighth Circuit has
rejected the "broad contention that a person is in custody
for Miranda purposes whenever a reasonable person would
not feel free to leave." Instead, "[o] ne is not free to leave a
Terry stop until the completion of a reasonably brief investi-
gation, which may include limited questioning. But most
Terry stops do not trigger the detainee's Miranda rights." By
way of extension, "the full panoply of protections prescribed
by Miranda does not apply during the course of a traffic stop
where the motorist is not subjected to the functional equiva-
lent of formal arrest."
261
Other district court decisions from within the Eighth Circuit have
257. United States v. Diaz-Quintana, 596 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (D. N.D. 2009).
258. See id. at 1281.
259. Id. at 1275-77.
260. Id. at 1281.
261. Id. at 1281 (citing United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1003 (8th Cir.
2005); United States v. Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 592 (8th Cir. 2003)) (citations
omitted). Perhaps the most interesting portion of the Diaz-Quintana opinion is the
test that the court states should be used to determine whether there has been a
"restraint on [a detainee's] freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest" such that the detention has become the "functional equivalent of an
arrest" and Miranda warnings are required. Id. Specifically, the court writes that the
appropriate test is to "determine whether a reasonable person in Diaz-Quintana's
position would have considered his freedom of movement restricted to the degree
associated with a formal arrest." Id. In other words, the test stated by the Diaz-
Quintana court is whether a reasonable person in a detainee's position would
consider that his or her freedom was restricted to such a degree and in such a way
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• 262followed the reasoning of Pelayo-Ruelas as well. And, in a very recent
case, the Eighth Circuit itself cited Pelayo-Ruelas for the proposition
that the Thompson reasonable-person test is not applicable in traffic
stop situations, but said nothing about Martinez and whether that case
no longer constituted good law.
In short, the Eighth Circuit's position on the issue of the intersec-
tion of Miranda warnings and Terry stops is unclear at best, and the
circuit appears to be divided on the issue much like many of the rest
of the federal and state courts throughout the United States.""
B. The First and Fourth Circuits: No Warnings Required During Coercive
Terry Stops
Once again, in defining the circuit split "over whether coercive
Terry stops constitute Miranda custody," the Artiles-Martin court notes
that the First and Fourth Circuits have taken the same position as the
Eighth Circuit that "so-called Terry reasonableness means Miranda
warnings are not required, even if the stop was coercive. "265 The cases
262. Another decision from a district court within the Eighth Circuit that followed
Pelayo-Ruelas in spite of the Eighth Circuit's subsequent holding in Martinez is United
States v. Treacle, No. 4:08CR3105, 2008 WL 5423743, at *7-8 (D. Neb. Dec. 10, 2008)
(citing Pelayo-Ruelas for the proposition that "[a] person is not necessarily in custody
for Miranda purposes even if a reasonable person in his or her position would not feel
free to leave" because a Terry detainee is not free to leave until a reasonably brief
investigation-which may include limited questioning-has been completed). Also,
the court in Treacle referenced Pelayo-Ruelas and United States v. Klein, 13 F.3d 1182,
1183 (8th Cir. 1994), as factual support for the proposition that Mirandawarnings are
not required simply because there is some degree of coercion during a Terry
detention. Treacle, 2008 WL 5423743, at *8.
263. See United States v. Morse, 569 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating "[i] n
Berkemer, the Supreme Court held that even though a motorist is seized during a
traffic stop, Miranda warnings are not required where the motorist is not subjected to
the functional equivalent of a formal arrest. Therefore, that [defendant-appellant]
reasonably believed that he was not free to terminate the encounter with [the officer]
does not resolve whether Miranda warnings were required in order to elicit admissible
statements from [defendant-appellant] ") (citing Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d at 592 for the
proposition that the Eighth Circuit has rejected the "broad contention that a person
is in custody for Miranda purposes whenever a reasonable person would not feel free
to leave") (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
264. In fact, courts within the same federal district have reached different
conclusions within the same year. Specifically, the Gelb and Treacle decisions, one of
which followed Pelayo-Ruelas and one of which followed Martinez, were both decided
in 2008 by courts within the District of Nebraska, making it even more apparent that a
split exists within the Eighth Circuit on the issue of Miranda warnings and coercive
Terry detentions similar to the split that exists among the federaljudiciary as a whole.
See Treacle, 2008 WL 5423743; United States v. Gelb, No. 8:08CR10, 2008 WL
4866338 (D. Neb. Nov. 7, 2008).
265. United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08CR14OclOGRJ, 2008 WL 2600787, at
2010] 1521
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cited for this proosition are the First Circuit's decision in United
States v. Trueber and the Fourth Circuit case of United States v.
Leshuk.26' Although neither case states directly that Miranda warnings
are never warranted in Terry detentions, the decisions in each of the
cases support the categorization given to them in Artiles-Martin.
1. The First Circuit
In Trueber, the First Circuit addressed a government appeal of a
lower court decision to suppress statements made by defendant
Trueber, an Austrian national who travelled to the United States via
the Dominican Republic, during a traffic stop and subsequent search
of a hotel room.2' 6 Briefly stated, Trueber came to law enforcement's
attention when his name was found in the possession of an individual
named Lemmerer, who was arrested when he was found to be in
possession of five kilograms of cocaine upon entering the United
States.' 69  Further investigation of Trueber provided additional
information that caused law enforcement to suspect that he was an
associate of Lemmerer and was further engaged in illegal activity,
including the fact that Trueber had a relationship with two companies
that were under investigation for illegal activities that included drug•  . 270g
trafficking and money laundering. After a period of surveillance,
three customs agents and at least two local law enforcement officers
conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Trueber was a passen-271
ger. During the stop, officers did the following: removed Trueber
and the driver from the vehicle; ordered the driver to get down on the
ground and later stand up and put his hands on the vehicle; con-
ducted a pat-down frisk of Trueber; asked Trueber a number of
questions about his reason for being in the United States and his
relationship with the driver; and obtained consent to search a suitcase
272that Trueber had placed in the vehicle. The suitcase was later
determined to contain items that officers later testified were used by
drug traffickers to attempt to mask the odor of certain controlled
273
substances. At some point during the encounter, which lasted
*11 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2008).
266. United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001).
267. 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995).
268. See Trueber, 238 F.3d at 82-83.
269. Id. at 82.
270. See id.
271. Id. at 83.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 83.
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about fifteen minutes, one of the customs agents drew his gun and
pointed it at the ground, though there was some question as to
274
whether Trueber saw the gun. Trueber further raised the officers'
suspicions by giving conflicting information about where he had been
staying while in the United States and his relationship with the driver
275
of the vehicle. Finally, the customs agents obtained Trueber's
consent to search his hotel room, so all of the parties travelled to
Trueber's hotel where he was further questioned and a search
276
conducted 7. During the questioning, Trueber continued to make
statements that were either inconsistent with statements that he had
made previously or were inconsistent with what was being found
during the search of the hotel room; Trueber also admitted to agents
that he knew the person arrested the day before and that they had
27
made plans to meet upon that person's arrival in the United States.
The interview in the hotel room lasted approximately one hour and
twenty minutes, and although Trueber was never told that he was not
free to leave, when he asked about that issue he was told that he was
not under arrest but that " [w] e are just questioning you. ' '2" He was
also allowed to use the bathroom but was told to keep the door ajar
and when he asked to look in one of his bags he was told that one of
the agents would locate the item for him.279 Trueber was ultimately
arrested and charged in connection with the cocaine found on
Lemmerer the previous day.'8° During suppression proceedings, the
district court found that "for purposes of Miranda, Trueber was in
custody when questioned [by customs agents] and, therefore, all
statements violated Miranda and should be suppressed.
281
The First Circuit ultimately reversed and vacated the district
2812
court's suppression order. In doing so, the court began by referenc-
ing prior First and Ninth Circuit case law for the proposition that
283
Miranda generally does not have a place in Terry detentions. The
court noted that "[a] s a general rule, Terry stops do not implicate the
requirements of Miranda because 'Terry stops, though inherently
somewhat coercive, do not usually involve the type of police dominat-
274. Id. at 84.
275. See id. at 83-84.





281. Id. at 91 (alteration in original).
282. Id. at 96.
283. Id. at 92.
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ed or compelling atmosphere which necessitates Miranda warn-
ings."284 Noting that the stop of Trueber's vehicle wasjustified under
Terry and that therefore "without administering Miranda warnings, the
agents were entitled to stop the truck, detain its occupants, and
pursue a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicions quickly, , and further noting that "[t]he central
issue in this case is whether an otherwise valid Terry stop escalated into
a de facto arrest necessitating the administration of Miranda warn-
,,186ings, the Truebercourt, referencing Berkemer, held that "the target of
a Terry stop must be advised of his Miranda rights if and when he is
'subject to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal
arrest.'"287 These statements by the Trueber court are significant for
the reason that, unlike other circuit courts that have addressed the
issue, the Treuber court did not recognize the existence of a hybrid
Terry-Miranda situation in which a person is detained pursuant to Terry
and therefore not under de facto or actual arrest, yet at the same time
is entitled to Miranda warnings before questioning. Additionally, the
court nowhere recognized that there should be separate Fourth and
Fifth Amendment analyses. Based on the nature and wording of the
opinion, the Treuber court made it clear that, in its view, either a
person is detained pursuant to Terry and is not entitled to Miranda
warnings, or that initial investigative detention has escalated or
transformed into a de facto arrest for which warnings are required.1
88
In answering whether, under the facts presented, there was a va-
lid Terry stop or a de facto arrest, the First Circuit first acknowledged
that "[t] here is no scientifically precise formula that enables courts to
distinguish between investigatory stops.., and... 'de facto ar-
rests.' 2 8 9 That said, Trueber nevertheless held that the appropriate
analysis for determining whether a situation has become a de facto
arrest for which Miranda warnings are required "is [to determine]
'how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would have understood
his situation.' 29' Later the court added additional detail to the nature
of the inquiry, noting that a court must consider
whether and when a reasonable person in [a defendant's]
284. Id. (quoting United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 958 (1st Cir. 1986)
(quoting United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1982)).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 92-93.
287. Id. at 93 (quoting Berkemerv. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984)).
288. See id. at 79.
289. Id. at 93 (quoting United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971, 975 (1st Cir. 1994)).
290. Id. (quoting Stansburyv. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994)).
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position would have believed that he was actually in police
custody and being constrained to a degree associated with
formal arrest (rather than simply undergoing a brief period
of detention at the scene while the police sought by means
of a moderate number of questions to determine his identity
and to obtain information confirming or dispelling their
suspicions) .
This determination, the court explained, "turns on an assess-
ment" of certain factors, which "include [s], among other inquiries,
'whether the suspect was questioned in familiar or at least neutral
surroundings, the number of law enforcement officers present at the
scene, the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect, and
the duration and character of the interrogation.' 292 Curiously,
Trueber cited Thompson as authority for the proposition that " [t] he
'ultimate inquiry' . .. is whether there was a 'formal arrest or restraint
on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest; ' 293 however, nowhere did it mention Thompson's reasonable
person test and did not establish a determination of whether a
reasonable person would feel free to terminate an investigation and
294
leave as being a relevant standard for the analysis. In fact, while it
further cited Thompson for the proposition that a custody determina-
tion involves "two discrete inquiries," it substituted its own standard
for Thompson's second inquiry, thus leaving out the determination of
whether a reasonable person would feel free to terminate an investi-
gation and leave as a factor in the analysis.
The Trueber court next addressed the facts of the case before it,
and in the context of that discussion, referenced a number of prior
court decisions in which a detention of a person was determined to be
a Terry detention rather than a de facto arrest requiring Miranda
296
warnings despite the use of coercive action by law enforcement.
The first case referenced by the Trueber court was that of United States
297
v. Taylor. In Taylor, as described by the Trueber court, the First
Circuit held that "a valid Terry stop did not mature into a de facto
arrest when police cruisers stopped a car, blocked it, and two officers
291. Id. (quoting United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 962 (1st Cir. 1986))
(alterations in original).
292. Id. (quoting United States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 711 (1st Cir. 1996)).
293. Id. (citations omitted).
294. See id. at 79.
295. See id. at 93.
296. See id. at 94.
297. 162 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1998).
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drew their weapons when approaching the car. ''298 According to the
decision in Tayloritself, the detained persons were also removed from
their vehicle and "secured on the ground and searched for wea-
pons,"2 "ten to twelve officers [were] on the scene,"300 and "the
detention lasted approximately thirty minutes."' Yet despite these
arguably coercive actions on the part of law enforcement, the Taylor
court still held that "the actions of... [the] officers, when viewed in
the totality of circumstances then confronting them, fit within the
contours of a permissible Terry stop."3°2 This conclusion, the court
noted, was based on the fact that "[u] nder these circumstances, we
cannot say that the district court erred in concluding that a reasona-
ble person, standing in Taylor's shoes, would have understood, at the
time, that he was being briefly detained for inquiry and investigation,
not arrested.
3 0 3
Next, the Trueber court made a brief reference to its decision in
United States v. Trullo,3° 4 another First Circuit decision in which the
court held that a police officer's use of a drawn weapon did not
convert an investigative detention into an arrest for Miranda purpos-
es. Trueber also referenced United States v. Zapata 6 for the proposi-
tion that "[m]ere numbers [of law enforcement officers] do not
automatically convert a lawful Teny stop into something more
forbidding. ' '31 Further, the court referenced United States v. Sharpe
°8
309and United States v. Owens for precedent supporting the view that a
detention does not become a de facto arrest simply because it lasts for• 310
more than a couple of minutes.
In the end, the First Circuit made two determinations as to Tru-
eber's claim that he was in Miranda custody. First, it held unequivo-
298. Trueber, 238 F.3d at 94 (referencing Taylor, 162 F.3d at 21).




303. Id. at 22.
304. 809 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1987).
305. See id. at 113 ( "It cannot be said that a display of a gun by a police officer
automatically converts a stop into an arrest.").
306. 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994).
307. United States v. Trueber, 238 F.3d 79, 94 (lst Cir. 2001) (quoting Zapata, 18
F.3d at 976) (alteration in original).
308. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
309. 167 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1999).
310. See Trueber, 238 F.3d at 94. The periods of detention in Sharpe and Owens,
which again were held to be Terry detentions instead of Miranda custody, were twenty
minutes and fifty minutes respectively. See id.
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cally that the initial detention of Trueber at the time that he was
pulled over and removed from his vehicle was a Terry stop and
nothing more; and therefore, Miranda warnings were not required
and Trueber's statements were inappropriately suppressed.3 ' Second,
with respect to the statements made in Trueber's hotel room as it was
being searched by Customs agents, the court opted to remand that
issue-as well as the issue of whether Trueber's consent to the search
of his room was truly voluntary-"for application of the correct legal
,,312test for determining custody while in the hotel room.
2. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit case cited for the proposition that Miranda
warnings are not required during investigative detentions even when
there are some coercive elements involved is United States v. Leshuk,
313
a marijuana manufacturing prosecution in which the defendant-
appellant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to
suppress both statements made to law enforcement and evidence
discovered as a result of a search. Curiously, in Leshuk the district
court found that the conduct of the law enforcement officers present
"during the questioning was neither coercive nor intimidating," a
contention with which the Fourth Circuit does not appear to disag-
ree.314 However, given the posture taken by the court in its discussion
of the general legal principles governing Terry detentions and Miranda
custody, the Artiles-Martin court appears to be on the right track when
it placed the Fourth Circuit in the category of those circuits that have
held that the existence of coercive elements in a Terry interrogation
does not automatically place the detainee in Miranda custody for the
purposes of limited questioning.3S
The prosecution of Leshuk arose when Leshuk and a co-
defendant were arrested and charged with violations of the federal
drug laws. In April of 1994, a turkey hunter discovered a marijuana
grow operation in a rural area of West Virginia.116 The hunter
reported the site to law enforcement, and when he was directing them
to the area in question the hunter and two sheriff deputies came
311. See id. at 95.
312. Id. at 95-96.
313. 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
314. Id. at 1110.
315. See United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08-CR-14-Oc-1OGRJ, 2008 WL
2600787, at *11 n.38 (M.D. Fla.June 30, 2008).
316. See id. at 1106.
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across Leshuk and his friend.1 7 The turkey hunter was the first to
discover Leshuk and when he did so he announced that "this is the
sheriffs office," ordered Leshuk and his companion to raise their
hands, and indicated that he or the officers would shoot Leshuk's dog
if he did not call it off."8 The hunter also at one point briefly held
Leshuk by the arm. 319 During this encounter Leshuk and his friend
were questioned about why they were in the area of the marijuana
grow and were confronted about whether or not they owned two
backpacks and a large plastic garbage bag later determined to contain
marijuana plants, all three of which were found in the immediate
vicinity of the detainees.Y In response to the questioning Leshuk
identified himself, told the officers how he had come to be in the
321
area, and denied ownership of the backpacks and the garbage bag.
Leshuk was thereafter arrested and charged. 22 Following a condi-
tional guilty plea to aiding and abetting the manufacture of marijua-
na,32 3 Leshuk appealed his conviction and sentence, claiming that his
constitutional rights were violated when he was detained and
questioned by law enforcement after he was discovered in the vicinity
324of a marijuana cultivation site. Specifically, "Leshuk contend [ed]
that the scope of the detention exceeded a Terry stop and was a
custodial interrogation for Miranda purposes because a reasonable
person in his position would have believed that he was in custody and
not free [to leave] from the very beginning of the encounter until the
time [of his] arrest."32 5 As noted elsewhere in this article, a number of
courts have accepted some version of this reasonable person test as
the appropriate test for determining whether a Teny detention has
317. Id. at 1106-07.
318. Id. at 1107.
319. Id. at 1110.
320. Id. at 1107.
321. Id.
322. Id. To avoid any issues arising from the turkey hunter's actions, the Fourth
Circuit approached the case with the assumption "that a reasonable person might
have believed that the hunter was a law enforcement official." Id. at 1110 n.3.
323. Id. at 1108. Specifically, Leshuk pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)
and 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1) (2006). Id. at 1107-08.
324. Id. at 1108.
325. Id. at 1109. While the district court ultimately denied Leshuk's motion to
suppress, it did so despite a magistratejudge's recommendation that his statements to
law enforcement be suppressed. Id at 1108. The magistrate judge made this
recommendation "based on his finding that a reasonable person in the defendants'
position would have understood that he was in custody and not free to leave from the
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transformed into Miranda custody. 6 In Leshuk, however, the Fourth
Circuit, like the Martinez dissent discussed above, unequivocally
rejected this version of the reasonable person test as being inconsis-
tent with the general nature of and principles supporting the Terry
327detention. In so doing, the Fourth Circuit noted that the reasona-
ble person test put forth by Leshuk is "important to the assessment of
whether a stop is considered custodial given that 'the initial determi-
nation of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the
interrogating officers or the person being questioned.'"328 But while
the Leshuk court noted the "importance" of the reasonable person test
set forth by Leshuk, it concluded that a "reasonable person['s] ...
belie[f] that he was in custody and not free [to leave]" was not
enough to convert a Terry stop to Miranda custody.329 The court wrote:
Such an objective belief, however, does not necessarily trans-
form a lawful Terry stop into a custodial interrogation requir-
ing Miranda warnings. As this Court has reasoned, " [t]he
perception... that one is not free to leave is insufficient to
convert a Terry stop into an arrest. A brief but complete re-
striction of liberty is valid under Terry. 3 30 In fact, Terry stops
customarily involve "detentions where the person detained is
not technically free to leave while the officer pursues the
investigation.
In other words, as the Pelayo-Ruelas court noted, the objective beliefs
of a reasonable person regarding whether or not that person is free to
terminate an investigative detention and walk away do not ultimately
determine whether that person's detention has changed from a Terry
stop to Miranda custody because in a Terry stop a detainee truly is not
free to leave until law enforcement has completed the investigation
332
that led to or resulted from the stop.
326. See supra Part III.A; infra Part V.A.2.
327. Id. at I110.
328. Id. at 1109 (quoting Stansburyv. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)).
329. Id.
330. Id. (quoting United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1978)).
331. Id. (quoting United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 376-77 (4th Cir.
1984)).
332. See Moore, 817 F.2d at 1108.
Appellant nonetheless contends that the stop and frisk were so intrusive
that they amounted to an arrest without probable cause. He argues that,
because he did not feel free to leave during the stop, he was in a custodial
situation. The perception, however, that one is not free to leave is insuffi-
cient to convert a Terry stop into an arrest. A brief but complete restriction
of liberty is valid under Terry.
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In its opinion in Leshuk the Fourth Circuit also acknowledged
precedent from multiple federal circuit court decisions throughout
the United States supporting the idea that the employment of such
arguably coercive acts as "drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect,
placing a suspect in a patrol car for questioning, or using or threaten-
ing to use force does not necessarily elevate a lawful stop into a
custodial arrest for Miranda purposes."3 This precedent, the court
wrote, is supported by the fact that "[i] nstead of being distinguished
by the absence of any restriction of liberty, Terry stops differ from
custodial interrogation in that they must last no longer than necessary
to verify or dispel the officer's suspicions. In other words, the
Leshuk court took the position that it is not the presence or absence of
a restriction on a detainee's liberty that determines whether one is
detained pursuant to Terry or, alternatively, is in Miranda custody,
because restrictions on liberty are a part of Terry detentions. Rather,
the primary issue is the length of time that a person is detained.
Additionally, the court also rejected Leshuk's contention that when
coercive tactics are employed, a Terry detention becomes Miranda
custody when "officers do not take [any] affirmative steps" to "'reduce
the intensity' of the initial contact" or "inform [] the defendants that
they could leave or could remain silent. "33' And in much the same
vein, the Leshuk court placed some emphasis on a law enforcement
officer's ability, when conducting a Terry stop, "to 'take such steps as
[are] reasonably necessary to protect [his or her] personal safety and
to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.' In
Leshuk those steps included such potentially coercive actions as
announcing the presence of law enforcement officers, holding
Leshuk by the arm, instructing him to put his hands in the air and call
off his dog, and conducting a pat-down search or frisk of Leshuk and
his companion, all of which were found to be an appropriate and
lawful part of the Terry detention.3 7
Finally, the Leshuk decision also addressed the admissibility of
Leshuk's unwarned statements. On that issue, the Fourth Circuit
Id.
333. Leshuk, 65 F.3d at 1109-10 (citing Manbeck, 744 F.2d at 377-80; Moore, 817
F.2d at 1108).
334. Id, at 1109.
335. Id. at 1110.
336. Id. at 1109 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1984)
("When the ... officers stopped Hensley, they were authorized to take such steps as
were reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status
quo during the course of the stop.")).
337. Seeid.at 1107, 1110.
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concluded that the questioning was reasonably related to the purpose
of the detention and was therefore proper because "[o]fficers may
temporarily detain an individual under Terry for purposes of question-
ing the individual .... .ss8 As was the case in Trueber, the Fourth
Circuit in Leshuk did not distinguish between the concept of Miranda
custody and formal or de facto arrest, but treated them as being the
same thing. Furthermore, while it did not contend that such a
situation cannot theoretically arise, the Leshuk court similarly did not
acknowledge or support the possibility that there can be a situation in
which a person is detained during a lawful Terry stop and yet must still
be provided with Miranda warnings. The court's conclusion, to the
contrary, was that Miranda warnings were not required when Leshuk
was questioned by the officers because the Terry stop was lawful and
officers are permitted to ask reasonable and pertinent questions of a
person detained pursuant to Teny.339
With regard to the decisions in Trueber and Leshuk, nowhere in
the decisions do the First and Fourth Circuits come out and directly
or unequivocally say that Miranda warnings are never required during
coercive Terry detentions. Given the tenor of the opinions, however,
and the fact that they do not distinguish between an arrest and
Miranda custody and do not treat them as separate and distinct
concepts, the Artiles-Martin court did not appear to be off base in
placing these two federal circuits on that side of the circuit split that is
the topic of this article.
C. The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits: Warnings are
Required During Coercive Investigative Detentions
Once again, in defining the circuit split "over whether coercive
Terry stops constitute Miranda custody," the Artiles-Martin court noted
that the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits "hold that a
coercive Terry stop requires warnings but still is deemed a valid Terry
stop." 40 The cases that are cited for this proposition are the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Ah, the Seventh Circuit's
decision in United States v. Smith,342 the Ninth Circuit's decision in
338. Id. at 1110.
339. Id.
340. United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08-CR-14-Oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL 2600787,
at *11 n.38 (M.D. Fla.June 30, 2008).
341. 68 F.3d 1468 (2nd Cir. 1995).
342. 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993).
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United States v. Kim,34' and finally, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Perdue.s 4
1. The Second Circuit
In a change of pace from its description of the position of the
First and Fourth Circuits, the Artiles-Martin court referenced the
Second Circuit as one that "hold [s] that a coercive Terry stop requires
warnings but still is deemed a valid Terry stop." '45 The case cited in
Artiles-Martin in support of that claim is United States v. Au. 34  Ali was
an appeal of defendant-appellant Ali's conviction for various federal
offenses stemming from his being caught attempting to transport a
number of shotguns in checked luggage on an international flight
leavingJFK Airport in New York City. The firearms were discovered
by an X-ray examiner who reported the finding to Customs officials."'
Prior to boarding his airplane, Ali was pulled from the boarding area
into an "adjacent corridor" and questioned without Miranda warnings
by a group of seven Customs officials, a number of whom were in
uniform and had visible firearms. 49 During the questioning Ali
initially lied about the circumstances of his having the firearms, but
later admitted to transporting them illegally.350 Ali was arrested,
charged criminally, and filed a motion to suppress his statements to
Customs officials on the ground that he was not provided with
Miranda warnings prior to questioning.151 When asked about Ali's
status at the time that he was confronted by the Customs officials, one
of the involved agents testified at a suppression hearing that Ali,
though not formally arrested, was not free to leave the place where he
was being questioned.3 5 ' Despite that testimony, the district court
denied Ali's motion to suppress, which Ali thereafter appealed to the
Second Circuit.3
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling
354
on the motion to suppress. In a relatively short opinion, the court
343. 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002).
344. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
345. Artiles-Martin, 2008 WL 2600787, at *11 n.38.
346. 68 F.3d 1468.
347. Id. at 1470.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 1471.
351. Id. at 1470.
352. Id. at 1471.
353. Id. at 1470-71.
354. Id. at 1475.
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first noted that the standard set by the Miranda decision was that
custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."3 5 Based on
that language and the Supreme Court's decision in Berkemer, the
Second Circuit held that for Miranda purposes, "[a] n accused is in
'custody' when, in the absence of an actual arrest, law enforcement
officials act or speak in a manner that coveys the message that they
would not permit the accused to leave." 56 The Court further stated
that "[t] he proper inquiry is thus whether a reasonable person in [the
appellant's] shoes would have felt free to leave under the circums-" ,357
tances. Upon making that inquiry in Ali's case, the Second Circuit
determined that, given the circumstances, a reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave and therefore Ali should have been
provided with Miranda warnings.) 8
In addition to holding that Ali should have been given Miranda
warnings prior to being questioned, the Second Circuit went a step
further and held that in such a context, whether a detention is lawful
under Terry is irrelevant to the Miranda analysis. 9 Specifically, the
court held:
[W] hether the "stop" was permissible under Terry v. Ohio...
is irrelevant to the Miranda analysis. Terry is an "exception"
to the Fourth Amendment probable cause requirement, not
to the Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination. The fact that the seizure and search of a sus-
pect comports with the Fourth Amendment under Terry
simply does not determine whether the suspect's contempo-
raneous oral admissions may be used against him or her at
trial.36
Thus the Ali court set the standard within the Second Circuit that
Terry and Miranda, in essence, have nothing to do with one another in
the sense that one can be appropriately detained pursuant to Terry
and still be entitled to Miranda warnings-a holding much different
from that of its First and Fourth Circuit counterparts.36 The court
355. Id. at 1472 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
356. Id. (quoting Campaneriav. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1021 n.1 (2nd Cir. 1989)).
357. Id. at 1473.
358. Id. at 1472-73.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. A handful of courts have accepted the Ali court's holding that Miranda and
Terry are completely unrelated and irrelevant to one another. See, e.g., United States
v. Bailey, 468 F.Supp.2d 373, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("[T]he Second Circuit has made
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further held that even if Ali was properly detained under Teny---and
the court never stated whether he was or was not-Miranda warnings




Much like the Eighth Circuit, however, the Second Circuit has
shown some inconsistency in formulating a test for Miranda custody.
Ali is regularly cited by those courts and commentators addressing the
circuit split at issue in this article, but a comprehensive review of
Second Circuit jurisprudence on the issue cannot be complete
without addressing the Second Circuit's later decision in Cruz v.
Miller,6 where it noted that "[t]he cases in our Circuit seem not
entirely consistent,3A on the issue of Miranda and Terry detentions.
Unlike Ali, Cruz was not a criminal case being prosecuted in the
federal courts, but was a federal habeas case addressing a crime
prosecuted in the New York state courts. One of the primary issues
before the Cruz court was "whether the state courts made an 'unrea-
sonable application' of clearly established Supreme Court law in
determining that the circumstances under which a suspect was
stopped and questioned on a public street did not result in 'custody'
• .. , • ,365
requiring Miranda warnings.
Briefly stated, the underlying criminal case involved a shooting in
an area of the Bronx that was known for regular drug activity.36 Two
witnesses to the shooting provided a description of the shooter and
the direction that he went after the crime was committed. 36' Based on
that information, law enforcement eventually stopped Cruz because
clear that the issue about whether an investigatory stop is reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment is separate from whether the seized suspect is 'in custody' for
purposes of Miranda.... Thus, in the instant case, the lawfulness of [the defen-
dant's] initial stop and detention during the search does not end the inquiry.") See
also United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659,673 (2nd Cir. 2004) ("This court has had few
occasions to consider when an investigative stop ... rises to the level of Miranda
custody.. . . Some courts have concluded that where an investigatory stop is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the seized suspect is not 'in custody' for
purposes of Miranda. This court, however, has specifically rejected Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness as the standard for resolving Miranda custody challenges.... A
number of our sister circuits are in agreement. Thus, instead of asking whether the
degree of restraint was reasonable, we have focused on 'whether a reasonable person
in defendant's position would have understood himself to be subjected to the
restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest." (citations omitted))
362. Id. at 1472-73.
363. 255 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 2001).
364. Id. at 85.
365. Id. at 77.
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he matched the description that they had been provided.' 68 The
officers approached Cruz with their guns drawn and one of them
ordered him to stop moving and put his hands in the air.' 69 After
calling for the eye witnesses to be transported to the location of the
stop, one of the officers began to question Cruz about his recent
whereabouts and Cruz's subsequent claim that he was in a certain area
buying drugs.30 Cruz was apparently crying at some point during the
questioning-an officer asked him about it and he responded that he
was crying because he was scared of having a gun pointed in his
face. 1' He was also described as "shaking and [acting] very upset
throughout the conversation. Cruz was not physically restrained
during the questioning, but there were at least six or seven officers on
scene and the officers asking the questions "acknowledged that had
Cruz tried to walk away, they would not have allowed him to
leave .. . .. That fact, however, was never communicated to Cruz.
374
After a witness positively identified him as the shooter, Cruz was
arrested. 375 He was not provided with Miranda warnings until after his
376
arrest.
Cruz was charged with second-degree murder in connection with
the shooting and a suppression hearing was held in which the state
trial court addressed the circumstances of his questioning.377
Specifically, Cruz argued that when he was questioned he was
subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda
warnings. 78 As noted in the Second Circuit's opinion, the trial court
rejected Cruz's assertion that he had been subjected to custodial
interrogation, ruling instead that "the questioning was not an
'interrogation' but rather 'investigatory in nature,' since the 'police
officers did not know whether they actually had the right person,' and
the inquiry was 'prior to the time that the show up was conducted for
the purpose of the identification.' 3 79 The trial court did not explicitly







374. Id. at 78-79.
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were such that Cruz was in "custody" for Miranda purposes.80
Following a denial of his motion to suppress, the case went to trial
38 1where Cruz was convicted of first-degree manslaughter.
In the context of the federal habeas case, the Second Circuit
upheld the conviction.8 2 In doing so, the court engaged in a lengthy
discussion of the law of custodial interrogation and the Supreme
Courtjurisprudence that had developed that law.383 In the course of
that discussion the Second Circuit referenced a handful of important
points and issues that have arisen since the original Miranda decision
384was handed down. First, in its discussion of the original Miranda
decision, the Second Circuit noted that the Miranda decision
explicitly stated that it "was not intended to apply to '[g] eneral on-the-
scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process.' 38 5 This fact, the
court wrote, "created a potential conflict that subsequent decisions
,386have not entirely eliminated." This conflict arises from the fact that
Miranda warnings are required whenever any person is "deprived [of]
his freedom of action in any significant way" since "most people
stopped by police on a street and asked questions would not feel free
to leave," and "general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surround-
ing a crime" are exempted from the requirement of Miranda warn-
ings.3" This conflict became "more troublesome," the Second Circuit
noted, once the Supreme Court decided Teny, in which it permitted
investigative detentions on less than probable cause but also "explicit-
ly declined to decide the 'propriety of an investigative seizure' .. . for
purposes of... interrogation... . In reviewing this issue, the Cruz
court also acknowledged Justice White's concurring opinion in Teny
in which he argued that "if the investigative stop is sustainable at all,
constitutional rights are not necessarily violated if pertinent questions
are asked and the person is restrained briefly in the process."
389
The Cruz court next cited a few subsequent cases that it posited
addressed the relationship between Miranda and Terry.390 The first
380. Id.
381. See id.
382. Id. at 78.
383. See id. at 80-87.
384. See id.
385. Id. at 81 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966)).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
389. Id. at 81 n.3 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 (White,J, concurring)).
390. See id. at 81-82.
1536 [Vol. 36:4
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case cited was United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,3 9' which the court found
to contain the "implication" that Miranda warnings were not required
when an immigration officer "question [ed] [a] driver and passengers
about their citizenship and immigration status, and... ask[ed] them
to explain [the] suspicious circumstances 3 9 2 that led to their being
stopped, even when those questions sought incriminating information
that went directly to the crime being investigated. The court nextS. 393
referenced Oregon v. Mathiason, noting that in that case the
Supreme Court "made it clear that Miranda warnings are not required
simply because 'the questioning took place in [either] a 'coercive
environment'" 394 or in a non-public setting, and that a "noncustodial
situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply
because a reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement, the questioning took
place in a 'coercive environment.' 3915 According to the Second
Circuit, the Mathiason decision found subsequent support in California
v. Beheler,s96 which held that "whether a suspect is 'in custody' for
purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest., 397 The Cruz
court also addressed United States v. Mendenhall,39 noting that while
the Supreme Court was developing a "freedom of movement"
standard for the application of Miranda warnings, "it was [simulta-
neously] developing what appeared to be a similar 'free to leave'
standard for determining when a seizure occurred for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment."' 99 Mendenhall the Second Circuit noted, played
a part in the development of that standard as it held that "a Fourth
Amendment 'seizure' occurs 'only if, in view of all of the circums-
tances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.'400
391. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
392. Cruz, 255 F.3d at 81 (quoting Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82).
393. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
394. Cruz, 255 F.3d at 81 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
395. Id. at 82 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
396. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
397. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (quoting Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495).
398. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
399. Cruz, 255 F.3d at 82.
400. Id. (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). The Mendenhall Court listed
several factors that played a part in determining whether there had been a seizure,
including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or
tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be
15372010]
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After discussing the Terry-seizure and Miranda-custody standards,
the Second Circuit next turned to Berkemer v. McCarty,"' in which the
402Supreme Court addressed the two situations in a single case. As
noted above and by the Second Circuit in the Cruz decision, Berkemer
held that "in a typical traffic stop, Miranda warnings are not re-
quired. The Cruz court further noted the Berkemer Court's holding
that the "comparatively nonthreatening character of [Terry] deten-
tions... explains the absence of any suggestion ... that Teny stops
are subject to the dictates of Miranda, "  while at the same time
recognizing that the Supreme Court simultaneously acknowledged
that traffic stops that go beyond a certain duration "could present
circumstances amounting to 'custody.' 40 5 The analysis of Berkemer
continued with the Cruz court once again turning to the Supreme
Court's holding in Brignoni-Ponce that "once [a] stop has been made,
'the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to
determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or
dispelling the officer's suspicions.' 40 6 The Cruz court also recognized
that there are some problems with the Berkemer test.40 7 Specifically,
after noting that the Berkemer test asks "how a reasonable man in the
suspect's position would have understood his situation, 4 0 8 the Cruz
court commented that:
[T]his cryptic reference to the suspect's "situation" left it
unclear whether the Court was applying the "freedom of
movement" standard from custodial interrogation cases such
as Mathiason and Beheleror the "free to leave" standard from
Fourth Amendment seizure cases such as Mendenhall... or
whether the two formulations are not meaningfully dis-
409
tinct.
In addressing the "cryptic reference" to the suspect's situation,
the Cruz court further stated that:
The opinion in Berkemer somewhat clarified what was
meant by the "situation" by referring to "those types of situa-
tions in which the concerns that powered [Miranda] are
compelled." Mendenhal4 446 U.S. at 554 (citations omitted).
401. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
402. See Cruz, 255 F.3d at 82.
403. Id. (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439).
404. Id. (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440).
405. Id. at 83 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441 n.34).
406. Id. (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439) (emphasis in Cruz decision).
407. See id. at 83.
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implicated." "Thus we must decide whether a traffic stop
exerts upon a detained person pressures that sufficiently im-
pair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitu-
tional rights. 41°
According to the Second Circuit's reading of Berkemer, relevant
circumstances include the length of a detention, the public nature of
the detention, and the number of law enforcement officers on scene
411during the seizure.
Noting the Supreme Court's acknowledgement in Oregon v. Els-
tad' 12 that "the task of defining 'custody' is a slippery one the Cruz
court then chose to "make some examination of how the federal
courts of appeals have analyzed the issue of custody for Miranda,,414 • ,
purposes to ascertain "the considerations that these courts have
considered relevant."41 5 This examination included references to
United States v. Leshuk,416 the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Salvo,417 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Booth,"' in
which the Ninth Circuit held that the relevant inquiry is "whether a
reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would conclude
that after brief questioninghe or she would not be free to leave., 4 9 The




recognizing that Ali incorrectly "placed considerable weight on
whether the suspect feels 'free to leave' without acknowledging that in
all Terry stops (and traffic stops), the suspect does not feel free to
leave, at least not while the permitted (brief) questioning is occur-
ring."42' The Cruz court further cited another of its own decisions-
United States v. Morales4 22-recognizing the holding in that case to be
that "custody itself does not necessarily require Miranda warnings:
'Only questioning that reflects a measure of compulsion above and
beyond that inherent in custody itself constitutes interrogation the
fruits of which may be received in evidence only after Miranda
410. Id. (citations omitted).
411. See id. at 83-84.
412. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
413. Id. at 309.
414. Cruz, 255 F.3d at 85.
415. Id. at 85.
416. 65 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1995).
417. 133 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 1998).
418. 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
419. Id. at 1235 (emphasis in Cruz decision).
420. 68 F.3d 1468 (2d Cir. 1996).
421. Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 85 (2001) (citation omitted).
422. 834 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1987).
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warnings have been given.
' 423
In concluding its discussion of the issue, the Cruz court deter-
mined that given the "the Supreme Court's lack of clear guidance on
the issue [of the interplay of Miranda and Terry] in the context of
sidewalk questioning," 24 the state court was not unreasonable in its
application of the law to Cruz's situation. While the court noted that
"some of the circumstances admittedly point toward custody,"4 5
including the drawing of weapons, ordering Cruz not to move and to
raise his hands, frisking him, and radioing for other officers to bring
witnesses to the scene for identification, it concluded that the
situation was such that the officers were reasonable in taking measures
to protect themselves from unknown but reasonably suspected
dangers.426 The court further noted that the statements that Cruz
tried to suppress "were made after very brief questioning of the sort
that could reasonably be thought not to make the suspect feel that heS• ,,427
was about to be held for a prolonged period of time and were of
the type that would assist in "confirming or dispelling the officer's
428suspicions" about Cruz's activities.
In summary, while not explicitly rejecting the reasoning and de-
cision in Ali, the Cruz court at the very least noted that there was room
for disagreement with that decision and that there are some circums-
tances in which Miranda warnings are not required-notwithstanding
the existence of what was arguably substantial coercion in the
effectuation of the Terry stop. It further noted, at least impliedly, that
there is a split on the issue of what test to apply for determining
Miranda custody within the Second Circuit as well.
2. The Seventh Circuit
The Artiles-Martin court referenced the Seventh Circuit's decision
in United States v. Smith as standing for the proposition that coercive
Terry stops require Miranda warnings. Smith, like many of the other
Terry-Miranda cases addressed by the courts, was a narcotics prosecu-
tion of a group of multiple defendants. 430 Law enforcement first
423. Cruz, 255 F.3d at 85 (quoting Morales, 834 F.2d at 38).
424. Id. at 85-86.
425. Id. at 86.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)).
429. See United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08-CR-14-Oc-1OGRJ, 2008 WL
2600787, at *11 n.38 (M.D. Fla.June 30, 2008).
430. See United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088, 1090 (7th Cir. 1993).
[Vol. 36:41540
74
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
MIRANDA & TERRY
became aware of Smith and his co-defendants when a motel clerk
reported that they appeared to be involved in drug-related activity.
During a subsequent investigation, law enforcement discovered
evidence which led them to believe that drug-related offenses were
being committed, including: information regarding significant foot
traffic going to and from the defendants' rooms, the defendants'
rooms being paid for in a suspicious manner, one defendant being
seen with a large sum of cash and cocaine residue, and a possible drug
ledger being found in trash discarded from the room.432 After a
period of time, law enforcement received word that the defendants
had checked out of the motel, had called for a taxi, and were on their
4533
way to the bus station, apparently to leave town. In order to prevent
them from leaving the area, officers stopped the taxicab.4 4 During
the course of that stop officers ordered the defendants out of the
vehicle, conducted a pat-search of each defendant, and handcuffed at
least two of the three before ordering them to sit on the ground.435 It
was also reported that at least one of the officers may have had a gun
drawn and held at his side.43 6 The officers also outnumbered the
suspects.437 Finally, during the encounter the officers asked each of
the defendants questions about who owned various bags within the
taxi and asked one of the defendants if he recognized one of the
officers from the motel. 438 At least two of the three admitted owning
some property within the taxi.439 Following a search of the luggage, a
significant amount of cocaine was found to be in the defendants'
440
possession.
In Smith, the Seventh Circuit addressed what it termed to be the
"complex problem" of deciding whether the Terry stop at issue
"required safeguards protecting the familiar Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights articulated in Miranda v. Arizona."44' Prior to addressing
the issue in full, the court noted the difficulty associated with the issue
of Miranda and Terry and that "the line between a lawful Terry stop and
431. Id. at 1091.
432. See id. at 1091-92.
433. See id. at 1092.
434. Id.
435. See id. at 1092-93.
436. Id. at 1092.
437. Id.
438. See id. at 1093.
439. See id.
440. See id.
441. Id. at lo9o.
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After discussing the general legal standards governing Terry stops,
the court determined that the officers had reasonable suspicion to
justify the stop and that the degree and duration of the restraints
employed, including the use of handcuffs, were also reasonable.44 3
That conclusion, however, did not end the inquiry. At the trial level,
the district court had held that the defendants "rights under Miranda
were not violated because they were not in custody when they made
these statements. '"" The Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed, noting
that any "inquiry into the circumstances of temporary detention for a
Fifth and Sixth Amendment Miranda analysis requires a different
focus than that for a Fourth Amendment Terry stop. '445 That focus,
the court wrote, "is much narrower " 44 6 since " [ t] he number of relevant
factors is severely limited"447 and " [p]olice officers have much less
discretion than in Fourth Amendment cases. " 44s The reason for the
different treatment of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment analyses, the
court held, was the difference in the rights protected by each. 44 It
wrote:
The purpose of permitting a temporary detention without
probable cause or a warrant is to protect police officers and
the general public....
The purpose of the Miranda rule, however, is not to pro-
tect the police or the public. "[T]he basis for [the] decision
was the need to protect the fairness of the trial ... " and
"[t] here is a vast difference between those rights that protect
a fair criminal trial and the rights guaranteed under the
Fourth Amendment."
4 50
Thus the court proceeded to analyze the case to determine
whether the defendants, though lawfully detained under Terry, were in
451
custody for Miranda purposes.
In conducting that analysis, the Seventh Circuit set forth its test
for determining whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes.
442. Id. at 1095 (quoting United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir.
1989)).
443. See id. at 1095-96.
444. Id. at 1096 (citation omitted).
445. Id.
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Referencing Berkemer and Beheler, the court determined that the
appropriate question to ask is whether a suspect was deprived of his
action in any significant way while at the same time taking into
account whether the suspect's freedom of action was curtailed to a
452degree associated with formal arrest. In terms of the Smith case,
after applying that standard the court determined that the defendant
"was not free to go anywhere" and that" [h] is movement was curtailed
as if he were handcuffed to a chair in a detective's office or placed in
a holding pen in a station house or put behind bars., 45'3 As such, the
court continued, "[w]e have no difficulty in concluding that [the
defendant-appellant's] freedom of action was curtailed in a very
significant way.",45 In support of its factual conclusion, the court
referenced other cases that had reached similar results.455
Finally, any review of Smith must necessarily include a look at one
particular statement in the opinion. In the middle of the court's
decision it writes that "Berkemer... underscores that Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights are implicated before a defendant has been
arrested."456 While one could read this statement to mean that the
court is referring to the fact that Miranda can come into play before a
formal arrest has taken place if the context of the detention has
transformed into a de facto arrest, the more logical interpretation of
this statement, based on the remainder of the opinion, is that the
Seventh Circuit reads Berkemer to mean that Miranda custody is a
separate and distinct inquiry from any analysis of Fourth Amendment
custody.
3. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit decision that has been associated with the view
"that a coercive Tery stop requires warnings but still is deemed a valid




455. Specifically, the court referenced United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040 (9th
Cir. 1993), in which the Ninth Circuit "held that when a suspect, who had not yet
been formally arrested, was handcuffed and placed in the back of a police car, he was
in custody for Miranda purposes." Smith, 3 F.3d at 1098 (citing Henley, 984 F.2d at
1042). The Seventh Circuit also noted that a similar conclusion was reached in United
States v. Sangineta-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1515 (6th Cir. 1988)). Id.
456. Id. at 1097.
457. United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08-cr-14-Oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL 2600787,
at *11 n.38 (M.D. Fla. June 30, 2008).
458. 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002).
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a district court's order suppressing incriminating statements made by
defendant Kim during the execution of a search warrant at a store
that she owned.459 After hearing the evidence, the district court
granted the motion to suppress on the ground that Kim was in
custody for Miranda purposes and therefore entitled to Miranda
warnings before questioning.
The case began with the execution of a search warrant at a deli
owned by Kim. 461 Law enforcement had received information that she
was selling large amounts of pseudoephedrine, a precursor chemical
in the production of methamphetamine, despite having been warned• 462
against such sales. Kim was not present at the store when officers
first began the search, but arrived as it was being executed. 4 ' At the
time of her arrival, her son was inside the store and was being
detained by DEA agents.46" Kim was allowed to enter the store but her
husband was kept out and the door was locked from the inside behind
her.46 ' Agents later told Kim that she was not to speak in Korean (her
son was still in the store but had been told not to speak with his
mother) and there was testimony that one of the agents even told her
to "shut up" at some point.466 After a period of time, a detective began
to question Kim though she was not provided with Miranda warnings
before the questioning began.467 Kim was not handcuffed during
questioning, but she did have multiple officers standing around her at
the time. 6g Kim was questioned for approximately thirty minutes
before an interpreter arrived, and for between fifteen and twenty
minutes afterwards.469 The facts were in dispute as to whether Kim was
told that she was not under arrest and was free to leave and whether
she was positioned in such a way that she could have left the area if470
she chose to do so. During the interview Kim admitted to being
involved in the large-scale sale of pseudoephedrine. 47' Kim was not
arrested at the scene, but was later indicted and, as noted above, filed








467. See id. at 971-72.










and successfully argued a motion to suppress her statements.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling
finding Kim was in custody for Miranda purposes when she made the
incriminating statements at issue.47' The test set forth in the Kim
opinion included a number of elements. First, the court noted that it
needed to first examine "all of the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation 47 4 to determine "whether there [was] a formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest., 475 The inquiry, the court noted, is an objective one,
and involves a determination of "whether 'the officers established a
setting from which a reasonable person would believe that he or she
was not free to leave.' ' 476 The court also provided what it stated was a
non-exhaustive list of factors that were potentially relevant to the-- . • 477
required determination. Based on its application of the referenced
test and factors for consideration, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
4781district court's order of suppression.
An obvious issue in the case was the fact that Kim went to the
store on her own and voluntarily entered the store knowing that law
enforcement officers were present inside. In its discussion of that
issue, the court noted that there is precedent in support of the view
that voluntarily entering a location where law enforcement is present
is a factor that goes against a finding of custody.479 In this regard the
Ninth Circuit noted that both Beheler and Mathiason-cases in which
defendants voluntarily went to a police location and after answering
questions were allowed to leave-found that the interviewees were not
in Miranda custody despite being questioned in a police station.4
°
Despite this precedent, however, the court distinguished Kim's
situation because, it found, her entry into her store was not with the
intent to voluntarily speak with law enforcement, but instead was to
472. Id.
473. Id. at 971.
474. Id. at 973.
475. Id. (quoting Stansburyv. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)).
476. Id. at 973-74 (quoting United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578,580 (9th
Cir. 1987) modified, 830 F.2d 127 (9th Cir. 1987)).
477. See id. at 974. The list of factors, which came from United States v. Hayden, 260
F.3d 1062,1066 (9th Cir. 2001), included the language used to summon the detainee,
the extent to which the person was confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical
location, surroundings, length of the interview, and the amount of pressure applied
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check on her son's welfare.481 The court wrote:
If the police ask-not order-someone to speak to them
and that person comes to the police station, voluntarily, pre-
cisely to do so, the individual is likely to expect that he can
end the encounter. By contrast, someone who comes to her
own store with no intention of submitting to questioning is
not likely to harbor the same understanding once police
interrogation nonetheless begins-especially if, as here, she
is ordered to shut up, seated in isolation away from two oth-• • 482
er family members, and then questioned.
Finally, the court addressed two cases from other courts-one of
which was cited by the government in support of its assertion that Kim
was not in custody and therefore was not entitled to Miranda warn-
4851
ings-that arguably provided contrary authority. In doing so, the
court distinguished both cases and held that they did not warrant a484r 485
different result in Kim.
484 The first case, United States v. Crawford,
which is addressed in more detail below, was distinguished both on
the facts of that case-the Kim court found that the situation in
Crawford was not nearly as coercive as Kim's detention-and on the
fact that in that case the Fifth Circuit applied a more deferential
standard of review than that applied in Kim.486 The second case, the
487
Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Summers, was distinguished
based on the fact that in that case law enforcement did not interro-
488
gate the suspect. And in doing so, the Kim court noted once again
that "whether an individual detained during the execution of a search
warrant has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes and whether that individual is 'in custody' for Miranda
purposes are two different issues." 489
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Kimwas not unanimous. Specifi-
cally, there is a dissenting opinion in Kim that plainly sides with those
courts that have taken the position that Miranda warnings need not be
given during a non-arrest Terry detention, even if that detention has
some coercive aspects to it. 49 0 The dissent disagreed with the majori-
481. See id.
482. Id. at 974-75.
483. See id. at 975-76.
484. See id. at 975-77.
485. 52 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 1995).
486. See Kim, 292 F.3d at 975-76.
487. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
488. See Kim, 292 F.3d at 976.
489. Id.
490. See id. at 978-82 (O'Scannlain,J., dissenting).
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ty's determination that defendant Kim was in Miranda custody when
questioned by law enforcement. 491 The dissent began by noting that
"an officer's obligation to give the traditional Miranda warning to a
suspect applies only to custodial interrogation, 492 which, it wrote,
means that a court must determine "whether there was a formal arrest
or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a
formal arrest."493 Noting that this determination should be made by
applying an objective standard to avoid "imposing upon police
officers the often impossible burden of predicting whether the person
they question, because of characteristics peculiar to him, believes
himself to be restrained,"494 the dissent characterized the appropriate
test for determining whether a Terry detention has become Miranda
custody as "whether, based upon a review of all the pertinent facts, 'a
reasonable innocent person in such circumstances would conclude
that after brief questioning [she] would not be free to leave.' 495 In
support of its position, and in support of the view that Miranda
warnings are not required simply because a detention has a coercive
aspect to it, the dissent referenced a handful of what it found to be
helpful cases. One such case was Crawford, the decision from the Fifth
496Circuit distinguished by the Kim majority. In describing the rather
coercive circumstances involved in that case and the Fifth Circuit's
ultimate holding that the coercive interrogation did not rise to the
level of Miranda custody, the Kim dissent noted first that Crawford
involved the detention of two suspects during the execution of a• , . .491
search warrant in the suspects' electronics store. In Crawford the
officers executing the search warrant "did not tell defendants that
they were or were not free to leave, the defendants... could not
491. Id. at 978.
492. Id.
493. Id. (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)).
494. Id. (quoting United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir.
1987)).
495. Id. (quoting United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1981)).
The dissent also referenced United States v. Mendenha, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), and listed
certain factors that can be taken into account to determine whether a person is in
Miranda custody. See Kim, 292 F.3d at 978. It stated:
Factors that.., should [be] consider[ed] in determining whether a person
was in custody include: (1) the language used to summon the individual, (2)
the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt, (3)
the physical surroundings of the interrogation, (4) the duration of the
detention, and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual.
Id. (citing United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2001)).
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move around the store without being accompanied by an agent and
could not be in each other's presence, and one defendant... was...S , ,,498
,sandwiched between two men at all times. Additionally, the
suspects were apparently aware that the officers had found evidence
of their guilt in the form of marijuana during the search.499 Given
these facts, the Kim dissent argued that "Crawford's 'factual differenc-
es' from [Kim] actually make the situation there more coercive," and
yet "[d] espite Crawford's coercive aspects... the Fifth Circuit held that
they did not constitute a custodial situation for Miranda purposes.,
00
The dissent also referenced Oregon v. Mathiason,0' which once again
held that "a noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes that...
the questioning took place in a 'coercive environment 50 'because all
police interviews, simply by their very nature, have some coercive
aspects to them.
With these cases serving as a guide, the Kim dissent contended
that while there may have been some coercive elements to Kim's
detention, in the end it was a Teny detention only and not an arrest or
a restraint on freedom to the degree associated with an arrest and
503Miranda warnings were therefore not necessary. Specifically, the
dissent concluded that " [w] hile the interview lasted about 90 minutes,
the police did not summon Kim, she was not confronted with
evidence of her guilt, she was in familiar surroundings, and the
degree of pressure applied to detain her was minimal 50 -a factual
conclusion that was obviously far different from that of the majority.
498. United States v. Crawford, 52 F.3d 1303, 1307-09 (5th Cir. 1995); see also
Kim, 292 F.3d at 979 n.1 (O'Scannlain,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
499. Crawford, 52 F.3d at 1308; see also Kim, 292 F.3d at 979 n.1.
500. Kim, 292 F.3d at 979 n.1.
501. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
502. Id. at 495. In a portion of the Mathiason opinion not quoted by the Kim
dissent but associated with the above declaration, the Supreme Court continued:
But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to
everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or
because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda
warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him "in custody." Itwas that sort of coercive
environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to
which it is limited.
Id.
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4. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit case referenced by the Artiles-Martin court as
standing for the proposition that coercive Terry stops require Miranda
warnings is United States v. Perdue.50' Factually, Perdue presents a fairly
coercive scenario. Perdue was contacted while law enforcement
officers in Jefferson County, Kansas were executing a search warrant
on a piece of property in a very rural part of the county. 50 6 During the
search of a building located on the property, law enforcement found
approximately five hundred marijuana plants, scales, packaging
materials, firearms, and ammunition. 7 While the search warrant was
being executed, Perdue and his pregnant girlfriend were seen driving
their vehicle onto the property toward the building and then quickly
turning around upon seeing law enforcement. 8 Two police officers
stopped Perdue's escape, approached the vehicle with weapons
drawn, and ordered Perdue and his girlfriend to get out of the car
and lie face down on the ground.50 9 The record was unclear, but the
Tenth Circuit noted that handcuffs may have been used as well.51 °
While Perdue was lying on the ground and while the officers' weapons
were still drawn, he was asked about his reason for being there. In
response, Perdue told the officers that he was there to check on his
"stuff' and that his "stuff' was the marijuana that those executing the
search warrant had found.512 Based in part on his admissions, Perdue
was charged, tried, and convicted of possession of marijuana with
intent to distribute and use of a firearm in relation to a drug traffick-
ing offense. 5  During the prosecution Perdue filed a motion to
514
suppress the referenced statements, but that motion was denied.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed Perdue's conviction on the
ground that his statements were improperly admitted and remanded
the case for a new trial.51 5 In doing so the court addressed the
interplay between Miranda and Terry and the need for Miranda
warnings during lawful Terry stops. The Perdue court began its analysis
505. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).





511. Id. at 1459.
512. See id.
513. See id. at 1458-60. Specifically, Perdue was convicted of violations of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841 (a) (1), (b) (1) (B) (2006), and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (2006). Id. at 1458.
514. See id. at 1460.
515. Seeid. at 1470.
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by noting that, in its view, "a suspect can be placed in police 'custody'
for purposes of Miranda before he has been 'arrested' in the Fourth
Amendment sense."51 6 The test cited by the court is a combination of
those set forth in Miranda, Beheler, and Berkemer. Specifically, the Perdue
court wrote:
The Supreme Court has instructed that a person has been
taken into police custody whenever he "has been deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." The Court has
also stated that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda be-
come applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is
curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." The
only relevant inquiry is "how a reasonable man in the sus-S • ,,517
pect's position would have understood his situation.
In addressing the specific interplay between Terry and Miranda,
the Perdue court first noted that "[t] he traditional view.., is that
Miranda warnings are simply not implicated in the context of a valid
Terry stop."'518 The reason for this traditional view, the court stated, is
that in terms of Terry-type stops,
the typical police-citizen encounter ... usually involves... a
very brief detention without the aid of weapons or hand-
cuffs, a few questions relating to identity and the suspicious
circumstances, and an atmosphere that is "substantially less
'police dominated' than that surrounding the ... interroga-
tion at issue in Miranda."
51 9
Thus, the court continued, "historically, the maximum level of
force permissible in a standard Terry stop fell short of placing the• ,,520
suspect in 'custody' for purposes of triggering Miranda. The Perdue
court next noted that since the Supreme Court's decision in Terry,
however, the landscape had changed and increasing degrees of
coercion had become acceptable in the realm of a Terry stop. It wrote:
The last decade, however, has witnessed a multifaceted
expansion of Terry. Important for our purposes is the trend
granting officers greater latitude in using force in order to
"neutralize" potentially dangerous suspects during an inves-
tigatory detention. As discussed in our Fourth Amendment
516. Id. at 1463-64.
517. Id. at 1463 (citations omitted).
518. Id. at 1464 (citing United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953,958 (1st Cir. 1986);
United States v. McGauley, 786 F.2d 888, 891 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v.Jones,
543 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323 (9th Cir.
1975)).
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analysis, when circumstances reasonably indicate that the
suspects are armed and dangerous, courts have been willing
to rely on the "officer safety" rationale of Terry and authorize
the use of handcuffs, the placing of suspects in police cruis-
ers, the drawing of weapons, and other measures of force
more traditionally associated with the concepts of "custody"
and "arrest" than with "brief investigatory detention." Thus,
today, consonant with this trend, we held that police officers
acted reasonably under the Fourth Amendment when they,
without probable cause and with guns drawn, stopped Mr.
Perdue's car, forced him to get out of his car, and de-
manded that he lie face down on the ground.'
Despite its holding that the Terry stop in Perdue was reasonable
and therefore lawful, the Tenth Circuit nevertheless held that for
Miranda purposes a custodial situation had been created. In this
regard the court noted that "[o]ne cannot ignore the conclusion,
however, that by employing an amount of force that reached the
boundary line between a permissible Terry stop and an unconstitu-
tional arrest, the officers created the 'custodial' situation envisioned
by Miranda and its progeny. ''522 Given this holding the court next
addressed the Berkemer reasonable-person test in the context of the
facts of Perdue's detention. Noting that the appropriate test was to
determine "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would
have understood his situation,"523 the court concluded that "[a]
reasonable man in Mr. Perdue's position could not have misunders-
tood the fact that if he did not immediately cooperate, his life would
be in danger" and "would have felt 'completely at the mercy of the
police,"' and therefore "as a matter of law that Mr. Perdue was in
police custody during the initial questioning by Officer Carreno.
524
Thus the court seemingly applied the aforementioned test by looking
at how a reasonable person in the detainee's position would view his
or her safety and whether or not refusing to cooperate with law
enforcement was an option.
In its opinion the Perdue court relied heavily on Berkemer and
spent a good portion of the opinion addressing the holdings of that
decision. Using Berkemer as a basis for its own holding, the Tenth
Circuit noted that while Berkemer "held that Miranda warnings are not
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 1465 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442).
524. Id. (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 438).
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required during a routine traffic stop, 52 5 it also "explicitly refused to
adopt a bright-line rule proffered by the government which would
have made Miranda inapplicable in all police-citizen encounters that
do not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment arrest.''526 It further
noted that Berkemer had specifically singled out two facts of impor-
tance in determining whether a routine stop had become Miranda
custody-the length of a stop and whether the stop was conducted in
a public area.52 7 Based on these two factors, the Tenth Circuit again
held that Perdue was in Miranda custody for the reason that his
detention "present[ed] the precise scenario envisioned by the
Berkemer Court when it indicated that Miranda warnings might be
implicated in certain highly intrusive, 'non-arrest' encounters."
528
Finally, the court noted that a "growing number of courts...
have recognized that Miranda rights can be implicated during a valid
Tery stop, 5 29 and given that fact, law enforcement officers would need
to be ready to make a determination of whether a given situation
required Miranda warnings. Specifically, the court held that"[p]olice
officers must make a choice-if they are going to take highly intrusive
steps to protect themselves from danger, they must similarly provide
protection to their suspects by advising them of their constitutional
rights.
5 3 0
D. The Eleventh Circuit's Purported Abstention
Artiles-Martinr53 was decided by the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, which is part of the Eleventh Circuit. After
recognizing the existence of the circuit split that is the subject of this
article and the differing points of view that make up the split, the
Artiles-Martin court noted that "the Eleventh Circuit has not expressly
adopted either view., 5 2 According to the Artiles-Martin decision, the
closest that the Eleventh Circuit had come to taking sides was its 2004
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 1466.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 1465 (citing United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Elias, 832 F.2d 24 (3rd Cir. 1987); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286,
1291 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Miranda warnings are necessary even during a Terry stop if the
suspect has been taken into custody or if the questioning otherwise takes place in a
police dominated or compelling atmosphere.")).
530. Id. at 1466.
531. United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08-cr-14-Oc-10GRJ, 2008 WL 2600787
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decision in United States v. Acosta 3 3 As the Artiles-Martin court read the
Acosta decision, that opinion "distinguished Perdue and focused on the
nature and level of restraint that the defendant was subjected to
during the Terry stop.,,
53 4
Acosta involved the stop of a person known to be involved in
money laundering. Specifically, agents from the United States
Customs Service High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Group
(HIDTA) received word from an undercover officer that Acosta was
going to be involved in the delivery of a large amount of cash as part
of a money laundering operation.53 5 After conducting surveillance for
a period of time, agents stopped Acosta's vehicle and detained him. 6
This detention was accomplished by a group of "five or six offic-
ers .... [a]t least one [of which] had his gun drawn, [though] all of
the officer's [sic] guns were re-holstered within ten-seconds [sic]."53
Acosta was also told that he was not under arrest but that agents
538 539wanted to speak with him. He was also frisked for weapons.
During the ensuing conversation, Acosta eventually gave consent to
search his vehicle, admitted that he had a large amount of cash inside,
and admitted ownership of a duffle bag that was later found to-- . 540
contain additional cash and heroin. It was not until after the heroin
541was discovered that Acosta was given Miranda warnings and arrested.
On the issues of Tery and Miranda, the Acosta decision was di-
vided into two sections. The first section addressed solely Teny and
542
concluded that the stop at issue was a lawful investigative detention.
In its discussion of that point, the court noted that when determining
whether a particular stop is a lawful Terry stop or is a detention that
has transformed into a de facto arrest that must be supported bT
probable cause, a court should look at "four non-exclusive factors."
The list of factors put forth by the court included "the law enforce-
ment purposes served by the detention, the diligence with which the
police pursue the investigation, the scope and intrusiveness of the
533. See id. (citing United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141 (11th Cir. 2004)).
534. Id.
535. Acosta, 363 F.3d at 1142.






542. See id. at 1145-48.
543. Id. at 1146.
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detention, and the duration of the detention."544 In its Terry discus-
sion, the Eleventh Circuit noted a few other important concepts.
First, the court addressed the fact that questioning that is non-
custodial for Miranda purposes is an important part of a Terry
investigation. Citing another opinion, the court wrote:
A Terry stop is justified to give the police an opportunity to
engage in brief and nonintrusive investigation techniques,
such as noncustodial questioning of the detained person....
[However,] the police [may not] use an investigative stop to
subject a suspect to custodial interrogation that would ordi-
narily require formal arrest and Miranda warnings.
545
In other words, the Acosta court recognized that a lawful Terry
stop can include the questioning of a suspect who is detained and not
free to leave without the need for Miranda warnings, so long as the• . • • • ,,546
situation does not rise to the level of "custodial interrogation. The
court also noted its position that "[w] hile restriction on freedom of
movement is a factor to be taken into account in determining whether
a person is under arrest, it alone is not sufficient to transform a Terry
stop into a de facto arrest."547 And, finally, the court also recognized
the uniqueness of the Terry investigative detention in that "the very
nature of a Terry stop includes stopping a suspect from leaving,"548 and
that "'an investigatory stop is not an arrest despite the fact that a
reasonable person would not believe he was free to leave.'
549
The second portion of the opinion that is relevant to the inter-
play between Terry and Miranda addressed the concept of Miranda
custody. With respect to the court's opinion, it should first be noted
that the Acosta court very clearly recognized that whether a person is
in custody for Miranda purposes is a separate and distinct inquiry
from whether a person has been subjected to a Terry detention or a de
facto arrest. In doing so (and despite distinguishing Perdue, as was
noted by Artiles-Martin) the Acosta court seemingly left open the
possibility that there might be some cases in which Miranda warnings
would be required in a pre-arrest, investigative detention situation.
Specifically, Acosta wrote that the stop and questioning at issue in the
544. Id. (quoting United States v. Gil, 204 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2000)).
545. Id. (quoting United States v. Hardy, 855 F.2d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 1988)).
546. See id.
547. Id. at 1147.
548. Id.
549. Id. (quoting United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995)).
550. Id. at 1148.
551. Id. at 1150.
1554 [Vol. 36:4
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case before it "did not involve the type of 'highly intrusive' coercive
atmosphere that may require Miranda warnings even before a formal
arrest is made." '552 Miranda warnings would be required, Acosta
concluded, when "a reasonable person in [the detainee's] position
would... have believed that he was utterly at the mercy of the police,
away from the protection of any public scrutiny, and had better
confess, or else. In short, the Eleventh Circuit's position on the
issue of the ability of officers to use at least some coercion in Terry
stops without converting the stops into Miranda custody contemplated
the possibility that Miranda warnings may be required if the atmos-
phere surrounding the stop is a "'highly intrusive' coercive" one, but
simultaneously recognized that coercion not reaching the level of
"highly intrusive" that does not leave the detainee believing that he or
she is "utterly at the mercy of police ... and had better confess or
else" will not necessitate the furnishing of Miranda warnings to a
554suspect during a Terry stop.
In its discussion of Miranda, the Acosta opinion made additional
statements of importance. First and foremost-and contrary to a
number of other cases that have addressed the issue-the Acosta court
recognized the incompatibility of the Teny investigative detention and
the Thompson reasonable-person test.555 It wrote:
Normally courts apply a two-part test to determine whether a
suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes: "first, what were
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and
second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable per-
son have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave." As we have already discussed, a
suspect who is detained during a Terry stop is not free to
leave from the beginning of the stop until it ends. If we ap-
plied the general Miranda custodial test literally to Terry
stops, the result would be that Miranda warnings are re-
quired before any questioning could occur during any Terry
556
stop.
The Acosta court found support for this position in Berkemer,
which again held that McCarty was not in custody despite it being very
clear that he was not going to be permitted to leave until law en-




555. Id. at 1148.
556. Id. (citation omitted).
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the influence. 5'7 The Acosta court noted:
The guidance the Berkemer decision provides stems from
the fact that traffic stops, like Terry stops generally, are in-
deed stops. A reasonable person knows that he is not free to
drive away from a traffic stop until it is completed, just as a
reasonable person knows that he is not free to walk away
from a Terry stop until it is over. If the lack of freedom to
leave were decisive, which is to say if every phrase in the Mi-
randa opinion is to be applied literally, then all traffic stops
as well as all Terry stops generally would be subject to the
requirements of that decision. Berkemerestablishes that they
558are not.
Despite referencing and reverencing Berkemer, however, Acosta
nevertheless did not follow Berkemer in the sense that it did not adopt
the traditional Berkemer test for determining Miranda custody, but
rather adopted its own test, which asks whether "a reasonable person
in [the detainee's] position would.., have believed that he was
utterly at the mercy of the police, away from the protection of any
public scrutiny, and had better confess, or else."
559
In reviewing Acosta it should be noted that, at least to some de-
gree, courts within the Eleventh Circuit have not quite known how to
interpret it, and in fact have read that decision in different ways. For
example, at least one district court in the Eleventh Circuit has read
Acosta, in conjunction with the Eighth Circuit's decision in Pelayo-
Ruelas, to mean that "[n] o Miranda warnings are required to legitim-
ize a Terry stop, even though the suspect is not free to leave during the
brief detention.,"5 Artiles-Martin did not quite go that far, but instead
noted that the Eleventh Circuit apparently had not yet taken a
position on the circuit split at issue in this article. 6 ' Regardless of how
one reads Acosta and the court's intentions, the Artiles-Martin court
appears to be correct when it noted that in terms of the circuit split at
issue "the Eleventh Circuit has not expressly adopted either view.
One thing that does appear to be clear from the decision, however, is
557. Id. at 1148-49 (citing Berkemerv. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)).
558. Id. at 1149.
559. Id. at 1150.
560. United States v. Middleton, No. CRIM.A. CR205-025, 2006 WL 156872, at *3
(S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2006) (focusing not on whether there was any coercion in the
course of the stop at issue, but on the fact that the investigating officer's questions to
the defendant were limited in time and scope).
561. United States v. Artiles-Martin, No. 5:08-cr-14-Oc-1OGRJ, 2008 WL 2600787,
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that the Eleventh Circuit presents yet another test for determining
when Miranda warnings are required in situations not involving a
formal arrest-a test that appears far more restrictive than simply
determining whether or not a reasonable person would have felt free
to terminate a Terry stop and leave.
E. The Remaining Federal Circuits: The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and D. C.
Circuits
The remaining federal circuits have each weighed in to one de-
gree or another on the interplay between Terry and Miranda, though
not as strongly as the aforementioned circuits. That said, their views
are an important part of a complete discussion of the issue.
1. The Third Circuit
Although not listed on either side of the circuit split, the Third
Circuit has addressed what constitutes Miranda custody in at least one
case. Even though that case does not involve a Terry stop, a review of
the case is nevertheless useful. United States v. Jacobs involved an
interview of a former paid FBI informant at a local FBI office.56
4
Specifically, law enforcement received information thatJacobs, who
had been working as an informant for a number of years, was involved
in the transportation of cocaine from Los Angeles, California, to
Wilmington, Delaware. 5D When asked about the allegations, Jacobs
initially denied any involvement. 6 Later, she was asked to go to the
Wilmington FBI office where she was confronted about her involve-
ment by her handler. 56 She was questioned by him in private, and
during the conversation she was shown some suitcases that had been
used by her co-conspirators during a recent drug run.6 She was also
confronted about inconsistencies or untruths in her version of
events. 9 At no time was she given Miranda warnings. 5 7 She was
allowed to leave after her interview and later gave officers some
evidence of the conspiracy that had been in her home.57'
563. 431 F.3d 99 (3rd Cir. 2005).
564. Id. at 103.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Id. at 103-04.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id. at 104.
571. Id. at 104 n.6.
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In addressing whetherJacobs was in custody for Miranda purpos-
es during her interview, the Third Circuit noted that there is not one
universally accepted test for determining Miranda custody,"' which
itself denotes the existence of a federal circuit and state court split of
authority. It wrote:
In this context, there are at least three differently worded
tests for when a person is in custody: (1) when the person
has been deprived of her or his freedom in some significant
way; (2) when a reasonable person would perceive that she
or he was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave; and (3) when there is a restraint on the person's free-
dom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest. More clear is that the determination of custody is an
objective inquiry (that is, what a reasonable person would
believe) based on the circumstances of the interrogation.573
The court also noted a number of factors that it held should be
addressed in making a Miranda custody determination, including the
location of the interrogation, how much the interviewing officers
knew in terms of a suspect's culpability, and whether the officer
indicated to the suspect a belief of the suspect's guilt.574 Another
factor addressed by the court was whether the suspect was permitted
to leave at the end of the interview. 5 It was in the context of this
discussion that the Third Circuit ultimately acknowledged its test for
determining Miranda custody, at least in the case before it, when it
wrote: " [T] he test for custody is not whether the police in fact let a
suspect leave at the end of the questioning without hindrance. Rather,
it is whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have
believed that during the questioning he or she could leave without
,,576hindrance. Because the case did not involve a Terry stop, the court
did not address how that test would play out in the context of a Terry
investigative detention. Regardless, the court ultimately determined
based on the referenced test and the three listed factors thatJacobs• • .577
was in custody and, therefore, her admissions should be suppressed.
The Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Elias, is also in-
structive in that it recognized the possibility that investigative
572. Id. at 105.
573. Id.
574. Id.
575. Id. at 106-07.
576. Id.
577. Id. at 107-08.
578. 832 F.2d 24 (3rd Cir. 1987).
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detentions can rise to the level of Miranda custody. Specifically, the
court referenced Berkemer and its "refus[al] to rule out the possibility
that a Tery-like traffic stop could mature into a more serious deten-
tion which would have to be considered custodial."579 However,r _580.
because of inconsistencies in the factual record, the court went no
further than making that basic observation.
2. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of Miranda custody and its
interplay with the concept of a Fourth Amendment seizure in United
States v. Bengivenga,58' an en banc decision that addressed the need for
Miranda warnings during routine border inspections and a Terry-like
5812
detention during such an inspection. And even though the
situation in Bengivenga was not particularly coercive in the sense that
no force or coercion were used, it still provides a good discussion on
the issue of determining Miranda custody and the interplay of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
As noted above, Bengivenga involved the detention of a subject atS 583
a fixed border checkpoint. During a routine check of a bus carrying
multiple passengers, border patrol agents discovered three suitcases
that had a strong odor of marijuana. 84 Tags on the suitcases indi-
cated that they were headed for Alice, Texas, and agents had previous-
ly determined that Bengivenga and a female companion of hers were
the only passengers headed for that location.585 Based on that
information, the two women were asked to accompany the agents to-- .• -. 586
the checkpoint trailer. The women, who had nervously watched the
agents as they first inspected the luggage, denied ownership of the. 587
suitcases. Later, however, agents found baggage claim slips in
Bengivenga's possession that matched the luggage. At that point,
Bengivenga was arrested and provided with Miranda warnings.589 Prior
to the arrest, she had answered questions regarding her destination
579. Id. at 26.
580. Id. at 27.
581. 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
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and the ownership of the luggage. 9 ° Prior to trial, Bengivenga moved
to suppress the statements that she had made and the physical
evidence of her bus ticket, her baggage claim stubs, and the marijua-
na from her suitcases, and did so on the alleged grounds that she had
been in custody and was entitled to Miranda warnings but did not get
them 9 ' Her motion was denied, the case went to trial, the evidence
was admitted, and Bengivenga was convicted.9
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed the proper test for deter-
mining whether a person is in Miranda custody, and although the
facts of Bengivenga are not particularly coercive (though the dissent
strongly disagreed with that assessment of the facts) 59 the decision
still provides a guide for understanding the way that the Fifth Circuit
would analyze the issue. In essence, the Bengivenga court applied the
Berkemer test, though with one clarification. It wrote:
A suspect is therefore "in custody" for Miranda purposes
when placed under formal arrest or when a reasonable per-
son in the suspect's position would have understood the
situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement
of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.
The reasonable person through whom we view the situation
must be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of
the investigation-that is, neither guilty of criminal conduct
and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the serious-
ness of the circumstances.594
By expounding on the status of the reasonable person as it did,
the court defined the reasonable person in a way not specified in
Berkemer, though not inconsistent with Berkemer either. As noted
below, a number of courts have adopted a similar definition of the
reasonable person.595
The court also addressed the issue of whether Miranda warnings
are required in Teny stops-an issue of obvious importance for the
purposes of this article. In so doing, the court determined that
Miranda warnings generally do not have a place in Terry investigatived . 596
detentions. In this regard, the Bengivenga court wrote that
"[o]fficers possessing reasonable articulable suspicion of a person's
590. Id.
591. Id. at 595.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 601-06 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
594. Id. at 596 (majority opinion).
595. See infra Part V.A.2.
596. Id. at 599.
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participation in criminal activity may seize the suspect in accord with
the Fourth Amendment to conduct an investigative stop-a narrow
intrusion involving limited detention accompanied by brief question-
ing and, if justified, a frisk for weapons. 5  The court added that
"[s]uch investigative stops do not render a person in custody for
purposes of Miranda.,Ms This holding appears to be based on the
majority's view of the relationship between the Fourth Amendment
and Miranda custody under the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, the
court held that:
[A] Fourth Amendment seizure does not necessarily render
a person in custody for purposes of Miranda .... "[T] he core
meaning both of 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense,
and of 'custody' in the Miranda sense, appears to be the
same: the restraint of a person's 'freedom to walk away' from
the police." The critical difference between the two con-
cepts, however, is that custody arises only if the restraint on
freedom is a certain degree-the degree associated with
formal arrest.599
Thus, the court appeared to hold that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment analyses are for all intents and purposes the same, much
like the holdings in United States v. Leshuke and United States v.
Trueber.601 The court also held that Terry detentions do not require
Miranda warnings because Terry detentions are not the equivalent of
an arrestand Miranda warnings are only required when a person is
restrained to a "degree associated with formal arrest" in the sense that•. ,,602
the person is not free "'to walk away' from the police. Based on all
of these standards, the court determined that Bengivenga and her
companion were not in custody for Miranda purposes, but were
instead reasonably detained pursuant to Terry with weight being
given to the fact that the questioning did not "exhaust the permissible
scope of investigative questioning." 0
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Id. at 598 (quoting United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348,357 n.12 (5th Cir.
1977)).
600. 65 F.3d 1105, 1110 (4th Cir. 1995).
601. 238 F.3d 79, 95 (1st Cir. 2001).
602. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d at 598.
603. See id. at 601. As noted above, there was a dissenting opinion in Bengivenga.
The court's decision was an en banc decision with one concurring opinion and four
dissenters. Id. The basic position of the dissentingjudges was that under the stated
test Bengivenga was in custody for Miranda purposes and therefore should have been
entitled to a suppression of evidence. Id. at 607 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
604. Id. at 599 (majority opinion).
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3. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit's position on the issue of the interplay between
Miranda and Tery is addressed, in part, in United States v. Salvo, a case
involving a consensual interview between FBI agents and a person
who had been caught sending e-mail messages seeking advice on
seducing young boys. The first interview took place in a computer
room in the suspect's college dorm, and involved the suspect and
606
three FBI agents. Following the interview, there was a consensual
search of the suspect's dorm room, and the suspect handed the FBI
his computer which, despite the suspect's attempt to erase the hard
drive, was determined to contain images of child pornography. 60 7
After some discussion, the Salvo court's position appears to be that in
most circumstances "because of the very cursory and limited nature of
a Terry stop, a suspect is not free to leave, yet is not entitled to full
custody Miranda rights."60 8 However, the court also noted that there
are some exceptions to that rule when it wrote:
[T] his does not equate to a broader application of this rule
to detentions of a more lengthy, substantive nature. In non-
transitory, more protracted interrogation situations, the
question of whether a reasonable person would feel free to
leave obviously becomes more pertinent to a determination
of whether the suspect is in custody for purposes of Fifth
Amendment protection. 60 9
Thus, the court recognized that the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment inquiries are separate from one another. The court provided
additional details on what it determined to be the appropriate test for
Miranda custody later in its opinion. Specifically, it held:
[F] or the purposes of a Fifth Amendment custody inquiry,
we believe that courts may consider, as one component or
aspect of the totality of the circumstances under which the
suspect is questioned, whether a reasonable person in the
suspect's position would have felt free to leave. We stress
that this is not necessarily an ultimate or even dispositive
inquiry; only that courts, in considering whether a suspect is
605. United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 945-47 (6th Cir. 1998).
606. Id. at 945-46.
607. Id. at 946.
608. Id. at 949; see also United States v. Hopewell, No. 1:08-cr-065, 2009 WL
414604, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2009) ("To the contrary, the Sixth Circuit has
recognized that a suspect generally is not entitled to full custody Miranda fights
during a limited Tery stop.").
609. Salvo, 133 F.3d at 949.
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"in custody" for the purposes of triggering the Fifth
Amendment protections, may inquire as to whether a rea-
sonable person in that suspect's particular circumstances
would have felt free to leave. In other words, this is one
permissible inquiry, among others, which courts may con-
sider in making Fifth Amendment custody determinations. 60
In other words, the court recognized the usefulness of the Thomp-
son reasonable person test but did not recognize it to be dispositive of
the issue of Miranda custody.61' In Salvo, the district court had
suppressed statements based on its finding that a reasonable person in
defendant's position would not have felt free to leave during his
interviews with law enforcement.612 In reversing the suppression, the
Fifth Circuit noted in accordance with the above-referenced statement
that "[a]lthough the District Court's inquiry into whether a reasona-
ble person in Salvo's position would have felt free to leave was
permissible, it was not sufficient because it did not go far enough and
its conclusion was not supported by the record.6 13  Referencing
Mathiason, the court concluded that although any police questioning
"by its very nature, is always going to have coercive aspects to it,'614 it
"does not mean, however, that a suspect is 'in custody' each time he
or she is questioned by a law enforcement officer." 15 Instead, the
court held that Miranda warnings are only required when "the
restraint exercised by [law enforcement] ... approach [es] the level
associated with either formal arrest or a coercive context tantamount
to custody.
616
The Sixth Circuit's position on the issue of Miranda and Terry
617stops is further defined in United States v. Swanson, which was
decided five years after Salvo. In Swanson, the court addressed a
situation in which the appellant was convicted of being a felon in• 618
possession of a firearm. Specifically, Swanson was in a tattoo parlor
610. Id. at 950. The Salvo court further noted that the following factors should be
taken into account in making such a custody determination: the purpose of the
questioning, whether the location in which the questioning took place was hostile or
coercive, the length of the questioning, and any other indicia of custody, such as who
initiated contact or questioning or whether the suspect had the ability to or was told
that he or she could leave at any time. See id.
611. See id. at 949-50.





617. 341 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2003).
618. Id. at 526.
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when an acquaintance of his was arrested by federal agents on an
arrest warrant.619 During the arrest, Swanson and others were
detained by a group of federal agents who had guns drawn and held
at their sides. Swanson was further told by the agents that he would
not be released until he was identified and officers were able to
621determine that he had no outstanding warrants for his arrest.
When he attempted to leave the area, Swanson was detained and
interviewed by one of the federal agents, though he was told that he
622was not under arrest and did not have to speak with the agent.
During an ensuing conversation Swanson, made incriminating
statements about the ownership of an automobile and how talking to
law enforcement regarding guns that might be in his possession would
621not be in his best interest, which were later used to convict him.
On appeal, Swanson argued that his statements should have been
suppressed because he was in custody at the time of the interrogation
624and was not provided with Miranda warnings. The Sixth Circuit
ultimately rejected Swanson's claim that he was in custody and ruled
125ithat the statements in question were properly admitted at the trial.
In doing so, the court first referenced the Supreme Court's holding in
Mathiason that "the obligation to administer a Miranda warning to a
suspect only arises 'where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him in custody.' 62 6 Citing Berkemer, the
court next noted that " [t] he very nature of a Terry stop means that a
detainee is not free to leave during the investigation, yet is not
entitled to Miranda rights. " 62 7 Given those two principles, the court
noted, "the pertinent question is whether Swanson was 'in custody'
during the investigatory detention for the purposes of determining
whether his Fifth Amendment rights were violated. 628
In setting forth the appropriate test for determining whether a
temporary detention has become a Miranda custody, the Sixth Circuit
wrote:
In determining whether a defendant was subject to cus-
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. Id. at 527.
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Id. at 527-28.
625. Id. at 531.
626. Id. at 528 (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per
curiam)).
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todial interrogation we look to the totality of the circums-
tances "to determine 'how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood the situation."' The "ulti-
mate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.,
629
Similar to the Salvo decision, the court then noted that the totali-
ty of the circumstances test should include "whether a reasonable
person in the defendant's position would feel free to leave" 63° with the
understanding that in a Terry stop a person is not free to leave, as well
as the following factors:
(1) the purpose of the questioning; (2) whether the place of
the questioning was hostile or coercive; (3) the length of the
questioning; and (4) other indicia of custody such as wheth-
er the suspect was informed at the time that the questioning
was voluntary or that the suspect was free to leave or to re-
quest the officers to do so; whether the suspect possessed
unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning; and
whether the suspect initiated contact with the police ... 13or]
acquiesced to their requests to answer some questions.
In holding as it did, the court gave particular deference to
whether the law enforcement officer had informed the suspect that he
or she was not under arrest, noting that "a statement by a law
enforcement officer to a suspect that he is not under arrest is an
important part of the analysis of whether the suspect was 'in custo-
dy.' -63 Interestingly, while not stating that Miranda warnings are
required in all Terry stops, the Swanson court nevertheless noted that
because "in the context of a Terry-style investigatory detention, a
person is not free to leave, at least temporarily, , that first factor in
the determination of whether a reasonable person in the defendant's
position is in custody "weighs in favor of defining [a detainee's]
detention and questioning as a custodial interrogation.,
634
Finally, the Swanson court noted that the test for determining
Miranda custody has changed since the Supreme Court decided
Miranda. Specifically referencing a prior Sixth Circuit decision in
629. Id. at 528-29 (quoting United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 948 (6th Cir.
1998); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285,291 (6th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotations
omitted).
630. Id. at 529.
631. Id. (quoting Salvo, 133 F.3d at 950).
632. Id. at 530.
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which the court had held that a defendant "was in custody when
questioned ... because the police had deprived [him] of his 'freedom
of action' in a 'significant way, "615 the Swanson court made it clear that,
based on its reading of Berkemes holding-that "a motorist tempora-
rily detained in a traffic stop does not have the right to a Miranda
warning even though a 'traffic stop significantly curtails the freedomof ctin o th drver ,,,16 th
of action of the driver. mere fact that a person was
deprived of his or her freedom of action is insufficient by itself to
convert a detention to Miranda custody, and, once again, that "[t] he
very nature of a Terry stop means that a detainee is not free to leave
during the investigation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights.
6 37
Lower courts within the Sixth Circuit have taken Swanson to stand
for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment inquiry under Teny
plays an important role in the Fifth Amendment inquiry under
Miranda and that Terry stops do not generally implicate Miranda
warnings. For example, in United States v. Moore, one court, quoting
Swanson, wrote:
Obviously [the] defendant was not free to leave; indeed, a
temporary investigative detention under Teny v. Ohio pre-
supposes that a suspect is not free to leave. But, so long as
the detention remains within the parameters of a Terry de-
tention and has not evolved into a custodial arrest, Miranda
warnings are not required. "The very nature of a Terry stop
means that a detainee is not free to leave during the investi-
gation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights."639
In another lower court decision, United States v. Mathis, W the dis-
trict court also referenced Swanson and held that "[c]ourts have
recognized that Miranda does not apply to an investigative detention,
otherwise known as a Terry stop. Courts in other federal circuits
642have also cited Swanson as authority for this same proposition.
635. Id. at 530-31 (referencing and commenting on United States v. Jones, 846
F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1988)). Interestingly, while the Swanson court appears to pay some
deference to its holding in Jones, the underlying tone of the court's discussion of that
prior decision arguably shows that the Swanson court would have reached a different
result.
636. Id. (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984)).
637. Id. at 528 (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439-41).
638. No. 2:05-CR-107, 2006 WL 897968 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 4, 2006).
639. Id. at *4 (quoting Swanson, 341 F.3d at 529).
640. 653 F. Supp. 2d 806 (E.D. Tenn. 2009).
641. Id. at 817-18.
642. See, e.g., United States v. Denson, No. 06-75, 2006 WL 3144857, at *4 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 31, 2006). Denson noted that:
It is clear that police officers are permitted to obtain information con-
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4. The D.C. Circuit
Like the Third, Fifth, and Sixth circuits, the D.C. Circuit is not
mentioned in the Artiles-Martin opinion. That said, there is case law
from the D.C. Circuit that provides some precedent for future
decisions within the circuit on the dual issues of whether coercion can
be used during a Terry detention and, if so, what level or degree of
coercion is necessary to transform an investigative detention into
Miranda custody.
On the issue of coercion during a Terry stop, the case law from
the D.C. Circuit appears to give law enforcement wide latitude in their
use of force. For example, in United States v. Mhite,643 the D.C. Circuit
upheld a Terry stop of a vehicle that involved law enforcement parking
in such a way that it was "difficult but not impossible for the [appel-
lant's vehicle] to pull away"644 and the drawing of firearms as the
officers approached the appellant's vehicle.645 The appellant was then
removed from the vehicle at gunpoint and was grabbed by officers. 646
Noting that "[w]hen a 'stop' ends and an arrest begins has been the
subject of numerous judicial decisions, the court held that "[t] he
use or display of [fire] arms may, but does not necessarily, convert a
stop into an arrest. Courts have generally upheld stops made at
gunpoint when the threat of force has been viewed as reasonably
necessary for the protection of the officer."649 Noting that "[o]n
occasion... the courts have ruled that the use of excessive force
firming or dispelling their suspicions during a Terry stop. The fact that an
individual is briefly detained while asked a moderate number of questions
does not, by itself, give rise to a custodial investigation. In Swanson, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized that "[t ] he
very nature of a Terry stop means that a detainee is not free to leave during
the investigation, yet is not entitled to Miranda rights. Therefore, the perti-
nent question is whether [the suspect] was 'in custody' during the investiga-
tory detention for the purposes of determining whether his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated."
Id. (citations omitted).
643. 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
644. Id. at 31.
645. Id.
646. See id. at 31-32.
647. Id. at 33.
648. Id. at 34.
649. Id. at 34-35. In support of this proposition, the White court cited a number
of cases in which stops or detentions of persons during which law enforcement drew
or otherwise used weapons were determined to be investigatory stops rather than
arrests, including United States v. Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Maslanka, 501 F.2d 208
(5th Cir. 1974); and United States v. Richards, 500 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1974). Id.
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,,650 teWiecutnvrhlstransformed a stop into an arrest, the Wite court nevertheless
determined that rather than just holding the situation to be an arrest
because law enforcement used some force while approaching and
detaining the appellant, the court should instead look to the reasons
that the officers acted the way that they did during the stop.65' The
White majority next held that the decision to order "the occupants to
get out of the car for questioning [was] compatible with an investiga-
tory stop,'' 652 noting that "[c] ourts have routinely allowed officers to
insist on reasonable changes of location when carrying out a Teny
stop."6 53 Finally, the majority also reiterated that "[1]evels of force and
intrusion in an 'investigatory stop' may be legitimately escalated to
meet supervening events, and that "suspicious behavior may lead
an experienced officer to fear for his safety, thus justifying an
escalation in the level of force used., 655 In short, a look at the White
decision makes it clear that the D.C. Circuit will not invalidate a Terry
detention or deem it an arrest simply because law enforcement
introduces some "admittedly coercive elements
656 into the stop.657
As for the issue of coercive Terry stops and Miranda custody, the
D.C. Circuit does not appear to have any cases directly addressing the
issue. However, in United States v. Gaston, 65 the court did address the
issue of how to determine whether a person is in Miranda custody
when that person is detained during the execution of a search
warrant-a situation many courts have held to be a Terry-type
detention. 659 In Gaston the D.C. Circuit addressed a situation in which
650. Id. at 35.
651. Id.
652. Id. at 36-37.
653. Id. at 37. In support of this proposition, the White court cited United States v.
Chatman, 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 57
(2d Cir. 1977).
654. Id. at 40.
655. Id.
656. Id.
657. See also, e.g., United States v. Clark, 24 F.3d 299, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
("[C]ourts have generally upheld stops made at gunpoint when the threat of force
has been viewed as reasonably necessary for the protection of the officer.") (citations
omitted); United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The amount of
force used to carry out the stop and search must be reasonable, but may include using
handcuffs or forcing the detainee to lie down to prevent flight, or drawing guns
where law officers reasonably believe they are necessary for their protection.")
(citations omitted).
658. 357 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
659. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The
traditional rule is that 'an official seizure of [a] person must be supported by
probable cause, even if no formal arrest is made.' However, some seizures which
1568 [Vol. 36:4
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at least ten police officers entered a home and handcuffed Gaston
and another individual, both of whom were found in the doorway of a
second-floor bedroom.666 One of the officers interviewed Gaston, who
was handcuffed at the time he was questioned, and Gaston admitted
that he co-owned the home with his sisters.661 Gaston was not
provided with Miranda warnings prior to being questioned by the
officer, and the statements that he gave regarding ownership were
later admitted as inculpatory evidence at trial.
In addressing Gaston's claim on appeal that he should have been
given Miranda warnings, the D.C. Circuit more or less skirted the issue
of whether Gaston was in custody for Miranda purposes. 66' The court
did recognize that the test for determining Miranda custody "is simply
whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement
of the degree associated with a formal arrest. '' 664 The court further
noted that the test is an objective one that asks: "would a reasonable
person have understood his situation to be comparable to a formal
arrest?, 665 After recognizing this test, however, the court declined to
would fall under this general rule 'constitute such limited intrusions on the personal
security of those detained and are justified by such substantial law enforcement
interests that they may be made on less than probable cause, so long as police have an
articulable basis for suspecting criminal activity.' A seizure effected by law enforce-
ment while executing a valid search warrant falls within this limited exception."
(quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696, 699 (1981)); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)) (citations omitted); United States v. Johnson, 528 F.3d 575,
579-80 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Michigan v. Summers recognizes that, consistent with Terry v.
Ohio, a limited intrusion on a person's security is sometimes justified by substantial
law enforcement interests such that it may be made on less than probable cause. For
example, the resident of a home subject to a search warrant may be detained so as to
prevent flight, minimize the risk of harm to the officers, and allow the officers to
conduct an orderly search. Because a neutral magistrate has already found probable
cause to search the home, there is naturally an articulable and individualized
suspicion of criminal activity thatjustifies the detention of the home's occupants. In
contrast, an articulable and individualized suspicion does not exist to search the
patron of a public business during the execution of a search warrant.") (citations
omitted); United States v. Calloway, 298 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 (D. D.C. 2003) ("The
Supreme Court has already held that the detention of occupants of a premises being
searched by the police is not a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, as it is
commensurate with the detention of suspects in a Terry v. Ohio stop. Under Summers
and Terry, therefore, police officers executing a search warrant can detain occupants
of a residence in order to minimize the risk of harm to the officers, to prevent flight,
and to facilitate the completion of the search.") (citation and footnote omitted).
660. Gaston, 357 F.3d at 81.
661. See id.
662. See id. at 81-82.
663. See id.
664. Id. at 82 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
665. Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984)).
2010] 1569
103
Dinger: Is There a Seat for Miranda at Terry's Table?: an Analysis of the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
address the issue in the context of a situation in which handcuffs are
used to restrain a subject during a search warrant. 666 It wrote:
Gaston was handcuffed when Officer Hurley questioned him
although the officers had not yet formally arrested him. The
government argues that handcuffing does not automatically
constitute custody, but is merely one factor to be consi-
dered. There is authority to this effect, but we do not have to
decide whether to follow it because the questioning fell with-
667in an exception to Miranda.
The "authority" that the court cited as supporting the govern-
ment's argument is Leshuk, the Fourth Circuit decision that held that
"drawing weapons, handcuffing a suspect, placing a suspect in a patrol
car for questioning, or using or threatening to use force does not
necessarily elevate a lawful stop into custodial arrest for Miranda
purposes. 66 8 Curiously, the court nowhere mentioned the cases on66 --670 - -- 671
the other side of the circuit split such as Ali,' Smith,'" and Perdue.
What that means in terms of how the circuit would come down if it
squarely addressed the issue of Miranda and coercive Terry stops,
however, is unclear.
IV. A SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED TESTS FOR DETERMINING WHEN A
TERRYDETENTION BECOMES MRANDA CUSTODY
As a close review of all of the decisions noted above demon-
strates, there is a great deal of disagreement over whether a valid Teny
stop can and ever will rise to the level of Miranda custody. Further-
more, those circuits that do recognize this possibility often disagree
over what test to apply to the Miranda custody determination-an
issue of importance as it directly determines when Miranda warnings
must be given to a person detained under the authority recognized in
Terry. A look at some of the proposed tests for determining Miranda
custody, including cases not referenced above, shows that there are a
number of different tests in use throughout the United States.
666. See id.
667. Id. (citation omitted). The exception to Miranda that the court relied on in
upholding the admission of the statements about ownership of the home is the same
exception that allows officers to ask "routine booking questions 'reasonably related to
the police's administrative concerns.'" Id. (quoting Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582, 601-02 (1990)). The ownership of the house, the court wrote, related to those
administrative concerns. Id.
668. United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109-10 (4th Cir. 1995).
669. United States v. Ali, 68 F.3d 1468 (2d Cir. 1995).
670. United States v. Smith, 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993).
671. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
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One such test-the most recent test suggested by the Supreme
Court-comes from the aforementioned Thompson v. Keohan: "Two
discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given
those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.,6" A good
number of lower courts- including the Eighth Circuit in Marti-
nez673 -have accepted this test or a similar iteration as the appropriate
one for determining whether a person detained for an investigative. .- -- 674
detention is also in Miranda custody. In Martinez, for example, the
court held the appropriate inquiry to be whether "[a] reasonable
person would not, considering the totality of the circumstances, feel
he was at liberty to stop the questioning and leave.,675
A similar test was suggested by the dissenting opinion in the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Kim, though that proposal allowed for brief
questioning, an apparent recognition of the nature of a Terry stop,
and further does not reference the detainee's ability to terminate
questioning.676 The proposed test is whether "a reasonable innocent
person in such circumstances would conclude that after brief
672. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); see also Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 652 (2004) (citing Keohane, 516 U.S. at 112).
673. United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2006).
674. See United States v. Romaszko, 253 F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A court
evaluating whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes must consider 'the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and... given those circumstances,
would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave.'") (citations omitted); State v. Dion, 928 A.2d 746, 750 (Me.
2007) ("A person not subject to formal arrest may be 'in custody' if 'a reasonable
person standing in the shoes of Lthe defendant would] have felt he or she was not at
liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.'") (quoting State v. Holloway, 760
A.2d 223, 228 (Me. 2000)); Buck v. State, 956 A.2d 884, 900-01 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2008) ("Under Supreme Court case law... the Miranda custody issue before the
circuit court remained whether a reasonable person in Buck's position .. would have
felt free to break off questioning and leave."); see also United States v. Budd, 549 F.3d
1140 (7th Cir. 2008); Locke v. Cattell, 476 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
Hernandez, 476 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Toliver, 480 F. Supp. 2d
1216 (D. Nev. 2007); United States v. Tudoran, 476 F. Supp. 2d 205 (N.D.N.Y. 2007);
United States v. Torres-Monje, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1028 (D. N.D. 2006); United States v.
Cox, 322 F. Supp. 2d 832 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Gren v. Greiner, 275 F. Supp. 2d 313
(E.D.N.Y. 2003); People v. Macklem, 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); State
v. Zubrowski, 921 A.2d 667 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007); State v. Weiss, 935 So. 2d 110 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Croom, 883 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Kelley v.
State, 825 N.E.2d 420 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Mata, 668 N.W.2d 448 (Neb.
2003); State v. Pontbriand, 878 A.2d 227 (Vt. 2005).
675. Martinez, 462 F.3d at 909.
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questioning [he or she] would not be free to leave."
677
Yet another version of the Thompson test is set forth in United
678
States v. Conrad, though it addresses simply feeling free to leave and
does not address the termination of any questioning. The court
wrote, "The inquiry into whether a suspect is in custody is objective,
and the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances and considers
whether a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was
free to leave." 67 9 A similar version of the test was used in United States
v.Jones,80 though the focus was not solely on leaving but on freedom
of movement. It asked "whether a reasonable man in the Defendant's
position would feel he is deprived of his 'freedom of movement. ""'8
And yet another related inquiry was discussed by the Georgia Court of• 682
Appeals in Thomas v. State, which said that "the test to determine
whether a detainee is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes is 'whether a
reasonable person in the detainee's position would have thought the
detention would not be temporary. -683
A different type of test for determining Miranda custody that has
gained wide-spread acceptance -though in a handful of similar yet
varying forms-comes from the Supreme Court's decision in Berkemer
v. McCarty, also referenced above. Berkemerapplied the following
test: "The only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect's position would have understood his situation.,686 A number
of lower courts have applied the Berkemer test exactly as stated.687
However, a handful of other courts have applied the test in slightly
modified versions. For example, in United States v. Pentaleri,68 the U.S.
677. Id.
678. 578 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
679. Id. at 1041.
680. 572 F. Supp. 2d 601 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
681. Id. at 611 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)); see also
Commonwealth v. Jones, 928 A.2d 1054, 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) ("A custodial
interrogation occurs when a person is physically deprived of their freedom in any
significant way or is placed in a situation in which they reasonably believe their
freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation."), rev'd, 988 A.2d
649 (2010).
682. 668 S.E.2d 540 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
683. Id. at 542 (quotingJohnson v. State, 506 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1998)).
684. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
685. See supra, note 141 and accompanying text.
686. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442.
687. See, e.g., State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 607 (Iowa 2001); State v. Hebert, 82
P.3d 470,481 (Kan. 2004); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 175,180 (Ky. 2006);
State v. Gant, 942 So. 2d 1099, 1122 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
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District Court for the District of Minnesota asked not how a reasona-
ble person would understand his or her situation, but whether that
person would understand the situation to be an arrest. It described
the test as "whether a reasonable person, under similar circums-
tances, would understand the situation to be an arrest."689 Other
courts have applied this same version of the test. 69 Still others have
applied the same test but have asked not whether the situation was
understood to be an arrest, but whether it was understood to be a
restraint on freedom that the law associates with formal arrest. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asked this question in United States v.
Bengivenga as whether "a reasonable person in the suspect's position
would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with
formal arrest. ,
692
Still others have asked not whether the reasonable person would
understand the situation to be an arrest, but whether a reasonable
person would understand the situation to be something less than an
arrest, such as an investigative detention. For example, in United States- 693 -
v. Taylor, the First Circuit put forth this inquiry: whether "[u] nder
the [] circumstances.. . a reasonable person, standing in [the defen-
dant's] shoes, would have understood, at the time, that he was being
briefly detained for inquiry and investigation, not arrested.
694
In United States v. Trueer, 695 e First Circuit used a similar though
slightly different inquiry that addressed both the concept of an arrest
and an investigative detention, asking whether the reasonable person
understood the situation to be an arrest and not just an investigative
detention, describing the inquiry as
whether ... a reasonable person in [the detainee's] position
689. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
690. See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 257, 262 (Va. Ct. App. 1998)
("If a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood that he or
she was under arrest, then the police are required to provide Miranda warnings
before questioning."); see also United States v. Hephner, 260 F. Supp. 2d 763, 778
(N.D. Iowa 2003).
691. 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
692. Id. at 596; see also United States v. Courtney, 463 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir.
2006); United States v. Lovell, 317 F. Supp. 2d 663, 668 (W.D. Va. 2004); United
States v. Lugo, 289 F. Supp. 2d 790, 795 (S.D. Tex. 2003); United States v. Maldona-
do, 213 F. Supp. 2d 710, 717 (S.D. Tex. 2002); People v. Mangum, 48 P.3d 568, 571
(Colo. 2002); State v. Rincon, 994 So. 2d 430, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); State v.
Grant, 939 A.2d 93, 101 (Me. 2008).
693. 162 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1998).
694. Id. at 22.
695. 238 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2001).
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would have believed that he was actually in police custody
and being constrained to a degree associated with formal
arrest (rather than simply undergoing a brief period of de-
tention at the scene while the police sought by means of a
moderate number of questions to determine his identity and
to obtain information confirming or dispelling their suspi-
cions) .696
This or a similar test has been applied in the lower courts within the
697First Circuit and elsewhere. Another version of this test that was
accepted by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Gunn v. State0 focuses
not on an arrest or investigative detention, but on Miranda custody:
"The proper inquiry is to ask 'whether a reasonable man in Appel-
lant's position would have considered himself to be in police custo-, ,, 99 .700
dy. And in Barrett v. State, the Indiana Court of Appeals
provided yet another test when it held, "Generally, we ask whether a
reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe that
696. Id. at93 (quoting United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 962 (lst Cir. 1986)).
697. Other cases accepting this as the appropriate test for determining Miranda
custody include United States v. Daubmann, 474 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (D. Mass. 2007)
("In short, ifa 'reasonable person in [the detainees'] position would have believed
that he [or she] was actually in police custody and [was] being constrained to a
degree associated with formal arrest,' then custody has been established for Miranda
purposes.") (quoting Trueber, 238 F.3d at 93); and United States v. Mittel-Carey, 456 F.
Supp. 2d 296,305 (D. Mass. 2006) (same). See also State v. Silva, 11 P.3d 44,50 (Idaho
Ct. App. 2000) ("[W]hether a reasonable person would believe he or she was in
police custody to a degree associated with formal arrest, not whether the person
would believe he or she was not free to leave.") (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420,442 (1984)); State v. Smith, 864 A.2d 1177,1181 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
("Because Teny and traffic stops necessarily involve some restraint on freedom of
action, the question is not whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave at the
inception of the questioning. The question is whether a reasonable person,
considering the objective circumstances, would understand the situation as a defacto
arrest or would recognize that after brief questioning he or she would be free to
leave.") (citation omitted).
698. 64 P.3d 716 (Wyo. 2003).
699. Id. at 720 (quoting Glass v. State, 853 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo. 1993)); see also
United States v. Jefferson, 562 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (E.D. Va. 2008) ("The custody
inquiry is objective: the question is not whether the suspect or the interrogating
officer believed that the suspect was in custody, but whether a reasonable person in
the suspect's position would have understood that he or she was in custody."); State v.
Navy, 635 S.E.2d 549, 553 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006) ("The relevant inquiry is whether a
reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood himself to be in
custody.") (quoting Bradley v. State, 449 S.E.2d 492,493-94 (1994)), rev'd, 688 S.E.2d
838 (S.C. 2010); State v. Mosher, 584 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ("The test
is 'whether a reasonable person in the [suspect's] position would have considered
himself or herself to be in custody, given the degree of restraint under the circums-
tances.'") (quoting State v. Swanson, 475 N.W.2d 148, 152 (Wis. 1991)).
700. 837 N.E.2d 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
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she was under arrest or not free to resist the entreaties of the
police. "'0'71
Some courts, such as the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Levin ,
appear to combine a number of the above-referenced tests into one.
In Levin, the Utah court wrote:
A person is in custody when "[the person's] freedom of ac-
tion is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest."
The inquiry is objective and considers "how a reasonable
man in the suspect's position would have understood his
situation." A suspect may understand himself or herself to
be in custody based either on physical evidence or on the
nature of the officer's instructions and questions. Therefore,
we focus on both the evidence of restraint and on objective
evidence of the officers' intentions. As stated by the U.S.
Supreme Court, "[A]n officer's views concerning the nature
of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential cul-
pability of the individual being questioned, may be one
among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether
that individual was in custody, but only if the officer's views
or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under
interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable
person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to
leave."7"3
In referencing such terms as "how a reasonable person in that
position would perceive his or her freedom to leave," "how a reasona-
ble man in the suspect's position would have understood his situa-
tion," "freedom of action... curtailed to a degree associated with
formal arrest," and "[a] suspect may understand himself or herself to
be in custody," the Utah court seemingly combines many of the above-
referenced tests, including Thompson, Berkemer, and other versions of
those tests.0 Other courts have applied a combination of the above
705
tests as well. In United States v. Molina, for example, the court
offered the following test:
The determination of whether a suspect was "in custody" for
the purposes of Miranda requires a two-step inquiry. The
first step in the inquiry is to ask "whether a reasonable per-
son would have thought he was free to leave." If a reasona-
ble person would not have thought himself free to leave, the
701. Id. at 1028.
702. 144 P.3d 1096 (Utah 2006).
703. Id. at 1105-06 (footnotes omitted).
704. Id.
705. 368 F. Supp. 2d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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next question to ask is "whether, in addition to not feeling
free to leave, a reasonable person would have understood
his freedom of action to have been curtailed to a degree
associated with formal arrest.
7 °0 6
In explaining the logic for such a two-part test, the New York
court made reference to the Berkemer decision, noting while persons
stopped for traffic citations likely would not feel free to leave without
officer permission, those same persons would not expect the traffic
707
stop to be the equivalent of a formal arrest. And in United States v.T 708
Touzel, the court held that the proper test involves the following
inquiries:
[T] he test for determining whether a person is in custody
for Miranda purposes is "whether a reasonable person in
defendant's position would have understood himself to be
subjected to the restraints comparable to those associated
with a formal arrest." Two important factors in making that
determination are whether "a reasonable person in the sus-
pect's shoes would have understood that his detention was
not likely to be temporary and brief," and whether he
"would feel that he was completely at the mercy of the po-
lice."70 9
Other courts have applied a version of the Berkemer test, but have
done so with the express statement that the "reasonable person" from
whose position the situation is viewed is an innocent person. For
example, in People v. Colon,7" ° the New York Supreme Court for New
York County used this test: "A person is deemed to be in custody...
when a reasonable person in the defendant's position who is innocent
of any crime would have believed himself or herself to be in custo-
dy."7 ' And in Aningayou v. State,712 the Alaska Court of Appeals stated
that in reviewing a situation to determine whether a person is in
custody for Miranda purposes, " [t] he examination of the circums-
tances of the questioning is objective, that is, from the point of view of
a reasonable, innocent person. 7 13 Other courts, and in particular
706. Id. at 311 (citations omitted).
707. See id.
708. 409 F. Supp. 2d 511 (D. Vt. 2006).
709. Id. at 522 (quoting United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 675 (2d Cir.
2004)).
710. 784 N.Y.S.2d 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
711. Id. at 317.
712. 949 P.2d 963 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997).




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [2010], Art. 10
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol36/iss4/10
MIRANDA & TERRY
courts from New York and Texas, have similarly held that the
reasonable person for the purposes of determining Miranda custody is
714
an innocent person.
Another type of test for determining whether a person is in Mi-
randa custody looks to the actions of the police officers involved and
what those actions tell about the situation, and sometimes also draws
additional elements from the above-referenced tests. One such test
was applied in Acosta, and was described as whether a "reasonable
person in [the detainee's] position would.., have believed that he
was utterly at the mercy of the police, away from the protection of any
public scrutiny, and had better confess or else." 1 5 The Tenth Circuit
in Perdue asked a similar question, making part of the focus for
determining "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would
have understood his situation" whether the person felt "completely at
the mercy of the police. 71 6
Another version that looked at police activity-and in particular
pressures placed on the defendant-came from the Maryland Court
717
of Appeals in Minehan v. State, which held that Miranda custody "is
an objective state that is entered when a suspect is 'led to believe, as a
reasonable person, that he is being deprived or restricted of his
freedom of action or movement under pressures of official authori-
ty. 718 A similar focus on police pressures came out of the Oregon
Court of Appeals in State v. Coen, which held that
Miranda warnings.., are required when a person is either
in full custody or under compelling circumstances....
Compelling circumstances exist when, taking into account
the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in de-
714. See, e.g, State v. Rodriguez, 986 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. App. 1999) ("The
reasonable person standard presupposes an innocent person."); see also United States
v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Berkemers 'reasonable person'
does not have a guilty state of mind."); United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593,596
(5th Cir. 1988) ("The reasonable person through whom we view the situation must
be neutral to the environment and to the purposes of the investigation-that is,
neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the
seriousness of the circumstances."); People v. Cheatom, 871 N.Y.S.2d 529 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008); People v. Hernandez, 806 N.Y.S.2d 589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re
Ricardo S., 746 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); People v. Ash, 594 N.Y.S.2d 366
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App. 2008); Nenno v.
State, 970 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
715. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1150 (11th Cir. 2004).
716. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation
omitted).
717. 809 A.2d 66 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
718. Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
719. 125 P.3d 761 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
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fendant's position would feel compelled to answer a police
officer's questions ... [or] would have felt required to stay
710
and answer all of the officer's questions.
In a subsequent decision by the Oregon Supreme Court in State
v. ShafT which applied the same standard as that used in Coen, the
court noted that "[t]he question whether the circumstances were
compelling.., turns on how a reasonable person in the suspect's
position would have understood his or her situation. 7 22 It further
noted that "the 'overarching inquiry is whether the officers created
the sort of police-dominated atmosphere that Miranda warnings were
intended to counteract.'
723
Many of the above inquiries are somewhat similar. However,
many of the inquiries are also very different from each other, and
even those that are similar have some subtle yet important differences.
In short, there appears to be a lack of a consistent standard for
determining when a Terry detention becomes Miranda custody, and
the lack of a consistent standard only adds to the difficulty of
determining whether or when a coercive Terry stop remains a Terry
stop fhat does not require Miranda warnings during the lawful and
Supreme Court-sanctioned questioning of a detainee.
Adding to the confusion is the fact that different courts give
weight to different factors or circumstances surrounding an interroga-
tion in applying the above-listed tests. Factors that courts have
considered in making a custody determination include, but are not
limited to, the location and physical surroundings of the encounter,
the suspect's familiarity with the location of questioning, the time of
day or night during which questioning takes place, the number of law
enforcement personnel present during any detention and question-
ing, the degree of physical restraint and coercion used during the
detention (including whether law enforcement frisked the detainee,
displayed weapons, and used handcuffs), the length and circums-
tances of any interrogation, the purpose of the interrogation, whether
and to what extent the detainee was confronted with evidence of his
or her guilt, whether the detainee was arrested at the termination of
the interview, whether the suspect is informed that the detention will
or will not be temporary, whether the investigation has focused on the
person being interviewed, the amount of time between questioning
720. Id. at 766-67 (citations omitted).
721. 175 P.3d 454 (Or. 2007).
722. Id at 457.
723. Id. (quoting State v. Roble-Baker, 136 P.3d 22, 22 (Or. 2006)).
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and subsequent arrest, by whom and how the contact was initiated,
how the suspect got to the location of the questioning, what words
were spoken by the officer, the language used to summon the
detainee, the officer's tone and general demeanor, who else was
present in addition to law enforcement, the officer's response to any
questions, whether the defendant was directed to do anything, the
detainee's response to any directives, whether law enforcement used
any deception or deceptive interview techniques, and whether there
724
are other objective indicia of arrest. As the Supreme Court has
noted, "the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a
determination of whether a suspect is 'in custody' for purposes of
receiving Miranda protection."72 What portions of these circums-
tances should be looked at and the weight that each factor should be
given, however, differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from
716court to court, and as one commentator noted, "[t] his grab bag of
relevant factors [often] makes custody determinations unpredictable
and inconsistent.,
727
V. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As a review of the pertinent case law indicates, there is significant
disagreement over whether coercive Terry stops constitute Miranda
custody and therefore whether Miranda warnings are required in
coercive Terry situations. Courts addressing these issues should find
that in the majority of cases, coercive Terry detentions do not require
Miranda warnings and should recognize that the mere fact that an
investigative detention involves force or coercion does not mean,
without more, that a Terry detention becomes Miranda custody. This is
true for a number of reasons. First, the original Terry decision
contemplated the fact that law enforcement officers would ask a
detainee questions during a potentially coercive encounter, and that
this could be done without the need for Miranda warnings. 72' Addi-
724. See United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v.
May, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Minn. 2006); People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453 (Colo.
2002); State v. Kester, 51 P.3d 457 (Idaho Ct. App. 2002); State v. Michaud, 724 A.2d
1222 (Me. 1998); State v. Payne, 149 S.W.3d 20 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Levin, 144 P.3d
1096 (Utah 2006); State v. Mosher, 584 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); Gunn
v. State, 64 P.3d 716, 720 (Wyo. 2003).
725. Californiav. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
726. See Gunn, 64 P.3d at 720 ("No one factor alone will necessarily establish
custody for Miranda purposes, and not all factors will be relevant to a given case.").
727. Swift, supra note 130, at 1080.
728. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968).
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tionally, post-Terry Supreme Court case authority similarly recognizes
that some coercion is appropriate in Terry detentions without
implicating Miranda. The view that coercion by itself does not convert
a Terry stop into Miranda custody also finds support in the fact that the
original Miranda decision did not contemplate that warnings would be
required in all coercive circumstances and in the concept and
definition of the term arrest. Additionally, the fact that the Supreme
Court has recently narrowed the definition of the term "custody"
provides additional support for the argument. And finally, practical
considerations weigh in favor of recognizing that Miranda's applicabil-
ity in Terry detentions should be the rare exception and not the rule.
Additionally, it is clear from the widespread disagreement noted
above that guidance is needed when it comes to defining an appro-
priate test for determining whether a situation is one of Miranda
custody. In this regard, the appropriate test would be one that
distinguishes between true Terry investigative detentions and other
encounters such as consensual encounters. Additionally, any accepted
test must account for the fact that a person detained pursuant to Terry
is not free to leave until the officer's suspicions have been dispelled
and therefore has had his or her freedom of movement lawfully
restricted and truly is not at liberty to terminate questioning and leave
the area of detention. Any proposed test further needs to recognize
the origins of Terry and respect the fact that law enforcement is
permitted, pursuant to that decision, to use a reasonable amount of
force to protect either the officer or the public, and is further
permitted to question detainees without implicating Miranda. In
short, the Thompson reasonable person test simply does not work in
the Terry context and those courts that give it strict adherence need to
replace it.
A. Analysis: Issues to Consider when Addressing the Circuit Split
When addressing the circuit split and the interplay of Terry and
Miranda in coercive situations, a handful of important issues must be
considered-issues that weigh in favor of a finding that the use of at
least some force or coercion is permissible in Terry detentions without
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1. The Mere Fact that an Investigative Detention Involves Force or
Coercion Should not Per Se Transform that Detention into One in
Which Miranda Warnings Are Required
Any court looking at the issues underlying the circuit split de-
scribed in the Artiles-Martin decision must begin its analysis with the
recognition that Terry stops, though not arrests, will often involve
some form of coercion. And more important, those courts must
accept the view that the mere existence of coercion in a Terry stop
does not transform the stop into Miranda custody and does not per se
require that Miranda warnings be provided to a detainee. Although
there may be some question as to where the line between Terry stops,
Miranda custody, and formal arrest actually is, the mere fact that there
is some coercion does not automatically take a situation out of the
realm of a traditional Terry stop and convert it into one in which
Miranda warnings are required. The view that some coercion is
permissible during a Terry stop without creating a situation in which
Miranda warnings become necessary is supported by authority from
729
the Supreme Court and other federal and state appellate courts, as
well as by the original Terry and Miranda decisions themselves.
a. The Original Terry Decision Contemplates that Some
Questions Will Be Asked During Terry Detentions-Including
Coercive Terry Detentions-Without Implicating Miranda
The original Terry decision contemplated a number of things, two
of which are of importance with respect to addressing and dealing
with the present issue. The first is that law enforcement officers
effecting an investigative detention are permitted to ask a detainee a
limited number of questions to confirm or dispel their reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. And it cannot be overlooked
that in so holding the Terry Court, significantly, did not make any
mention of its recently issued Miranda decision and in no way
implicated or involved Miranda in its Terry decision-something that it
obviously had the ability to do if it so chose. The second principle of
importance is the fact that law enforcement officers are permitted to
729. See, e.g., State v. Dawson, 983 P.2d 916, 922 (Mont. 1999) ("This Court has
previously held that law enforcement officers need not administer Mirandawarnings
to suspects during brief investigative encounters even if those encounters are
somewhat coercive. Moreover, we have stated that an interrogation is not custodial
unless there is a significant restriction of personal liberty similar to an arrest, and
even temporary confinement as a safety precaution does not render the detention
,custodial' for Miranda purposes.") (citations omitted).
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use some coercion to effect these investigative detentions in which
they can subsequently ask a detainee questions. As noted by the
United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor,730 "[o]ur Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to
make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right
to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect
it. 7 3' And as the Terry decision itself instructed,
we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement
officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims
of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause
for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that
the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating
at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the of-
ficer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable
to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon• • 732
and to neutralize the threat of physical harm.
Thus, the very Court that permitted law enforcement to detain an
individual based on reasonable suspicion and ask that detainee a
limited number of questions about the very criminal acts being
investigated without implicating or even making reference to Miranda
also permitted those same officers in the same detentions to use
necessary force to protect themselves and the public and to effect the
purposes of the stop. And, once again, in holding as it did, the Court
nowhere referenced its decision in Miranda from just two year
earlier-a significant fact in the context of a decision approving some
questioning in situations that were understood might involve some
degree of force or coercion.
The position that the Terry decision contemplated the use of ne-
cessary force and the questioning of a detainee, and that it did so
without putting any Miranda-based stipulations or restraints on that
questioning, is supported by Justice White's concurrence in Terry. In
joining the 8-1 decision in Terry, he wrote:
[A] lthough the Court puts the matter aside in the context of
this case, I think an additional word is in order concerning
the matter of interrogation during an investigative stop.
730. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
731. Id. at 396.
732. Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968); see also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
146 (1972) ("So long as the officer is entitled to make a forcible stop, and has reason
to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a weapons search
limited in scope to this protective purpose.").
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There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents a po-
liceman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets.
Absent special circumstances, the person approached may
not be detained or frisked, but may refuse to cooperate and
go on his way. However, given the proper circumstances...
the person may be briefly detained against his will while per-
tinent questions are directed to him. Of course, the person
stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be com-
pelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest,
although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation.... But if the investigative stop is sustainable at
all, constitutional rights are not necessarily violated if perti-
nent questions are asked and the person is restrained briefly
in the process.733
Justice White's comment is significant because it supports the
idea that a person can be stopped and frisked if the circumstances
warrant a frisk and otherwise "restrained briefly" in a Terry-type
detention, and further can be asked specific questions about the.... 734
reasons for the stop, without the implication of Miranda. Additional-
ly, the existence of the comment itself andJustice White's additional
comment that the Court "puts the matter [of Miranda] aside"
indicates that the Terry Court was well aware of its Miranda decision
from two years prior and chose not to make it a part of the Terry
context. 7 5 Furthermore, the fact that Justice White raised the issue
and stated a belief that questioning in a Terry context does not
implicate a detainee's Fifth Amendment rights, and no contrary
response or challenge was raised by any other member of the Court,
indicates at the very least a non-rejection, and perhaps even an
acceptance, of his views on the issue.
This view is even consistent with statements contained in the Mi-
randa opinion itself, which held:
In announcing these principles, we are not unmindful of
the burdens which law enforcement officials must bear, of-
ten under trying circumstances. We also fully recognize the
obligation of all citizens to aid in enforcing the criminal
laws. This Court, while protecting individual rights, has al-
ways given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies in
the legitimate exercise of their duties. The limits we have
placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an
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undue interference with a proper system of law enforce-
ment. As we have noted, our decision does not in any way
preclude police from carrying out their traditional investiga-
tory functions.
73 6
Arguably, the entire concept of the Terry investigative detention,
including investigating criminal activity that is happening in the
officer's presence and talking with persons potentially involved to
determine what exactly is happening, is a "traditional investigatory
function" 37 and is not meant to be affected by Miranda. This view is
further supported by the Miranda Court's statement that "[g]eneral
on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other
general questioning of citizens in the factfinding process is not
affected by our holding.' 8
A good example of these basic principles in the context of an
actual case is presented by the very straightforward case of United States
v. Cervantes-Flores,3 9 which involved the prosecution of an illegal alien
for reentering the United States. The basic facts of the reentry were
described in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the case. Specifically, in
May of 1998, the defendant was found inside the United States
without proper documentation.14° He was thereafter convicted of
improper entry by an alien and was removed from the country in
January of 2003. One week after his removal, Cervantes was
reapprehended in California when he was observed walking along the
side of a highway. 742 Specifically, a border patrol agent's suspicions
were aroused when Cervantes, upon noticing the agent's marked
743vehicle, began to run away from the vehicle. The agent was able to
catch Cervantes after about three-quarters of a mile, at which time
Cervantes was subdued and handcuffed.74 As noted by the Ninth
Circuit, "[w] ithout giving any Miranda warning, [the border patrol
agent] then asked Cervantes his citizenship, whether he had immigra-
tion documents allowing him to be in the United States, and how he
crossed the border.", 745 In response to the questioning, Cervantes
admitted that he was a Mexican citizen and that he had entered the
736. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481(1966).
737. Id.
738. Id. at 477.
739. 421 F.3d 825 (9th Cir. 2005).
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United States illegally. 7 6 Cervantes was thereafter convicted of a
reentry offense and appealed his conviction, including the trial
court's refusal to suppress the statements that he made to the border
patrol agent who arrested him.
4 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a post-Kim de-
cision, upheld the conviction. On the Terry and Miranda issues, the
Ninth Circuit noted that agents had reasonable suspicion to detain
Cervantes and that given that fact the agent "could ask Cervantes
questions 'reasonably related in scope to the justification for their
initiation. 749 Specifically, the court held that questions about
Cervantes's place of birth, citizenship, lack of permission to be in the
United States, and manner of crossing the border-though questions
that went to the heart of the illegal conduct that he was later charged
with-"were reasonably limited in scope to determining whether
Cervantes had crossed the border illegally 750 and were therefore
appropriate and his answers admissible despite the fact that Miranda
warnings were not provided. The Court further noted that under the
circumstances the use of handcuffs to detain Cervantes was not
inappropriate and did not convert the Terry detention into Miranda
custody. The court concluded:
In sum, [the agent] had reasonable suspicion to make an
initial Terry stop. He limited the scope of his questions to
investigating that suspicion alone. His use of handcuffs was
justified by Cervantes' flight and [the agent's] safety concern
and thus did not convert the stop into a custodial arrest.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in
admitting the statements Cervantes made in response to
[the agent's] questions.52
Cervantes-Flores serves as a useful example for a number of rea-
sons. First, it provides a classic example of a Terry stop, involves some
use of coercion and force that is reasonable given the circumstances
surrounding the stop, involves questioning that pursuant to Terry is
properly limited in scope, and recognizes that all of these things are
consistent with, and appropriate under, the original Terry decision
746. Id.
747. See id. at 829.
748. Id. at 835.
749. Id. at 830 (quoting U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975);
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and, most important, are appropriate without the need for Miranda
warnings.
b. Later Supreme Court Precedent Supports the View that Some
Coercion is Permissible in Teny Detentions Without Implicating
Miranda
The concept of some coercive elements existing during a Terry
detention is not a new one. As the Supreme Court stated in Mathia-
son, "[a] ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer
will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the
police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimate-
ly cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. 753 The Supreme
Court has been clear, however, that the mere fact that some coercion
exists is not enough to convert a Terry stop into a situation in which
Miranda warnings are necessary, and therefore any court addressing
the interplay between these two important decisions must remember
that fact.
In addition to the Court's statement in Mathiason, a number of
Supreme Court decisions support the theory that coercion can be
used in a Terry stop without converting that stop into either an arrest
or a situation in which Miranda warnings are required. First and
foremost, the Miranda decision itself supports that belief. As will be
discussed below, while Miranda ultimately concluded that warnings
should have been given in the case before it, the facts and back-
ground of the Miranda decision, as well as the language used indicates
that not all situations involving coercion require Miranda warnings.
Other decisions support these arguments as well. In United States v.
HensLey, TM for example, the Supreme Court addressed the stop of a
person in one jurisdiction who was suspected of criminal activity in
another jurisdiction.755 The stop at issue involved law enforcement
pulling a vehicle over, approaching the vehicle with a weapon drawn
pointed in the air, and ordering the occupants to get out of the-. 756
vehicle. In holding that the police officer's actions were all
warranted and appropriate under a Terry investigative detention
scenario, the Court noted that "[w]hen the.., officers stopped
Hensley, they were authorized to take such steps as were reasonably
necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status
753. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
754. 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
755. Id. at 221.
756. See id. at 224.
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quo during the course of the stop," and therefore their "conduct was
well within the permissible range in the context of suspects who are
reported to be armed and dangerous.""' And while Hensley did not
involve any interrogation of significance enough to address in the
opinion, the Court, once again without reference to Miranda, further
held that the underlying reasonable suspicion was such that it
"justif[ied] a brief stop to check Hensley's identification, pose questions,
and inform the suspect that [law enforcement from anotherjurisdic-
tion] wished to question him. "758 In short, the Court upheld the stop
as a standard investigative detention despite the coercive acts of
pulling the suspects over, approaching their vehicle at gunpoint, and
ordering them out of the car. In so doing, the Court recognized that
law enforcement can ask questions during a Terry stop without
implicating or even referencing Miranda.
Another case in which the Supreme Court approved of a coercive
Teny situation is Michigan v. Sumwrs,759 which also had an added
element of some questioning that did not cause the Court to invoke
Miranda. In Summers, the Court addressed the seizure and subsequent
search of a person discovered just outside of a home for which law
enforcement had obtained a search warrant. 76 With respect to the
facts of the case, the Supreme Court noted that as a group of police
officers were preparing to execute a search warrant on a home
believed to contain narcotics, they encountered Summers descending
the front steps of the home. 6  Officers thereafter "requested his
assistance in gaining entry, and detained him while they searched the
premises." 762 Drugs were found in the home, officers were able to
determine that Summers owned the house, he was arrested, and a
search of his person revealed 8.5 grams of heroin in an envelope in
763
Summers's pocket.
The lower courts provided additional details of the detention,
search, and questioning that took place. The first appellate court to
address the case was the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v.
Summers.7M In that opinion the Michigan court noted that Summers
was detained by law enforcement outside of the home and asked
757. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
758. Id. at 234 (emphasis added).
759. 452 U.S. 692 (1981).




764. 243 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
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about his relationship to the premises.165 It also noted that he was
eventually ordered to re-enter the house-a matter about which "he
had little choice --where he was subsequently detained in a single
room with other occupants and further questioned. Summers
thereafter "indicated upon questioning that he was the owner of the
house and lived there."767 Those answers were inculpatory because
drugs were found in the home. The Michigan Supreme Court also
heard and ruled on the case in its own version of People v. Summers.76
The Court's description of the facts included a statement that "the
testimony of [the detaining officer] at the preliminary examination
indicates that the defendant was not free to leave the front porch as
the premises search warrant was being executed, but was instead
escorted into his house and deprived of his liberty.,
769
Procedurally, both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Mich-
igan Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case
770after a suppression hearing and prior to trial, so none of the
statements that Summers made were actually introduced into
evidence or had their admissibility challenged. As such, the United
States Supreme Court's decision is not a Miranda-based decision.
However, with the above-referenced facts as background, the Summers
Court did make some statements relevant to the issue of whether
Miranda warnings are required in coercive Terry detentions such as
that at issue in Summers. First and foremost, the Court wrote that:
If the purpose underlying a Terry stop-investigating possi-
ble criminal activity-is to be served, the police must under
certain circumstances be able to detain the individual for
longer than [a] brief time period .... As one commentator
observed: "It is clear that there are several investigative tech-
niques which may be utilized effectively in the course of a
Terry-type stop. The most common is interrogation, which
may include both a request for identification and inquiry
concerning the suspicious conduct of the person de-
tained .... There is no reason to conclude that any inves-
tigative methods of the type just listed are inherently
objectionable."77'
765. Id. at 690-91.
766. Id. at 691 n.2.
767. Id. at 691.
768. 286 N.W.2d 226 (Mich. 1979).
769. Id. at 228.
770. Id. at 227, 231.
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Once again, Summers is not a Miranda-based case; however, in
writing the above footnote the Court nowhere indicates that Miranda
warnings might be required in such a circumstance.
The Court also makes a comparison of the facts of Summers toS .772
those of Dunaway v. New York, a case in which a Terry stop was
deemed to be a de facto arrest.773 In making that comparison, the
Summers Court noted that "[i]n sharp contrast to the custodial
interrogation in Dunaway, the detention of this respondent was
'substantially less intrusive' than an arrest., 774 This is a significant
statement in the context of a discussion of Miranda and its role in
Terry detentions. First, the Court made it very clear that the situation
in Summers--which included detaining a person against his will inside
a single room while multiple law enforcement officers search the
remainder of the home for drugs and doing so in such a way that it
was clear that he was not free to leave-did not rise to the level of a
"custodial interrogation" like the situation in Dunaway.775 Further,
and perhaps more important, the Court found the same situation to
be "'substantially less intrusive' than an arrest., 776 This is significant
because Beheler and Berkemer held that a seizure only rises to the level
of custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings when "a
suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with
formal arrest.' 777 Thus, it is clear from the opinion that a situation
such as that described above, which again has been referred to as a
Tery detention, is far from rising to the level of custodial interroga-
tion and is "'substantially less intrusive' than an arrest," and any
questioning that takes place within the parameters set for Teny
detentions does not need to be preceded by Miranda warnings. In the
same discussion, the Court further noted in another footnote that
"unlike the seizure in Dunaway, which was designed to provide an
opportunity for interrogation and did lead to Dunaway's confession,
the seizure in this case is not likely to have coercive aspects likely to
induce self-incrimination."778 In other words, the Court once again
found the situation in Summers to be very much different from the
cases that led to the Miranda decision and therefore found it to be a
772. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).




777. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)).
778. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702 n.15.
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case in which Miranda warnings would not be required-an analysis
and result that should be given significant consideration by courts
addressing a claim that Miranda warnings should have been required
during a particular Terry detention.
Of course, the Supreme Court decision of most importance to
the argument that Miranda warnings generally have no place in Terry
detentions, even if those detentions involve some degree of force or
coercion, is Berkemer. As noted above, the investigative detention at
issue in Berkemer involved a motorist being stopped by law enforce-
ment, removed from his vehicle, and subjected to testing to deter-
mine if he was under the influence of some substance. 79 McCarty, the
motorist, was undoubtedly seized and his freedom of action curtailed
to a degree that he was not free to leave, and yet he was not deemed
to be in custody because he was not "subjected to restraints compara-
ble to those associated with a formal arrest. As noted above, the
Supreme Court distinguished traffic stops in the sense that motorists
do not feel completely at the mercy of police, traffic stops are
generally more public, there is less danger that a person will be forced
to make self-incriminating statements when he or she otherwise would
not do so, and "the atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is
substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds
of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself and in the subsequent cases
in which" Miranda has been applied. This comparison of traffic
stops to the significantly overbearing interrogation at issue in Miranda
is important. As will be discussed below, the types of interrogation
that led to the Miranda decision are significantly overbearing and
coercive, and much more so than even a Terry stop like those at issue
in Pelayo-Ruelas, Martinez, Treuber, Leshuk, Ali, Cruz, Smith, Perdue, and
many of the other cases referenced above. Regardless, in making a
comparison to the facts of Miranda a part of the consideration, the
Berkemer court set a standard that other courts would be right to
follow. More specifically, in addressing the circuit split at issue here,
the courts should compare the facts of each Terry-type case to the facts
of Miranda when determining whether warnings are required in a
particular situation-a procedure suggested by Beckwith and other
Supreme Court decisions.11
2
779. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 423.
780. Id. at 441.
781. Id. at 438-39.
782. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976) ("An interview
with Government agents in a situation such as the one shown by this record simply
does not present the elements which the Miranda court found so inherently coercive
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Given the extremely coercive nature of the interrogations that
led up to the Miranda decision, except in rare circumstances the
suggested comparison should weigh in favor of warnings not being
required for Terry stops. The most often-cited portion of the Miranda
opinion for support for the position that warnings are not required in
Terry detentions reads:
The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions
of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in our
opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miran-
da. The similarly noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops
prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pur-
suant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda."
Again, this statement from Berkemer notes that there should be a
comparison between the facts and circumstances of those cases that
led the Court to decide Miranda, and those Terry stops that courts are
being asked to address. This is significant because, once again, even
coercive Terry stops that involve handcuffs and other coercive acts
necessitated by a suspect's danger to officers and the community in
general are far less coercive than the situations complained of in
Miranda.
Finally, one additional part of the Berkemer decision that supports
the non-applicability of Miranda in most Terry stops is its statement,
found in a footnote in the opinion, that
[o]ne of the investigative techniques that Miranda was de-
signed to guard against was the use by police of various
kinds of trickerym-such as "Mutt andJeff' routines-to elicit
confessions from suspects. A police officer who stops a sus-
pect on the highway has little chance to develop or imple-
ment a plan of this sort.78
The same is certainly true of most Teny stops-including those in
which the circumstances of the stop require a use of force and
coercion-because by their very nature as incidents that generally
arise without much warning, they do not provide law enforcement
with any chance to develop or implement an interrogation plan.
as to require its holding.").
783. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440.
784. Id. at 438 n.27.
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c. The Original Miranda Decision Does Not Require Warnings
in all Coercive Interrogations
The aforementioned cases are important in the context of a dis-
cussion of whether and when Miranda becomes applicable in a Terry-
like investigative detention. Specifically, the fact that Terry itself
contemplates that some force and coercion may be necessary in
certain circumstances, yet at the same time allows law enforcement
officers to ask some questions regarding the circumstances of the
stop, is significant. This is particularly true because the Court had
decided Miranda just two years prior to Terry, and in no way refe-
renced the need for Miranda warnings in discussing the questioning
that was permitted to take place during a Terry stop. Certainly a
person who had been detained by law enforcement and potentially
even searched during the investigation of criminal activity had been
"deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way," which was
the standard under Miranda that was applicable at the time. And yet,
again, nowhere in the Terry opinion is it suggested that Miranda was
even remotely applicable. This lack of discussion of the need for
Miranda warnings in the Terry decision or a number of other Teny-
related decisions up until the Court ruled in Berkemersuggests that the
Court did not intend Miranda to apply in those types of situations.
This suggestion, in turn, is supported by the Miranda opinion itself,
which precedes its ruling with a discussion of "graphic examples" of
overbearing and unlawful coercion. 7s5 Thus when Miranda referenced
the applicability of the warnings to those situations in which a person
has been arrested or is "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way," the Court was undoubtedly referring to those
coercive circumstances described in the opinion or their functional
equivalent, and not necessarily less coercive circumstances such as
those that the Mathiason Court indicated do not require Miranda
warnings.
There are a number of places in the Miranda opinion in which
the Court described the types of situations that gave rise to its
landmark decision. Near the beginning of the opinion, for example,
the Court noted that the right against self-incrimination "had its
origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust
methods of interrogating accused persons,"786 which included "the
temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid
785. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
786. Id. at 442 (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896)).
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or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal
contradictions.,
7
The Miranda Court also described the situations of the actual
cases themselves that the Miranda Court was asked to resolve, which
shared a number of "salient features-incommunicado interrogation
of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional
rights. ' '71 s The Court further described other factors that led up to and
played into its decision in Miranda, including a disturbing history of
interrogation in the United States. 78' The Miranda Court also
referenced a number of specific police practices and interview
techniques that it believed required a holding such as that set forth in
the Miranda opinion.7 90 For example, the opinion referenced
direction given by law enforcement interrogation manuals that
suggests such things as (1) conducting an interview in a private
location of the interrogator's choice and in an "atmosphere [that]
suggests the invincibility of the forces of the law' 79' so as to "deprive []
[the subject] of every psychological advantage" ;792 (2) displaying "an
787. Id. at 443 (quoting Brown, 161 U.S. at 596-97).
788. Id. at 445.
789. In describing the referenced history of interrogation within the United
States, the Miranda Court wrote:
An understanding of the nature and setting of this in-custody interrogation
is essential to our decisions today. The difficulty in depicting what transpires
at such interrogations stems from the fact that, in this country, they have
largely taken place incommunicado. From extensive factual studies under-
taken in the early 1930's ... it is clear that police violence and the "third
degree" flourished at that time.
In a series of cases decided by this Court long after these studies, the
police resorted to physical brutality-beating, hanging, whipping-and to
sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort
confessions. The Commission on Civil Rights in 1961 found much evidence
to indicate that "some policemen still resort to physical force to obtain
confessions." The use of physical brutality and violence is not, unfortunate-
ly, relegated to the past or to any part of the country. Only recently in Kings
County, NewYork, the police brutally beat, kicked and placed lighted ciga-
rette butts on the back of a potential witness under interrogation for the
purpose of securing a statement incriminating a third party.
Id. at 445-46 (citing People v. Portelli, 205 N.E.2d 857 (1965)). The Miranda Court
did later note that " [t] he examples given above are undoubtedly the exception now,
but they are sufficiently widespread to be the object of concern." Id. at 447. It was
the Court's hope that "a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation ... such as
these decisions will advance" would provide an "assurance that practices of this
nature will be eradicated in the foreseeable future." Id.
790. Id. at 449-55.
791. Id. at 450 (citations omitted).
792. Id. at 449 (citations omitted).
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air of confidence in the suspect's guilt,"793 by focusing only on
confirming certain details of the offense and finding out the reasons
the subject committed the act "rather than.., asking the subject
whether he did it,"794 minimizing the moral seriousness of the offense
and blaming the victim or society rather than the suspect, providing
the suspect with legal excuses for the alleged conduct, and otherwise
using "tactics ... designed to put the subject in a psychological state
where his story is but an elaboration of what the police purport to
know already-that he is guilty";79 5 and (3) presenting an overbearing
and "oppressive atmosphere of dogged persistence," by interrogat-
ing "steadily and without relent, leaving the subject no prospect of
surcease"797 for hours and even days if need be "with no respite from
the atmosphere of domination,"79 and otherwise "dominat[ing] his
subject and overwhelm [ing] him with his inexorable will to obtain the
truth 799 withjust enough respite to "avoid a charge of duress that can
be technically substantiated."8 0 '
The Court also addressed concerns regarding other law enforce-
ment tactics such as: pre-planned "Mutt and Jeff' or "good cop/bad
cop" routines, inducing confessions "out of trickery"80' such as the use
of fictitious or bogus line-ups, convincing the subject that silence and
a refusal to answer questions is only an admission of guilt, convincing
a subject that it is better not to involve other persons when an
attorney or family member is requested,8 2 and otherwise using
methods that will "persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his
constitutional rights. "80 These specific practices and the need to avoid
them were the primary reason behind the Court's opinion in Miranda.
In support of its holding, the Court also referenced some of the
factual scenarios of then-recent cases that played into its decision.
And, perhaps most important, the Court noted that "[i] n the cases
before us today, given this background [of recent confession cases],
we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere
793. Id. at 450.
794. Id.
795. Id.





801. Id. at 452-53.
802. See id. at 453-54.
803. Id. at 455.
1594 [Vol. 36:4
128




and the evils it can bring. In other words, the Court's reference to
the recently-decided cases, which immediately followed its discussion
on excessive police interrogation techniques, is the "background" that
provides details on the "interrogation atmosphere" that is at the heart
of the Miranda opinion. The then-recent cases that played into the
Court's decision to rule as it did in Miranda included Townsend v.
Sain, Lynumn v. Illinois,"' Haynes v. Washington, and Fay v. Noia,
8
all of which, the Court found, involved an "incommunicado police-
dominated atmosphere." 80 The facts of these cases are significant to
an analysis of the reasons behind the Miranda decision as they show
the coercive and intimidating nature of the situations being consi-
dered by the Court at the time-situations far more coercive and
intimidating than the comparatively tame scenarios presented in the
Teny cases that make up the circuit split referenced in Artiles-Martin.
Townsend, for example, involved the extended detention and
questioning of a nineteen-year-old heroin addict.8al The detention
involved multiple periods of questioning at various law enforcement
locations and took place over a period of over twenty hours.""
Townsend, the suspect in a murder and separate robbery investiga-
tions, was under the influence of heroin at the time he was first
detained and later began to suffer symptoms of withdrawal.8 2 During
his time of detention, Townsend was placed into a line-up and later
alleged that when one of the robbery victims identified someone
other than Townsend as his attacker, Townsend was physically hit in
the stomach by one of the police officers, causing him to vomit, and
the officer then told Townsend that he knew that Townsend commit-
ted the crime.8' During his detention, Townsend was given certain
pills and injected with medication to address his withdrawal symp-
toms, and later alleged that prior to receiving the medication, he was
told that medical help would be contingent on his cooperation in the
814murder investigation. After being detained for approximately
twenty-one hours, Townsend finally confessed to the murder for
804. Id. at 456.
805. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
806. 372 U.S. 528 (1963).
807. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
808. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
809. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456.
810. Townsend, 372 U.S. at 297.
811. Id. at 297-98.
812. Id.
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• • -- 815which he was being investigated. He was further detained for
approximately three days when he was taken in front of a coroner's
inquest and called as a state witness where he again confessed."
16
Townsend was informed that he had a right not to testify at the
inquest, but was also not appointed an attorney until he was arraigned
on the murder charge another nine days later.81 Certainly it goes
without saying that any comparable interrogation would be so far
outside the bounds of a lawful Tery detention that no true Terry stop
could involve such horrific and blatantly unconstitutional interroga-
tion tactics.
818Lynumn involved a similarly coercive situation. Specifically,
Lynumn involved a confession made in response to a threat by police
that if the petitioner-a mother who "had had no previous experience
with the criminal law, and had no reason not to believe that the police
had ample power to carry out their threats"-did not "cooperate" with
the officers' investigation, her financial aid would be cut off and her
children taken away.8' 9 As noted by the Court, "these threats were
made while she was encircled in her apartment by three police
officers and a twice-convicted felon who had purportedly 'set her
up.,,820
In Haynes, the suspect's version of events included allegations
that he was detained for approximately sixteen hours before making
and signing a confession, during which time his repeated requests to
call his attorney and his wife were denied. 82 1 He further alleged that
officers told him that he would only be allowed to make the requested
calls after he "cooperated" in the sense that he provided law enforce-
ment with a written and signed confession admitting participation in a- - 22
robbery. And, "according to the petitioner, he was, in fact, held
incommunicado by the police until some five or seven days after his
arrest. ,823 Haynes' version of what happened was, in some respects,
contested by the State, though the involved detectives did testify that
Haynes may have asked to call his wife and that they may have told
him that he could only do so if he cooperated with their investiga-
815. Id. at 299.
816. Id.
817. Id. at 299-300.
818. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 529-34 (1963).
819. Id. at 534.
820. Id.
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tion.824 Again, as noted above, the Berkemer Court suggested a
comparison of pending cases to these types of scenarios to determine
the applicability of Miranda, and there is no doubt that no valid Terry
stop can compare to these cases in degree of force or coercion.
The Miranda opinion and its underlying reasoning were based in
great part on the facts of the individual cases on which the Court was
asked to rule-the Miranda decision itself serving as a ruling in
multiple underlying cases. In addressing the coercive circumstances
of the separate prosecutions and appeals making up the Miranda
decision, the Court wrote briefly on each of the underlying cases,
noting that they involved such "menacing police interrogation
procedures" as securing a confession in a special interrogation room,
lengthy overnight detention and interrogation by both state and
federal officers, and, in one truly egregious case, a series of nine
separate custodial interrogations over a period of detention lasting
8215five days. These circumstances, the Court wrote, which each
"carrie[d] its own badge of intimidation," were designed "for no
purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his
examiner. ' '8' 6 The Court also took note of the special circumstances
of each defendant, writing, for example, that the defendant in
Miranda "was a seriously disturbed individual with pronounced sexual
fantasies" and that the defendant in California v. Stewart "was an
indigent Los Angeles Negro who had dropped out of school in the
sixth grade.",
27
In summing up all of the cases and interrogation techniques re-
ferenced above and placing them in the context of the need for what
became Miranda warnings, the Court wrote:
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privi-
lege [against self-incrimination] apply to informal compul-
sion exerted by law enforcement officers during in-custody
questioning. An individual swept from familiar surroundings
into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and
subjected to the techniques of persuasion described above
cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to speak. As a
practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated
setting of the police station may well be greater than in
courts or other official investigations, where there are often
impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trick-
824. See id. at 509-10.
825. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 (1966).
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828
ery.
The Miranda Court further noted that it was seeking to provide
protection against those "interrogation practices which are likely to
exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making
a free and rational choice."82 9 The Court expressed concern regard-
ing those "inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely. ° The Court further explained that
the required warnings are necessary to overcome those "inherent
pressures of the interrogation atmosphere" and "an interrogator's
imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the interroga-
tion will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the
face of accusation is itself damning, and will bode ill when presented
to ajury. And the Court repeatedly made reference to "the secret
,,832interrogation process, the "isolated circumstances under which...
interrogation takes place,"' 83 and the concept of "incommunicado
interrogation."83
This discussion of the cases, interrogation techniques, and police
practices is significant, because immediately after this lengthy
discussion, the Court sets forth its holding that "[t]he principles
announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the
privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
835
Specifically, the cases and practices discussed immediately prior to
this statement are important because they provide the context for the
Court's reference to the concept of "otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way.''836 In the context of the
discussion of when the newly-announced Miranda warnings should be
given, it is those overbearing and shocking circumstances to which the
Court has referred that are the subject of discussion. Nowhere in the
discussion of police practices and case decisions does the Court
discuss a mere investigative detention that later came to be known as a
828. Id. at 461.
829. Id. at 464-65.
830. Id. at 467.
831. Id. at 468.
832. Id. at 470.
833. Id. at 475.
834. Id.
835. Id. at 477.
836. Id. at 444.
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Terry stop. It is the more significant deprivations of liberty and dignity
used for the express purpose of extracting a confession to which the
Court has referred, and not those uses of force or coercion that are
necessary in a Terry stop to maintain the status quo and otherwise
safely effectuate the purposes of and allow law enforcement to safely
gain control of the investigative detention.
This view of Miranda is bolstered by the Court's next area of dis-
cussion. In addressing when Miranda warnings are and are not
required, the Court noted the following about situations in which the
warnings are not necessary:
General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a
crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-
finding process is not affected by our holding. It is an act of
responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever in-
formation they may have to aid in law enforcement. In such
situations, the compelling atmosphere inherent in the
process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily
present.
837
Certainly true Terry stops, such as those at issue in the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decisions in Martinez and Pelayo-Ruelas, involved "on-the-scene
questioning as to the facts surrounding a crime"-the very question-
ing contemplated by the original Terry decision. At the end of the
statement the Court added a footnote of significance. In that
footnote the Court wrote:
The distinction and its significance has been aptly de-
scribed in the opinion of a Scottish court: "In former times,
such questioning, if undertaken, would be conducted by
police officers visiting the house or place of business of the
suspect and there questioning him, probably in the presence
of a relation or friend. However convenient the modern
practice may be, it must normally create a situation very un-
favorable to the suspect."
839
Taken together, these two statements seemingly place a limit on
how often and in what situations Miranda warnings were intended to
be required. This position finds support in the Supreme Court's later
statement in Rhode Island v. Innis that "' i]nterrogation,' as concep-
tualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compul-
837. Id. at 477-78.
838. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4-6 (1968); id. at 477;; Martinez, 462 F.3d 903,
907-08 (8th Cir. 2006); Pelayo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 590, 592 (8th Cir. 2003).
839. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 n.46 (citations omitted).
840. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
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sion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself."84'
The view that Miranda was intended to apply to only those over-
bearing circumstances where a person essentially loses the ability to
resist is supported by Justices White and Stewart's reading of Miranda
as expressed in their dissenting opinion in Orozco v. Texas. 8 4 Decided
three years after Miranda, Orozco reversed a murder conviction on the
grounds that the defendant's statements, which were made after he
was arrested and then questioned without Miranda warnings in his
own home, should not have been used against him at trial.843 In
dissent, Justices White and Stewart complained about the Court's
application of Miranda to what they believed was a very non-coercive
844interrogation, the defendant's arrest notwithstanding. In address-
ing what they believed to be the original intent of the Miranda
decision, Justices White and Stewart first addressed the extreme
nature of the interrogation techniques used in the Miranda cases. In
so doing they noted that the Miranda cases involved "subtle forms of
psychological pressure,8 45 the "incommunicado interrogation of/ ,,846
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, "extended pe-
riod [s] of isolation, repeated interrogation, cajolery, and trickery,
" 4
1
and, overall, techniques causing a risk that "the confidence of the
prisoner could be eroded."848 Justice White then expressed his
concern that the Miranda decision was being applied in situations in
which such contemptible techniques were not used. He wrote:
The Court now extends the same rules to all instances of
in-custody questioning outside the station house. Once ar-
rest occurs, the application of Miranda is automatic. The
rule is simple but it ignores the purpose of Miranda to guard
against what was thought to be the corrosive influence of
849
practices which station house interrogation makes feasible.
And as Justice White noted, the Miranda decision as applied in
Orozco does not even take into account whether or not an interroga-
tion actually involves coercive interrogation tactics. He wrote:
The Court wholly ignores the question whether similar ha-
zards exist or even are possible when police arrest and inter-
841. Id. at 300.
842. 394 U.S. 324 (1969).
843. Id. at 327.
844. Id. at 330 (WhiteJ., dissenting, joined by Stewart,J.).
845. Id. at 328.
846. Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445).
847. Id. at 329.
848. Id. at 328.
849. Id. at 329.
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rogate on the spot, whether it be on the street corner or in
the home, as in this case. No predicate is laid for believing
that practices outside the station house are normally pro-
longed, carried out in isolation, or often productive of the
physical or psychological coercion made so much of in Mi-
randa. It is difficult to imagine the police duplicating in a
person's home or on the street those conditions and prac-
tices which the Court found prevalent in the station house
and which were thought so threatening to the right to si-
lence. Without such a demonstration, Miranda hardly
reaches this case or any cases similar to it.8
S°
Finally, Justices White and Stewart also expressed concern over
the fact that Miranda as applied required warnings even when a
person clearly knew his or her rights prior to an interrogation, writing
that "[w] here the defendant.., as a lawyer, policeman, professional
criminal, or otherwise has become aware of what his right to silence is,
it is sheer fancy to assert that his answer to every question... is
compelled unless he is advised of those rights with which he is already
intimately familiar. 8 51 Justice White concluded that the defendant's
conviction should not have been overturned on Miranda grounds for
the reason that "there was no prolonged interrogation, no unfamiliar
surroundings, no opportunity for the police to invoke those proce-
dures which moved the majority in Miranda,",52 and therefore no
reason to exclude the confession. This discussion of the original
intent of the Miranda decision is significant because Terry stops, and
even coercive Terry stops, are not carried out like the deliberate,
prolonged, isolated, and psychologically overpowering interrogation
situations at issue in Miranda. Officers conducting true Terry stops
that are limited in scope and in time simply do not have the opportu-
nity to employ the "Mutt and Jeff' routines and use other planned,
deliberate, and prolonged interrogations that caused so much
concern for the Miranda Court.
The view that Miranda was intended to apply to circumstances far
more coercive than a Terry-type investigative detention is further
supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v. Murphy,8
53
a case involving a probationer's confession to committing a prior rape
and murder to his probation officer during a court-mandated
probation interview. First, the Murphy Court noted that the purpose
850. Id. at 329-30.
851. Id. at329.
852. Id. at 330.
853. 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
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of the Court's decision in Miranda was "[t] o dissipate 'the overbearing
compulsion ... caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody,"' 
8 4
an obvious reference to the Miranda Court's frequent mention of the
"incommunicado interrogation" noted in that Court's discussion of
the cases and police practices that preceded announcement of the
rule-practices and incommunicado isolation that simply do not take
place in true Tery stops. The Murphy Court further pointed out that
Miranda custody is a more narrowly-defined condition than other
forms of custody. In this regard the Court, in reference to the
appellant in Murphy, wrote:
He was, to be sure, subject to a number of restrictive condi-
tions governing various aspects of his life, and he would be
regarded as "in custody" for purposes of federal habeas cor-
pus. But custody in that context has been defined broadly
to effectuate the purposes of the writ, and custody for Mi-• -1 1855
randa purposes has been more narrowly circumscribed .
The Murphy Court referenced a handful of prior decisions in its
discussion of what constitutes Miranda custody. One of the cases
cited as helpful precedent in Murphy is Roberts v. United States,857 which
provides additional support for the view that Miranda involves a
"narrower standard"8 58 of determining custody. Specifically, the
Roberts Court noted that:
Although Miranda's requirement of specific warnings
creates a limited exception to the rule that the privilege
[against self-incrimination] must be claimed, the exception
does not apply outside the context of the inherently coercive
custodial interrogations for which it was designed. The
warnings protect persons who, exposed to such interroga-
tion without the assistance of counsel, otherwise might be
unable to make a free and informed choice to remain si-
lent.859
In other words, the Roberts Court considered Miranda to be in-
volved when the coercive nature of custodial interrogation is such and
to the degree that it affects a person's ability to make a free and
voluntary choice to remain silent. Another case cited in Murphy is
854. Id. at 430 (quoting United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187 n.5
(1977)).
855. Id. (citations omitted).
856. Id. at 430-31.
857. 445 U.S. 552 (1980).
858. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430.
859. Roberts, 445 U.S. at 560-61 (citations omitted).
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United States v. Washington, which provides some insight into the
Court's view of when Miranda warnings are required. First and
foremost, citing United States v. Beckwith, the Washington Court noted
that in that decision it had "reaffirmed the need for showing overbear-
,,861
ing compulsion as a prerequisite to a Fifth Amendment violation.
The use of the word "overbearing" is consistent with the previously-
referenced holding of Roberts that in order to create a Miranda
violation the coercion must be such that it voids the person's ability to
make a free and voluntary choice not to speak to law enforcement.
The Washington Court further noted:
Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, ad-
missions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inhe-
rently desirable. In addition to guaranteeing the right to
remain silent unless immunity is granted, the Fifth Amend-
ment proscribes only self-incrimination obtained by a "ge-
nuine compulsion of testimony." Absent some officially
coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment privilege is
not violated by even the most damning admissions.... The
Constitution does not prohibit every element which influ-
ences a criminal suspect to make incriminating admis-
861sions.
Again, the Court's reference to such terms as "genuine compul-
sion of testimony" and its reference to the fact that the Fifth Amend-
ment "does not prohibit every element which influences a criminal
suspect to make incriminating admissions" supports the view that in
order for coercive circumstances to reach the level of a Miranda
violation, they must be coercive to the degree that the detained party
loses his or her ability to make a voluntary choice not to speak. This,
in turn, means more than just a little bit of coercion. It also moves
the realm of Miranda custody away from the true Teny investigative
detention where the intent of questioning is to confirm or deny an
officer's reasonable suspicions and not necessarily to compel self-
incriminating statements that a person would not otherwise make.
And finally, the oft-cited Berkemer decision provides further sup-
port for the view that Miranda was intended to apply to only those
overbearing circumstances where a person essentially loses the ability
to resist. As noted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Acosta:
Instead of asking whether a suspect reasonably would feel
free to leave, the Berkemer Court instead said the question
860. 431 U.S. 181 (1977).
861. Id. at 190.
862. Id. at 187 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 440 (1974)).
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should be "whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of
his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be
warned of his constitutional rights."
8 63
Berkemer also noted that "[f] idelity to the doctrine announced in
Miranda requires that it be enforced ... only in those types of sit-
uations in which the concerns that powered the decision are impli-
cated. ,8 In other words, at least in the context of a Terry-like traffic
stop, Mirandawarnings are only required when the pressures exerted
impair a person's ability to freely exercise the right against self-
incrimination, and not in less coercive situations that would often
arise in Terry-type investigative detentions. And finally, Berkemer also
rejected the defendant's argument that Miranda requires warnings to
be given even in simple roadside traffic stops. In so doing the Court
significantly limited the scope of the Miranda Court's declaration that
warnings are required when "a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,"
65
noting that "we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in
the Miranda opinion emphasized by respondent."8 6 In other words, a
deprivation of liberty rising to the level of Miranda custody involves far
more than a situation in which a person simply is not free to leave
until allowed to do so by law enforcement, even when some force or
coercion is employed out of necessity.
As the facts of Miranda and the statements in the following cases
demonstrate, Miranda has some limits in its application. Certainly
Miranda warns against unreasonable and unfair interrogation
techniques that are not appropriate in our civilized society. It also
provides for the protection of warnings for those being subjected to
custodial interrogation. What it does not provide for, however, is
warnings in all situations in which there is some coercion or coercive
circumstances involved in a law enforcement encounter with a
suspected criminal. Thus the Supreme Court's Statement in Mathia-
son that:
[A] noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which
Miranda applies simply because a reviewing court concludes
that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a
863. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1149 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437 (1984)).
864. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437.
865. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
866. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437.
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"coercive environment." Any interview of one suspected of a
crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it,
simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a
law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the sus-
pect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not
required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom
they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the
station house, or because the questioned person is one
whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required
only where there has been such a restriction on a person's
freedom as to render him "in custody." It was that sort of
coercive environment to which Miranda, by its terms, was
made applicable, and to which it is limited.
This is significant in the context of a Terry stop for the reason that
in the vast majority of Terry stops, all of the evils warned about in the
Miranda opinion are simply non-existent. For example, Miranda
discusses and then bases its holding upon legitimate concerns
regarding the use of "sustained and protracted questioning incom-
municado in order to extort confessions. "868 By their very nature, the
majority of true Terry stops will not and cannot involve "sustained and
protracted questioning" because a Terry stop is not only brief, but can
only last long enough to confirm or dispel the detaining officer's
suspicions. Thus, officers simply will not have time to hide a person
away and subject the person to lengthy interrogation while maintain-
ing a true Terry detention. Additionally, true Terry encounters are
unexpected in the sense that law enforcement will not have time to
plan a method of carrying out an encounter and questioning during
that encounter that will play on a suspect's fears and take advantage of
the pre-planned "Mutt andJeff" routines that the Miranda court wrote
about. Terry stops arise when law enforcement becomes suspicious
about criminal activity and, by their nature, are carried out without
the benefit of scenario-specific planning and training, are carried out
outside of the controlled environment of the police station where law
enforcement obviously has the upper hand, and are carried out
without the opportunity to prepare a course of interrogation designed
to cause a suspect to talk and confess when he or she would not
otherwise do so. This is true particularly in those situations that
require some force or coercion because of the nature of the suspected
crime or the actions or identity or the proclivity for violence of the
867. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
868. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 446.
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suspected criminal being questioned and investigated. In short, when
making the comparison of a present case to the underlying situations
in the cases that make up the Miranda decision, as the Berkemer Court
suggests, Terry detentions-including those similar to the detentions
in Perdue, Ali, Smith, and Martinez that involve some force and
coercion-simply (and fortunately) do not measure up.
d. The Concept and Definition of "Arrest" Supports the
Argument that Miranda Warnings Have no Place in Terry
Detentions
In Beheler, the Court noted that for the purposes of determining
Miranda custody, "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a
'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest."869 Given these statements, it is clear
that in making a determination of whether or not a person is in
custody for Miranda purposes, it is appropriate for courts to look to
the definition and concept of an "arrest" to determine whether the
circumstances presented in an individual case rise to the level of
Miranda custody, much like the Supreme Court did in Summers when
it found that the detention of a homeowner during the execution of a
search warrant did not rise to the level of an arrest or Miranda
custody.s7° After such a comparison, those situations that do not rise
to the level of an arrest, then, should not and do not require Miranda
warnings.
This view is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Duna-
way v. New York. In Dunaway the Supreme Court rejected the
detention of a suspect on less than probable cause for the purpose of
conducting a custodial interrogation." More specifically, in Dunaway
the Court found a Fourth Amendment violation when officers who
did not have probable cause nevertheless took a suspect into custody
for the purposes of interrogating him about a crime that was under
investigation and did so in such a way that the suspect had no choice
but to accompany the officers to the police station and remain there
for questioning. In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court held
that Dunaway was, for all intents and purposes, under arrest, though
not formally arrested. In reaching that conclusion, the Court spent a
significant portion of the opinion addressing Terry detentions and
869. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (citations omitted).
870. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
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their relationship to and differences with arrests-a discussion that is
significant in light of the Beheler Court's holding that Miranda custody
involves a "'restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.
8 73
In terms of the spectrum of seizures, the Court noted first that
"since the intrusion involved in a 'stop and frisk' [is] so much less
severe than that involved in traditional 'arrests,' 874 the general rule
requiring probable cause is inapplicable in those Terry-type situations.
The Court reiterated this concept later in the opinion, noting that
Terry "departed from traditional Fourth Amendment analysis" in that
"it defined a special category of Fourth Amendment 'seizures' so
substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule requiring
probable cause to make Fourth Amendment 'seizures' reasonable
could be replaced by a balancing test.''s75 Finally, after referencing
Terry, Adams, Mimms, and Brignoni-Ponce, the Court noted that the
"intrusions" in those cases "fell far short of the kind of intrusion
associated with an arrest."876 Given these statements, it appears that as
long as a detention of a suspect falls within the guidelines set for
lawful and appropriate Terry detentions, the detention is considered
to be "substantially less intrusive than [an] arrest[] ,877 and therefore,
pursuant to the Beheler "'restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest!s78 test, does not amount to
Miranda custody.
Finally, in considering these issues, it is important once again to
review the basic concept of the de facto arrest, because it is at the
point that a detention becomes a de facto arrest that it leaves the
realm of a Terry stop and under Dunaway becomes more than the
investigative detention that is considered to be "substantially less
intrusive than [an] arrest[] .,879 In its most basic terms, an investiga-
tive detention remains a lawful Terry detention and does not rise to
the level of a de facto arrest so long as it falls within the following
guidelines set forth in Florida v. Royer.880
The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of
probable cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a
873. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1124 (citations omitted).
874. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209.
875. Id. at 209-10.
876. Id. at 212.
877. Id. at 210.
878. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 (citations omitted).
879. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 210.
880. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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limited intrusion on the personal security of the suspect.
The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some ex-
tent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case.
This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effec-
tuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative
methods employed should be the least intrusive means rea-
sonably available to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in
a short period of time.
Furthermore, while there is no time limit for Terry investigative
detentions, courts should "examine whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel
their suspicionsguickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant." This description of the parameters of an appropri-
ate Terry stop is helpful because it presupposes the existence of some
force or coercion, noting that if force and coercion are used they
must be used in the "least intrusive" way possible given the circums-
tances. And finally, with respect to the Royer Court's statement that
"[t] he scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with
the particular facts and circumstances of each case, '' 83 no court can
forget that in conducting Terry investigative detentions, law enforce-
ment officers are "authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably
necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status
quo during the course of [a Terry] stop,884 even when those steps
involve the use of force or coercion.
The bottom line is that a Terry detention is not an arrest. Similar-
ly, a Terry detention that does not exceed the bounds set forth in Royer
and the other aforementioned cases is not a de facto arrest. Thus, if a
Terry stop is valid in the sense that it is limited in scope, limited in
time, and questions posed are within the bounds set for Terry stops,
then according to the Supreme Court in Dunaway, it is presumably
less intrusive than an arrest, and therefore it would not rise to the
level of Miranda custody as defined in Beheler. In short, when there is
a valid Terry stop, the rebuttable presumption should be that it is not
an arrest, is not a de facto arrest, does not create a restraint on
freedom of movement to the degree associated with formal arrest,
and therefore is not Miranda custody. As such, under Beheler, no
Miranda warnings are required in those situations.
881. Id. at 500.
882. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).
883. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.
884. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985).
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e. Questioning During Custodial Interrogation Has a Different
Purpose from that Done During a Teny Detention
As originally contemplated, the questions that were permissible
in a Terry stop were different from those at issue during custodial
interrogation. Put differently, the purpose of interrogation is differ-
ent from that of Terry questioning. In interrogation, particularly as
outlined in the Miranda decision and the descriptions of the cases at
issue there, the purpose is to elicit incriminating responses from the
person being questioned. As noted in Rhode Island v. Innis, "the term
'interrogation' under Miranda refers.., to any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect., 8 5  In Terry,
however, the purpose of questioning is different. Law enforcement,
while trying to stop what they reasonably suspect might be criminal
activity, are not intentionally trying to elicit incriminating responses
from a subject whom they suspect might be involved in a crime, but
instead are attempting to "obtain information confirming or dispel-
ling the officer's suspicions" regarding possible criminal activity."
s6
The difference may be a subtle one, but it is a difference still the
same, and because there is a difference, the required Miranda
warnings should be held to apply to questions asked during custodial
interrogation but not to appropriately limited questions asked during
Terry detentions.
f The Supreme Court's Narrowing of the Definition of
"Custody" Supports the View that Miranda Has Little to No
Place in Teny Investigative Detentions
In determining which situations require Miranda warnings and
which do not, it is also important to note that the Supreme Court has
arguably narrowed the definition of custody since the original
Miranda decision. 87 This has been done by way of changing the test
for custody in such a way that the Court has more narrowly focused
the number of situations in which the definition can be applied.
Setting aside the nature of the coercive circumstances that led to the
Miranda decision, the plain language used in the opinion arguably
885. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,301 (1980).
886. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).
887. See Swift, supra note 130 at 1078-79 (addressing the ways in which the
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casts a wide net with respect to the number and types of circumstances
to which the decision applies, as it requires Miranda warnings
whenever a person has been "deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way., 88 Without looking to the types of custodial interro-
gations that led the Court to decide as it did, the Miranda Court's
statement that warnings are required in those cases where a person is
"deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" could apply
to any number of circumstances, including Teny stops. 8 9 For as the
Berkemer Court wrote, "a traffic stop significantly curtails the 'freedom
of action' of the driver.., of the detained vehicle.890 Once again, in
Berkemer the defendant was ordered out of his vehicle and asked to
take a number of field sobriety tests.89g He was certainly not free to
leave until the tests were satisfactorily completed such that the
detaining officer would have been satisfied that he was not under the
influence of alcohol. Arguably, then, he was deprived of his freedom
of action in a significant way, but the Court nevertheless held that he
was not in custody under a revised test that applied Miranda warnings
only in those situations where the detention was comparable to an
actual arrest, or as the Berkemer Court put it where the "suspect's
freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal
arrest.' 891 In a sense, then, the test has narrowed so that detentions
such as Terry stops can lawfully take place without the need for
Miranda warnings.
g. Practical Considerations
Finally, courts addressing the issue of whether Miranda warnings
are required in coercive Terry stop situations need to consider a few
practical considerations. For example, under the current view taken
by some courts, the more violent and dangerous a criminal is, the less
law enforcement will be able to do in the sense of confirming or
dispelling the reasonable suspicion that is the basis for the Terry stop.
In a situation in which a suspected criminal is violent enough and
dangerous enough to law enforcement that coercion and force in the
nature of drawn weapons and handcuffs must necessarily be used,
some courts would immediately require that Miranda warnings be
given because the detained criminal will not feel free to terminate the
888. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
889. See id.
890. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 436.
891. Id. at 423.
892. Id. at 440.
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stop and leave. This was the position taken by the Perdue court when
it held that "[p] olice officers must make a choice-if they are going to
take highly intrusive steps to protect themselves from danger, they
must similarly provide protection to their suspects by advising them of
their constitutional rights. 89 ' This position is unsatisfactory because it
provides a benefit to violent criminals that does not apply to non-
violent criminals whose Terry stops are effected with little or no
coercion. Additionally, holdings like that of the Perdue court will limit
law enforcement's ability to quickly take control of a situation and
investigate the suspected criminal activity that is the basis for the stop
because the officers will not be able to ask questions without first
stopping to provide Miranda warnings. As noted in Quarles, "[w] e
decline to place officers.., in the untenable position of having to ...
give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence
they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability to
obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting
them."894 It is likewise unsatisfactory to say that in such a situation law
enforcement can still ask the necessary questions to confirm or dispel
their reasonable suspicions and take control of the situation with the
trade-off being that the statements will just be suppressed and
unusable in the state's case-in-chief at trial. Such a position, however,
is unacceptable because, once again, a dangerous criminal ends up
benefiting from his or her violent tendencies.
One might also claim that the public safety exception can step in
to prevent suppression of any statements made. However, while it is
quite useful, the public safety exception may not always come into
play in such a situation because that exception is limited in its
applicability. A good example is the case that led to the creation of
the exception itself. As noted above, Quarles involved a suspect hiding
a gun in a supermarket where any other patron could have come
across it had law enforcement not intervened. Had the suspect in
Quarles been pulled over in a car, however, the situation would have
been different. Law enforcement would still have known him to be
dangerous based on the fact that he had allegedly raped another
person and had a firearm in his possession, but the situation and
danger to the public (though not to the officers) would be much less
poignant. Thus an officer who decided to approach the car at
gunpoint and ordered the suspect to get down on the ground would
893. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1465 (10th Cir. 1993).
894. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1984).
895. Id. at 652.
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not have been able to invoke the public safety exception, but would
still have faced a dangerous situation. To require an officer in that
situation to stop and provide the suspect with Miranda warnings prior
to inquiring about the gun and the circumstances of the stop would
seriously inhibit the officer's ability to take control of the situation
and quickly confirm or dispel the reasonable suspicions that were the
basis for the stop. Thus the suspected criminal's penchant for
violence would actually hinder law enforcement's ability to take
control of the situation and would, in the end, provide a benefit for
the suspect that a less dangerous suspect would not receive-a benefit
that cannot be removed because of the inapplicability of the public
safety exception.
Another practical concern has to do with the logic of the situa-
tion in which a person is validly detained under Terry but is also in
custody for Miranda purposes. To say that a seizure is a valid Terry
detention means that law enforcement only needs reasonable
suspicion to make the stop-no evidence rising to the level of
probable cause is required. But to say at the same time that the
situation is one of Miranda custody means, under Beheler, that the
restriction on the detainee's liberty is of a degree associated with
formal arrest.896 A formal arrest, of course, requires probable cause,
and so to hold that a person is in Miranda custody but is validly
detained under Terry is to say that even though law enforcement has
exercised enough control over the person that probable cause is
otherwise required, in the particular situation at issue reasonable
suspicion is enough to justify the detention. This problem has been
recognized by at least one legal commentator who wrote:
By allowing a Terry stop to rise to the level of Miranda custo-
dy while remaining a valid Terry stop these courts implicitly
endorse the expansion of Terry to cover custodial situations.
That endorsement allows police to take suspects into custody
without probable cause, so long as they read them their
rights. This violates the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable seizures.' 97
Obviously such a situation simply does not make much legal
sense.
In short, courts addressing these issues need to look to the prac-
tical consequences of their decisions and perhaps reconsider a ruling
that may provide an added benefit or protection to the most violent of
896. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
897. Swift, supra note 130 at 1088.
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criminals, particularly when all of the above-referenced authority
permits questioning in coercive Terry circumstances without the need
for Miranda warnings.
2. Many of the Proposed Tests for Determining Miranda Custody
Are Flawed
As noted above, there are a number of different tests and varia-
tions of tests used in courts throughout the United States to deter-
mine whether a situation rises to the level of custodial interrogation.
8 98
Many of these proposed tests are flawed in the sense that they leave no
room for questioning during Terry stops without requiring Miranda
warnings or otherwise lead to confusing and inconsistent results.
a. The "Reasonable Person Would Not Feel Free to Leave" Test
from the Supreme Court's Decision in Thompson and the Eighth
Circuit's Decision in Martinez is Not Workable
One of the most frequently cited tests is whether a reasonable
person in the suspect's position would have felt free to terminate the
interrogation and leave-a test originally set forth in the Supreme
Court's decision in Thompson and later adopted by the Eighth Circuit
in Martinez.899 This test has been referred to above as the Thompson
reasonable person test.9°° As a number of courts have noted, however,
there are some significant flaws or weaknesses with that test.
First and foremost, when a person has been detained for a tradi-
tional, non-coercive investigative detention pursuant to Terry, that
person is not free to leave until the Terry stop is completed and
therefore should reasonably feel that he or she is not free to leave."'
Therefore if it is read literally, the test set forth in Thompson at least
when applied in the Terry context, is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to terminate an interrogation and detention and leave
in a situation where that person realistically cannot leave and would
not be allowed to do so. The concerns regarding the application of
such a test in Terry investigative detentions are laid out well by the
898. See supra Part V.
899. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,112 (1995); United States v. Martinez,
462 F.3d 903, 90809 (8th Cir. 2006).
900. See supra notes 184-187 and accompanying text.
901. See, e.g., United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 949 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he
transitory nature of a Terry stop itself indicates that a suspect is not free to leave
during that brief period of detention."); People v. Martinez, 200 P.3d 1053, 1057
(Colo. 2009) ("A stop allows an officer temporarily to detain an individual for limited
investigatory purposes such that he is not free to leave.").
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Eleventh Circuit's decision in Acosta.902 It wrote:
Normally courts apply a two-part test to determine whether a
suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes: "first, what were
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and
second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable per-
son have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave." As we have already discussed, a
suspect who is detained during a Terry stop is not free to
leave from the beginning of the stop until it ends. If we ap-
plied the general Miranda custodial test literally to Terry
stops, the result would be that Miranda warnings are re-
quired before any questioning could occur during any Terry90s
stop.
A number of courts and court opinions have recognized this very
problem, including the Eighth Circuit's decision in Pelayo-Ruelas,90 4 the
Ninth Circuit's Kim dissent,
905 and others.906
In this regard, it is not much of a stretch to argue that had the
Supreme Court applied this very test in Berkemer, the result of that
decision would have been different. Once again, Berkemer involved a
DUI investigation where a person was removed from his vehicle and
asked to perform field sobriety tests.9°7 Given that situation, one
would be hard-pressed to say that a reasonable person in the detai-
nee's position would have felt free to terminate the investigation
(including terminating the field sobriety tests) and drive away. The
Supreme Court itself even recognized that "a traffic stop significantly
curtails the 'freedom of action' of the driver.., of the detained
902. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141 (11th Cir. 2004).
903. Id. at 1148 (citations omitted).
904. United States v. Peyalo-Ruelas, 345 F.3d 589, 59293 (8th Cir. 2003).
905. United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 978 (9th Cir. 2002).
906. See, e.g., State v. Marcum, 205 P.3d 969, 977-78 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
("Contrary to the trial court's ruling, the fact that numerous police vehicles
surrounded Marcum in the grocery store parking lot did not convert the investigatory
detention of Marcum into a custodial arrest. By definition, someone subject to a Terry
investigative detention is not 'free to leave.' . .. Provided the stop is justified by
reasonable suspicion and does not exceed its allowable purpose, the presence of
numerous officers does not convert it into a custodial arrest .... During such a
seizure, suspects need not 'feel that they were free to leave.' ... Marcum was not free
to leave. But that does not convert his investigatory detention into a custodial arrest
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. Rather, a 'detaining officer may ask a
moderate number of questions during a Terry stop to determine the identity of the
suspect and to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions without rendering the suspect 'in
custody' for the purposes of Miranda.' Such questioning is precisely what occurred
here.") (citations omitted).
907. SeeBerkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 423 (1984).
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vehicle "908 and that "few motorists would feel free either to disobey a
directive to pull over or to leave the scene of a traffic stop without
being told they might do so."909 Despite that fact, however, the Court
held that the defendant in Berkemer was not in custody for Miranda
purposes and that his unwarned statements were admissible against
him at trial.9t0 Thus, there is clearly some discrepancy between the
holdings and results under Berkemer and Thompson in a Terry context,
which has led some courts to reject Thompson in the sense of deter-
mining that the Thompson holding does not apply to Terry stops. For
example, as referenced above, the Sixth Circuit made a parenthetical
comment in Salvo that "the [Thompson] 'free to leave' inquiry is at
least a component of a Fifth Amendment custody determination
(presumably with the exception of a Terry stop situation).""'1
The bottom line is that a literal application of the test set forth in
Thompson, which many courts have applied in Terry situations, would
require Miranda warnings in almost all non-arrest and non-consensual
police encounters. This is because even a person stopped for a
routine speeding violation can arguably be said to feel that he or she
is not free to leave until the stopping law enforcement officer releases
the person. This very fact was referenced by the Eleventh Circuit in
Acosta, where it noted:
The guidance the Berkemer decision provides stems from
the fact that traffic stops, like Terry stops generally, are in-
deed stops. A reasonable person knows that he is not free to
drive away from a traffic stop until it is completed, just as a
reasonable person knows that he is not free to walk away
from a Terry stop until it is over. If the lack of freedom to
leave were decisive, which is to say if every phrase in the Mi-
randa opinion is to be applied literally, then all traffic stops
as well as all Terry stops generally would be subject to the
requirements of that decision. Berkemer establishes that they
are not.
912
Such a result does not make sense and, as noted above, would
involve a much wider application of Miranda that was originally
contemplated by the Court in that it would encompass detentions and
interrogations far different and far less restrictive than those at issue
in Miranda. Thus, the Sixth Circuit view that Thompson does not
908. Id. at 436.
909. Id.
910. Id. at 441-43.
911. United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1998).
912. United States v. Acosta, 363 F.3d 1141, 1149 (11th Cir. 2004).
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provide the proper framework for an inquiry involving a Terry stop913
makes some sense. This is particularly true in light of the facts of
Thompson, which involved a person who was not detained by the police
for a brief investigation of possible on-going criminal activity, but
instead involved a person who was asked to meet with detectives at a
police station, who appeared under his own power, and was repeated-
ly told that he was free to terminate questioning and leave at any
time."'
b. The Lack of Specificity in the Berkemer Test Has Led to Some
Confusion Among Lower Courts that Limits its Effectiveness as a
Possible Test for Determining Miranda Custody
Perhaps the most oft-cited authority for determining whether a
situation has developed to the point that a detainee is in Miranda
custody is Berkemer, where the Supreme Court held that "the only
relevant inquiry [in determining whether a person is in custody for
Miranda purposes] is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position
,915would have understood his situation." One of the obvious chal-
lenges with applying this standard is first determining exactly what the
Court is referring to when using the phrase "would have understood
his situation." For example, it is unclear whether the Court was
referring to a person's circumstances at the time of a detention in
general terms, or whether the person is deemed to have an under-
standing of the difference between a Terry stop and an arrest and
therefore understood the "situation" to be either an arrest or an
investigative detention. Thus, as referenced above, some courts focus
on an understanding of whether a person is under arrest, some courts
focus on an understanding of whether the situation isjust a temporary
detention, some courts focus on an understanding of whether a
person is in custody, some courts focus on an understanding of
whether a person is at the mercy of police, and other courts focus on
916an understanding of additional factors. In short, it can be unclear
what exactly the reasonable person is deemed to or should under-
stand. In a slightly different sense, the Second Circuit recognized a
problem with the Berkemer test in Cruz v. Miller when it wrote:
Berkemer emphasizes that "the only relevant inquiry [in
determining when a person is in 'custody' for purposes of
913. Salvo, 133 F.3d at 950.
914. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102-05 (1995).
915. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442.
916. See supra Part IV.
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Miranda] is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position
would have understood his situation." However, this cryptic
reference to the suspect's "situation" left it unclear whether
the Court was applying the "freedom of movement" stan-
dard from custodial interrogation cases such as Mathiason
and Beheler or the "free to leave" standard from Fourth
Amendment seizure cases such as Mendenhall and Delgado, or
whether the two formulations are not meaningfully dis-
tinct."'
Furthermore, the mere fact that there are many different versions
of the Berkemer test, as referenced above, demonstrates a lack of
specificity in the test. Given these concerns, it is apparent that the
Berkemer test, while widely-accepted and applied, needs some clarifica-
tion.
B. Recommendations: The Best Method for Determining When a Terry
Detention Becomes Miranda Custody is a Method that Recognizes that Some
Limited Use of Force or Coercion is Necessary Because of the Circumstances
of a Stop is Permissible Without Implicating Miranda
As noted above, the original Terry decision contemplated that law
enforcement would be permitted to ask some questions during all
Terry investigative detentions, including coercive Terry investigations-
a position solidified and supported by subsequent Supreme Court
918authority. Furthermore, the Miranda decision was not intended to
apply to all coercive situations-an idea supported by other cases such
as Beheler and Berkemer. Based on these concepts, it is apparent that
the best method for determining when a Terry detention becomes
Miranda custody is a method that recognizes that some limited use of
force or coercion is necessary because of the circumstances of an
investigative detention is permissible without automatically implicat-
ing Miranda.
One fact that is significant, but is not mentioned by the Artiles-
Martin court when delineating the circuit split, is that the cases that
make up the split are really of three distinct types. The first type
involves a true Terry stop in which law enforcement has reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and makes a temporary
detention pursuant to the terms and principles of Terry to confirm or
dispel the reasonable suspicions. Situations like this include Berkemer,
Trueber, Leshuk, Ali, Cruz, Smith, Perdue, Swenson, and Salvo, as well as
917. Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2001).
918. See supra Part II.A.2.
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countless other cases. The second type of situation is one in which
law enforcement does not have just reasonable suspicion to believe
that there is criminal activity, but necessarily has probable cause by
virtue of the fact that they were able to obtain a warrant for the search
of a particular premises. This type can be seen in the Supreme
Court's decision in Summers9 19 and the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Kim,920 which both involved the detention of a person during the
execution of a search warrant, which clearly presents a different
situation.92 And a third situation, addressed in such cases as Mathia-
son, Thompson, and Beheler, involves not a Terry stop but a consensual
encounter that, unlike a Teny detention or a detention during the
execution of a search warrant, can presumably be terminated at any
time.
The differences between these three situations are significant and
should be taken into account when determining whether the
presence of coercive actions necessitates the use of Miranda warnings
in each circumstance. Part of the problem that reviewing courts have
faced is trying to find a test that applies equally to Terry stops and
consensual encounters-or, put another way, trying to apply one
specific test for Miranda custody into each of the situations outlined
above. This has proven difficult at best, and consequently the better
approach is to treat each of the situations differently and not attempt
to apply the same test to each. More specifically stated, cases such as
Beheler and Mathiason involve consensual encounters and not true
Terry stops, so some consideration of that fact has to be given when
applying the principles in those cases and any test for Miranda custody
to true Teny stops. Otherwise the confusion that currently exists in
this area of the law is certain to continue.
Given these considerations, the best test for determining Miranda
custody in a true Terry situation is one that combines elements from a
number of different Supreme Court decisions and in doing so stays
true to the principles of those decisions but does so in a way that has
not yet been fully employed by any federal circuit or state court to
date. Specifically, the best approach for true Terry-type situations
involves a two-part test that combines a modified version of the
919. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 692 (1981).
920. United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973-73 (2002).
921. Id. at 971-72. At the same time, however, Kimalso potentially involves not a
detention during the execution of a search warrant in the manner addressed in
Summers, but a consensual encounter in the sense that Kim was not originally
detained by law enforcement, but voluntarily submitted herself to their presence
when she decided to enter her store during the search. See id. at 971.
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Berkemer reasonable person test with the requirement from Beheler that
custodial interrogation is a "'restraint on freedom of movement' of
the degree associated with a formal arrest."
92 2
First, any court addressing the issue should look to whether the
degree of force and coercion used in a particular case does rise to the
level such that it is "to the degree associated with formal arrest," with
due deference being given to the Berkemer Court's directive that a
comparison be made with the types of cases and interrogations that
originally led to the Court's Miranda decision. Given the general
holdings of Summers and other cases, if a particular encounter, though
coercive, (1) falls squarely within the parameters of a lawful Terry stop
in the sense that any use of force or coercion is necessary for the
protection of law enforcement and the public and is a reasonable
response to the situation, (2) any questions asked are limited to the
suspected criminal activity under investigation, and (3) the duration
of the stop is limited to what is necessary to carry out the investigation,
then this part of the test should weigh in favor of the situation being
deemed non-custodial. This view is consistent with such cases as
Berkemer and Brignoni-Ponce, and was adopted in the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Davis92 3 when it wrote: "Where an individual
has been detained... and officers' questioning stays within the
bounds of questioning permitted during a Terry stop, Miranda rights
are not required. If, however, the individual is asked questions going
'beyond a brief Terry-type inquiry,' the individual is entitled to
Miranda warnings. "924 To say that no lawful Terry stop can rise to the
level of Miranda custody would go directly against the Supreme
Court's holding in Berkemer, in which it rejected a proposed rule that a
suspect "need not be advised of his rights until he is formally placed
under arrest.''92 5 However, as the aforementioned authority demon-
strates, the application of Miranda warnings to a completely lawful
922. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (citations omitted).
923. United States v. Davis, 530 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2008).
924. Id. at 1081.
925. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441 (1984) ("Either a rule that Miranda
applies to all traffic stops or a rule that a suspect need not be advised of his ights
until he is formally placed under arrest would provide a clearer, more easily
administered line. However, each of these two alternatives has drawbacks that make it
unacceptable. The first would substantially impede the enforcement of the Nation's
traffic laws-by compelling the police either to take the time to warn all detained
motorists of their constitutional rights or to forgo use of self-incriminating statements
made by those motorists-while doing little to protect citizens' Fifth Amendment
rights. The second would enable the police to circumvent the constraints on
custodial interrogations established by Miranda.").
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Terry stop should be the exception and not the rule.
Second, in conjunction with the answer to the first question, a
court addressing a situation involving a true Terry stop should
consider how a reasonable innocent person who is "neither guilty of
criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the
,,926
seriousness of the circumstances, and who understands the
difference between Terry detentions and de facto or actual arrests,
would understand his or her situation. Specifically, courts should
consider whether the person would consider it to be an arrest or a
temporary investigative detention for the purpose of quickly confirm-
ing or dispelling suspicions of criminal activity. In addition to the
above inquiries, it is important that the Thompson reasonable person
test not be a part of the inquiry when dealing with a true Terry
detention because, as stated by a number of courts, a person simply is
not free to terminate a Terry investigation and leave because they truly
are detained. It simply does not make sense to ask whether a person
would feel as if he or she was free to terminate questioning and leave
when the person would not be able to do so. The better inquiry is to
focus on whether the reasonable person, who understands the
difference between Terry stops and custodial interrogation, de facto
arrests, and actual arrests, and the reasons for each, would understand
the situation at hand. This same approach would apply to situations
such as that in Summers where a person is detained subject to the
execution of a search warrant. 9 7 In such cases the person is not
generally free to leave, and therefore the Thompson reasonable person
test should not be a part of the inquiry.
In the context of consensual encounters, however, such as those
present in Beheler, Mathiason, and Kim to a certain degree, a different
approach is appropriate. The test for consensual encounters is
necessarily different because in a true consensual encounter the
person really is free to leave at any time-unlike the situation in Terry
and the other Terry-stop cases. In those circumstances, the test should
include the factors addressed above-namely whether the person has
been subjected to a "'restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest " 9 28 and how a reasonable person
in the suspect's position would understand the situation-though with
some modifications. Specifically, instead of employing the standard
of a reasonable person who knows the difference between Terry
926. United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
927. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 693 (1981).
928. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (citations omitted).
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detentions and de facto or actual arrest, the better inquiry is to use a
reasonable person who understands the difference between a
consensual encounter and a de facto or actual arrest. Additionally, in
such an inquiry, the Thompson reasonable person test becomes useful
in the sense that the question is whether the reasonable person who
consented to contact with law enforcement would feel free to
terminate the investigation and leave-something that a person
theoretically should be able to do in a true consensual encounter.
That inquiry is a necessary part of the larger question of how the
reasonable person understands the situation and whether that person
would believe it to still be a consensual encounter.
An application of the above test for determining custody in a true
Terry-stop situation to the facts and context of one of the cases that
held that Miranda warnings can be required during coercive Terry
stops is instructive. One of the courts to hold that Miranda warnings
are required in coercive Terry stops was the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Martinez.9'9 Martinez involved a true Teny stop that was based on
information reported following a robbery. As noted by the Eighth
Circuit, Martinez involved the investigation of a bank robbery. In
that case law enforcement stopped Martinez and told him that they
932needed to talk with him. As noted by the court, Martinez was
cooperative, but given the circumstances of the crime being investi-
gated, the officer "walked up to Martinez, took the cell phone from
his hand and laid it on the ground, grabbed his hands, and told him
that he was being detained because he matched the description of a
bank robber. 93 ' The officer, cognizant of the fact that a gun had
been used during the robber, performed a pat-down search of
Martinez to check for weapons. As one officer was performing the
pat-down search, another officer asked Martinez if he had any
935
weapons. Martinez denied having any weapons, but did indicate
that he had a large sum of money on his person.936 The initial officer
"felt what he knew to be a wad of cash in Martinez's pocket" and
thereafter placed Martinez in handcuffs and informed him that he
929. United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
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would be "further detained."9 37 Officers then asked Martinez where
he had obtained the cash. 9m He first indicated that he had just
recently been paid for some work that he had done, but later
"changed his story to say he saw a man running in the park, and that
he found the money. 939 As noted by the court, the officer "then
placed Martinez in the back of the police car, read him his Miranda
rights, and took him to the bank for a show-up identification."
940
With respect to the proposed test for true Terry stops such as that
at issue in Martinez, the first part involves determining whether the
stop fell within the parameters of a lawful and constitutionally
sustainable Terry stop. In the Martinez opinion there was no assertion
by the court that the stop was not a lawful Terry stop. 94 1 To the
contrary, the court held that "neither placing Martinez in the police
car nor transporting him to the bank converted this Terry stop into an
arrest for which probable cause was required., 942 Additionally, a
comparison of the facts of Martinez to those at issue in Miranda, as
directed by the Berkemercourt, demonstrates that the facts of Martinez
were far less coercive than the Miranda cases in the sense that, among
other things, there was no incommunicado interrogation, Martinez
was not held in isolation, and officers did not have time to implement
planned interrogation routines designed to overcome a Martinez's
possible resolve to remain silent.943
Because the facts of Martinez place it squarely within the parame-
ters of a lawful Terry stop in the sense that the use of force was
necessary for the protection of law enforcement and the public and
was a reasonable response to the situation, the questions that were
asked were limited to the suspected criminal activity under investiga-
tion, and the duration of the stop was limited to what was necessary to
carry out the investigation, and because the facts do not rise to the
level of an arrest or a restraint of the degree associated with an arrest
as set forth in Dunaway and do not compare to those underlying
Miranda, this first part of the test should weigh in favor of a finding
that the restraints used were not "to the degree associated with formal





941. See id. at 907.
942. Id at 908.
943. Id. at 906.
944. United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 720 (8th Cir. 2004).
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of the proposed test, once again, is to consider what a reasonable
person who understands the difference between Terry investigative
detentions and an arrest would understand the detention to be,
pursuant to the precedent set forth in Berkemer.
Briefly stated, based on the facts of Martinez and the officer's ac-
tions being wholly consistent with an investigative detention as
opposed to an arrest, a court addressing the issue could clearly
conclude that a reasonable person, who understood the difference
between an arrest and an investigative detention, would find the
situation at issue to be an investigative detention as opposed to an
arrest. Based on these findings, an application of the suggested test
could reach a reasonable conclusion of a non-Miranda custody
situation in Martinez.
VI. CONCLUSION
Criminal courts and appellate courts deal with issues of Miranda
and Terry stops on a daily basis, as do police officers, prosecutors, and
criminal defense attorneys. Given the fact that in today's world,
criminals appear to be more violent than in the past, and also that law
enforcement officers are at times required to use greater degrees of
force and coercion to safely effect an investigative detention, the two
cases and their holdings now occasionally conflict with one another.
Additionally, because of a lack of direct Supreme Court authority as to
how to handle these conflicts, courts in different jurisdictions have
reached different conclusions and applied different legal standards in
addressing this significant conflict, thus leading to a split in the
federal circuits over whether coercive Terry detentions constitute
Miranda custody.
In addressing these situations, courts should look to the original
Miranda and Terry decisions and subsequent Supreme Court authority
to determine how to resolve the conflicts in individual cases. When
that authority is consulted, it becomes apparent that the mere fact
that there is some coercion and force used in a particular situation
should not, and does not, automatically require Miranda warnings to
be given during the course of a Terry stop. Additionally, the very
nature of a Teny stop requires that in determining whether a person is
in Miranda custody, the fact that the person does not feel free to leave
is not and should not be dispositive of the issue. Instead courts
should look at the entire circumstances of a stop as required by the
Supreme Court and apply the test proposed in this article to make
2010] 1623
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that determination.945
Until the Court addresses the issue more directly there will likely
be continued confusion and disagreement among the federal and
state courts. However, applying the suggested test will ensure that the
original intent of the Miranda and Terry decisions are given proper
respect, the concept of arrest and custodial interrogation are not
modified or changed to the detriment of those accused of committing
criminal acts, and the rights of criminal defendants will continue to
be protected in a way that does not inappropriately restrict law
enforcement's ability to investigate crime and protect the public.
945. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994) ("[A] court must
examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.").
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